PKI use cases
Every X.509 certificate this service relies on is validated for one of these use cases. See Certificate validation for what each check means and Paranoid PKI mode for when they apply. The last column is the phase of the rollout that held that use case’s sites to the row; all six are wired.
| Use case | What it covers | Anchors it may reach | What paranoid adds | keyUsage | extendedKeyUsage | Specification exemption | Setting | Phase |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
tls-client |
A client certificate presented to the main port, a custom listener, LDAPS or the debugger listener, and everything that reads the verdict of that handshake. On SPIFFE’s gRPC sockets it holds no connection and only refuses to bind the SPIRE Server API in the clear; the channel between cells is cell-peer. |
the client-certificate truststore, this service’s own Root | The path rules on every listener, not only the main port; clientAuth and keyUsage on every leaf; revocation on every listener; a demoted connection stays demoted across TLS resumption; a failure inside the check refuses. | digitalSignature or keyAgreement | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 (if present) | none | pki.paranoidTlsClient |
1 |
tls-client-self-signed |
RFC 8705 self_signed_tls_client_auth, and a GNAP key proved by a pinned certificate. | the registered certificate itself | The validity window; keyUsage; the register’s revocation. A self-signed leaf is accepted only here at a handshake. | digitalSignature or keyAgreement | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 (if present) | path: RFC 8705 section 2.2 and RFC 9635 section 7.3.2 define the method as certificate equality | pki.paranoidTlsClientSelfSigned |
1 |
tls-server-outbound |
Every address this service dials: federation back channels, SSF and GNAP push, the XACML PEP nudge, SCIM provisioning, mail, the database, the secret store, the cloud SDKs, CRL and OCSP over https, LDAPS. | the use case’s own setting, the signer truststore | Revocation of the peer’s certificate, stapled first, before any request body is written; serverAuth; the path rules and the host check in every process; the signer truststore beside each family’s CA file. | digitalSignature or keyAgreement or keyEncipherment | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1 (if present) | revocation: RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.13: a CRL or OCSP fetch over plain http has no certificate to check; self-signed-allowed: Not a specification, rcbj’s decision: one self-signed certificate accepted by name in the signer truststore, or configured byte for byte as this dialer’s own CA, still held to its window and fields | pki.paranoidOutboundTls |
2 |
jose-signer |
The x5c behind an RFC 7523 assertion, private_key_jwt, a JAR request object, a software statement or a registered JWK. | this service’s own Root, the root registered with it, the signer truststore | An incomplete registered chain completed from the signer truststore before it is refused; keyUsage on the leaf; a self-signed x5c[0] in a JWK held to the upload door’s rule. | digitalSignature | none asked | none | pki.paranoidJoseSigner |
3 |
saml-signer |
The certificate behind an RFC 7522 assertion, a service provider’s signed request, the SOAP artifact caller and an SP metadata signature. | the root registered with it, the signer truststore, the registered certificate itself | Validity at every use; a chain to the signer truststore when the certificate is not self-signed; revocation; keyUsage; SP metadata that reaches no anchor is refused. | digitalSignature | none asked | self-signed-allowed: SAML Metadata section 2.4.1.1 lets a provider publish a self-signed certificate, when it is registered on the application | pki.paranoidSamlSigner |
3 |
federation-partner |
A partner’s SAML or WS-Federation signature, a partner JWK’s x5c and a federated logout signer. | the root registered with it, the signer truststore, the registered certificate itself | Validity at every use; revocation on logout and sign-in alike; field checks when the certificate is registered. Registering it names it, so it needs no chain. | digitalSignature | none asked | self-signed-allowed: SAML Metadata section 2.4.1.1, when it is registered on the relationship | pki.paranoidFederationPartner |
3 |
wss-x509-token |
The WS-Security X.509 Token Profile signer of a WS-Trust request. | this service’s own Root, the signer truststore | A stored outside leaf must chain to the signer truststore; the OCSP or CRL issuer comes from that path, never from the leaf’s own Authority Information Access alone. | digitalSignature | none asked | none | pki.paranoidWsSecurityToken |
3 |
jose-bare-key |
OpenID Federation entity keys, SSF transmitter keys, claims-provider keys and GNAP cert keys. | the root registered with it, the signer truststore | A JWK that carries an x5c is held to what its certificate says: validity, usage, revocation. It needs no path, as a bare JWK needs none. | digitalSignature | none asked | path: OpenID Federation 1.1 section 3: entity keys are bare JWKs by design, when no x5c is present | pki.paranoidJoseBareKey |
3 |
encryption-recipient |
The certificate a SAML assertion is encrypted to, and a JWE recipient’s x5c. | the root registered with it, the signer truststore, the registered certificate itself | Validity; keyUsage keyEncipherment or keyAgreement; revocation; nothing is ever encrypted to a certificate merely observed on a request. | keyEncipherment or keyAgreement | none asked | self-signed-allowed: SAML Metadata section 2.4.1.1, when it is registered on the application; path: RFC 7517 section 4.7 makes x5c optional, so a bare JWK has no certificate to check | pki.paranoidEncryptionRecipient |
4 |
client-attestation |
The attester’s certificate behind OAuth attestation-based client authentication. | the use case’s own setting, the signer truststore | Revocation where the chain names a list; keyUsage on the leaf. | digitalSignature | none asked | none | pki.paranoidClientAttestation |
5 |
webauthn-attestation |
A passkey’s attestation statement. | the use case’s own setting, the signer truststore | Each format’s extendedKeyUsage and keyUsage made explicit (the TPM AIK EKU required for tpm). Validity is evaluated at now, as before: an expired attestation certificate makes the statement untrusted. | digitalSignature | none asked | none | pki.paranoidWebauthnAttestation |
5 |
device-attestation |
Android key attestation, Apple App Attest and TPM attestation of a registered device. | the use case’s own setting, the signer truststore | OCSP or CRL for the Apple and TPM chains where the chain names any; the extendedKeyUsage each format asks. | digitalSignature | none asked | none | pki.paranoidDeviceAttestation |
5 |
spiffe-svid |
The X509-SVID a caller of the SPIRE Server API or the Broker API presents, and a federated SVID. | the use case’s own setting | The extendedKeyUsage X509-SVID section 4.3 recommends becomes required; a federated bundle’s authority certificate is field-checked. | digitalSignature | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 or 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1 (required) | revocation: A federated SVID: the federated authority publishes nothing this service may dial | pki.paranoidSpiffeSvid |
5 |
spiffe-attestation |
The x509pop, TPM DevID, Azure IMDS, AWS instance identity and sigstore attestors. | the use case’s own setting, the signer truststore, the registered certificate itself | Revocation where the chain names any; the keyUsage and extendedKeyUsage each attestor asks; the AWS pinned certificate’s validity; the Azure AIA intermediate must chain before it is used. | digitalSignature | none asked | validity: The Sigstore client specification evaluates a certificate at its notBefore | pki.paranoidSpiffeAttestation |
5 |
pkinit |
The client certificate in an RFC 4556 AS-REQ. | the use case’s own setting | Already full; the door makes it one call. | digitalSignature | 1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4 or 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2 (required) | none | pki.paranoidPkinit |
5 |
enrollment-credential |
The client certificate an EST request presents, and the signer of a SCEP renewal. | this service’s own Root | Already full for EST; SCEP’s self-signed PKCSReq signer gets the validity window. | digitalSignature | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 (required) | path: RFC 8894 section 2.3: the PKCSReq signer is self-signed by definition | pki.paranoidEnrollmentCredential |
5 |
vc-key-attestation |
The x5c of a wallet’s key attestation at the credential endpoint. | the use case’s own setting, the signer truststore | A real path with intermediates, not one hop; revocation where the chain names a list; keyUsage on the leaf. | digitalSignature | none asked | none | pki.paranoidVcKeyAttestation |
5 |
vc-issuer |
An mdoc’s IACA-to-DS chain, a CWT status-list signer, an OpenID4VP trusted issuer certificate and a foreign status list’s signer. | the use case’s own setting, the signer truststore, the registered certificate itself | The ISO 18013-5 document-signer EKU and profile; revocation for the status-list signer; validity and a chain for a trusted-issuer certificate that is not self-signed. | digitalSignature | none asked | self-signed-allowed: A configured trusted-issuer certificate: OpenID4VP trust is configured, not chained | pki.paranoidVcIssuer |
5 |
cell-peer |
The certificate the other cell presents on the inter-cell channel, in both directions. | this service’s own Root | Revocation from the register; clientAuth and serverAuth; the path rules. | digitalSignature or keyAgreement or keyEncipherment | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 or 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1 (required) | none | pki.paranoidCellPeer |
1 |
ca-import |
The import of an operator’s Root or Issuing CA at /admin/pki, and a pinned key pair. | this service’s own Root | An imported Issuing CA must chain to the service Root; cA, keyCertSign, validity and pathLen; a pinned leaf is field-checked. | keyCertSign | none asked | path: An imported Root is its own anchor | pki.paranoidCaImport |
1 |
anchor-admission |
What /admin/tls/trust, the signer truststore, tls.trustAnchorsFile and pki.signerTrustAnchorsFile accept. | the use case’s own setting | An anchor is a self-signed CA within validity whose self-signature verifies; an intermediate is a CA that chains to an anchor held; a leaf is refused from both. The signer truststore holds to this whatever the row says: it has no earlier behaviour to restore. | keyCertSign | none asked | revocation: An anchor is what revocation answers are believed on, so no authority above it could revoke it | pki.paranoidAnchorAdmission |
0 |
revocation-signer |
The delegated OCSP responder certificate and the CRL signer revocation answers are believed on. | the use case’s own setting | Already full; the door is asked so the checks are the same code. | digitalSignature | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9 (required) | revocation: RFC 6960 section 4.2.2.2.1: id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck | pki.paranoidRevocationSigner |
5 |
fido-mds |
The signer of an imported FIDO MDS3 BLOB. | the use case’s own setting, the signer truststore | Already full; the door is asked so the checks are the same code. The administrator’s audited overrideSignature is unchanged. | digitalSignature | none asked | none | pki.paranoidFidoMds |
5 |
policy-signer |
The certificate a policy export from Directory → Policies is signed with, and the chain in its x5c, when it is inspected or imported. | the use case’s own setting, the signer truststore | While this row is on the full checks apply in every mode, the master included: validity, keyUsage, the path, revocation of every link. Off, the master decides as for any other row. | digitalSignature | none asked | none | pki.paranoidPolicySigner |
5 |