Directory models
These are the directory models, in reading form. Each heading is one TypeSpec model. Abstract data model is the picture. LDAP schema explains the names. The directory still enforces nothing.
A value is one, several, or not stated when the model does not say. A name’s origin is RFC, other standard, this service, derived, or not stated. Secret marks a value the model withholds.
This page is rewritten whenever that TypeSpec model is written. Do not edit it by hand.
Models
| Model | TypeSpec | Container | Attributes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Application | Application |
ou=applications | 360 |
| Attribute source | AttributeSource |
ou=attributesources | 4 |
| Claims provider | ClaimProvider |
ou=claimproviders | 2 |
| Device | Device |
ou=devices | 24 |
| Federation relationship | FederationRelationship |
ou=federations | 92 |
| Group | Group |
ou=groups | 15 |
| Kerberos trust | KerberosTrust |
ou=kerberosTrusts | 8 |
| OpenID Federation entry | Oidfed |
ou=oidfed | 5 |
| Operational attributes | Operational |
6 | |
| Person | Person |
ou=users | 124 |
| Attribute policy | PolicyAttributes |
ou=attributePolicies | 8 |
| Attribute policy on a person | PolicyAttributesOnPerson |
on the person | 1 |
| Authentication policy | PolicyAuthn |
ou=authnPolicies | 27 |
| Authentication policy on a person | PolicyAuthnOnPerson |
on the person | 2 |
| Locale policy | PolicyLocale |
ou=localePolicies | 4 |
| Locale policy on a person | PolicyLocaleOnPerson |
on the person | 1 |
| Passkey policy | PolicyPasskey |
ou=passkeyPolicies | 28 |
| Passkey policy on a person | PolicyPasskeyOnPerson |
on the person | 2 |
| Password policy | PolicyPassword |
ou=passwordPolicies | 16 |
| Password policy on a person | PolicyPasswordOnPerson |
on the person | 2 |
| Post-login policy | PolicyPostLogin |
ou=postLoginPolicies | 11 |
| Service-account policy | PolicyServiceAccount |
ou=serviceAccountPolicies | 17 |
| Role | Role |
ou=roles | 12 |
| Secrets destination | SecretsDestination |
ou=applications | 11 |
| Service account | ServiceAccount |
ou=users | 0 |
| Service account on a person | ServiceAccountOnPerson |
on the person | 12 |
| Signer trust anchor | SignerTrustAnchor |
ou=signerTrustAnchors | 5 |
| SPIFFE | Spiffe |
ou=spiffe | 30 |
| Trust anchor | TrustAnchor |
ou=trustAnchors | 3 |
| XACML policy enforcement point | XacmlPep |
ou=peps | 26 |
| XACML policy enforcement point cluster | XacmlPepCluster |
ou=pepClusters | 5 |
| XACML policy | XacmlPolicy |
ou=policies | 11 |
Application
TypeSpec model Application.
Container ou=applications.
Recorded in ./applications.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
applicationProcess |
RFC | 2.5.6.11 |
structural | top | The one REGISTERED object class that fits an application. It brings cn, description, seeAlso, ou and l — so the NAME of an application here is a standard attribute even though nothing else about it can be. |
stsApplication |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.3 |
auxiliary | top | INVENTED, because no registered LDAP schema has a client_id, a set of redirect URIs, an entityID or a service principal name. Every product that stores OAuth clients keeps them in its own database rather than in a directory, so there was nothing to borrow. These are this service’s own names in the way x509subject and didSubject already are. |
top |
RFC | 2.5.6.0 |
abstract | The abstract class every entry carries. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
acmeAllowedProfiles |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.1 |
THE ACME PROFILES THIS APPLICATION MAY BE ISSUED. Where it lists something it OVERRIDES acme.allowedProfiles for this application, wider or narrower; empty leaves the realm’s list. The five CA, OCSP and KDC profiles are never issued. From the console, or by hand. |
acmeCertificateLifetimeDays |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.2 |
How long a certificate this application is issued over ACME is valid, in days, overriding acme.certificateLifetimeDays (longer or shorter). No certificate outlives its Issuing CA. From by hand. |
acmeDefaultProfile |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.3 |
THE PROFILE THIS APPLICATION IS ISSUED OVER ACME WHEN A REQUEST NAMES NONE, overriding acme.defaultProfile. Used only while the list in force for it allows it. From the console, or by hand. |
appAcmeEabKey |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.5 |
Secret. ACME External Account Binding keys issued for this application, one JSON record each: the key id, the sealed HMAC key, its expiry and the account it bound. A working credential, WITHHELD from every page and /admin-api reply. From /admin/acme. |
appAllowedProtocol |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.6 |
THE PROTOCOL FAMILIES THIS APPLICATION IS DECLARED FOR, one value per family, from the closed table PROTOCOLS publishes. It is the DECLARED twin of appProtocol above and the two must not be read as one thing: that attribute is what has happened and cannot be edited, this one is what somebody said the application is for and is ticked on /admin/applications/new before it has ever connected. It grants nothing. In PRODUCT mode the issuance policy refuses an issuance through a family it does not name — an application declared for SAML 2.0 alone is refused an access token (STS-XACML-0084); in development it refuses nothing. Declared for nothing, nothing is refused in either mode. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
appAllowedToActOnBehalfOf |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.7 |
THE INTERMEDIARIES THIS APPLICATION ACCEPTS as acting for somebody else when it is the TARGET of a delegation — the resource-based analogue of Kerberos’s msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, set on the back end. One intermediary application identifier per value. From by hand. |
appAllowedToDelegateTo |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.8 |
THE TARGETS THIS APPLICATION MAY OBTAIN A TOKEN FOR ON SOMEBODY ELSE’S BEHALF, when it is the INTERMEDIARY of a WS-Trust OnBehalfOf / ActAs request or an RFC 8693 token exchange — the analogue of Kerberos’s msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, on the front end. One application identifier (or the literal audience / AppliesTo) per value. Enforced in product mode; development records what would have been refused on /admin/delegation. appAllowedToActOnBehalfOf on the TARGET is the other way to allow the same pair. From by hand. |
appAuthentications |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.9 |
How many credentials this service has accepted FOR this application. ASSIGNED on every change — a counter that accumulated values would be nonsense — and it is a live number in a directory entry, which is unusual enough to say out loud: a real directory would not hold one. From this registry. |
appAuthnPolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.10 |
THE AUTHENTICATION POLICY THIS APPLICATION’S PEOPLE SIGN IN UNDER: default (or empty), or the name of a named authentication policy of this realm (Directory > Policies). A named policy holds the first-factor mechanisms allowed (password, password-mfa, webauthn, spnego, wallet, federation; none allows every one) and the second factors allowed (password, securityKey, totp, recoveryCode, emailCode, emailLink, wallet; none leaves the realm’s as it is). default allows every mechanism the realm’s authentication policy allows. ENFORCED at every browser sign-in to the application, in both modes: a person whose session stands on a mechanism the policy does not allow is sent to sign in again with one it does. One first-factor mechanism listed is also where the sign-in goes (spnego to /authn/spnego, wallet to /authn/wallet, federation to appFederationRelationship). The second factors only NARROW the realm’s policy: one it has switched off stays off here. A name no policy of this realm holds — written past the console — allows NO mechanism until the policy exists (STS-AUTHN-0536). It is WRITTEN BY NOBODY: no protocol presents it, so it is editable and starts empty. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
appAuthorizationServer |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.11 |
WHICH AUTHORIZATION SERVERS this client has used, by the name in their paths — one value per server it has been seen at. This process publishes several, each with its own capabilities and its own endpoints under /{id}/oauth2/…, and EVERY CLIENT MAY USE EVERY ONE of them: nothing here restricts a client to a server, so this records where it HAS been rather than where it may go. Accumulated, because a client that talks to two of them is one client with two values and not two clients. From OAuth 2.0 / OIDC. |
appAuthzenApplication |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.12 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. AUTHZEN APPLICATION SCOPE (#563): the applications this client, calling /access/v1 with its own client_credentials token, may name in context.application — one identifier per value. The client’s own identifier is always in scope. Set by an administrator, never by the caller. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
appAuthzenCallbackUri |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.13 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. AUTHZEN ACCESS REQUEST CALLBACK (#1180): an https URL this client, as an AuthZEN PEP, may name as an access request’s callback.endpoint — one per value, matched exactly. A request naming any other is refused; this service never dials a callback URL taken from a request alone. Set by an administrator, never by the caller. From the console (the AuthZEN tab), the management API, or by hand. |
appCertificateHostName |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.14 |
A DNS name or IP address this application may be issued a certificate for over ACME, EST or SCEP. Registering one is the whole proof of control: this service never dials a name to validate it. Set by an administrator; read by common/cert_enrollment.ts. From /admin/acme, /admin/est, /admin/scep. |
appCorsOrigin |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.15 |
THE ORIGINS A BROWSER PAGE MAY CALL THIS SERVICE FROM FOR THIS APPLICATION — https://app.example.com, one exact origin per value, with no path and no wildcard. A request that names this application as its client (a client_id, a Basic credential, a client assertion, or an access token issued to it) is answered with Access-Control-Allow-Origin only when its Origin is listed here; a request that names no client at all — discovery, a JWKS, a DID document, a CORS preflight — is answered for an origin listed on ANY application in the realm. EMPTY ALLOWS NO THIRD-PARTY ORIGIN, in both modes. This service’s own origins (its listeners, global.publicBaseUrl, the embedded debugger, and global.corsOrigins) never need listing. Normalised when written: scheme and host lower-cased, a default port dropped. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
appDefaultDelegationSemantics |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.16 |
delegation or impersonation: what an act this application is part of is when the request does not say — the actor’s default first, then the subject’s, then delegation.defaultSemantics. From by hand. |
appDelegationSemantics |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.17 |
THE SEMANTICS this application allows: delegation, impersonation, or both. As the ACTOR — the client of a token exchange, the requester of a WS-Trust OnBehalfOf / ActAs, the service of a Kerberos S4U request — it says what this application may DO; empty is delegation only, so impersonating somebody needs impersonation here (Kerberos’s TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION). As the SUBJECT it says what may be done AS it; empty is both. The issuance policy decides; this is one of its facts. From by hand. |
appDelegationSubjectGroup |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.18 |
THE PEOPLE THIS INTERMEDIARY MAY ACT FOR, as group DNs: a subject must be a member of one of them. EMPTY MEANS ANYBODY who is not protected — a person carrying stsNotDelegated, or a member of the console’s Admin Read or Admin Write roster, is never delegated whatever this says. From by hand. |
appEnrolledCertificate |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.19 |
One JSON record per certificate issued to this application over an enrollment protocol: serial, protocol, profile, subject, names, validity, who asked, whether the key was generated here, the certificate and its issuing chain, and a revocation mark. Public material. Written by common/cert_enrollment.ts only. From /enroll/acme, /.well-known/est, /enroll/scep. |
appEnrolledPrivateKey |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.20 |
Secret. A private key THIS SERVICE generated for one of the certificates above (EST server-side key generation, or the console’s server-generated key pair), as <serial>:<PEM>, sealed wherever the key-encryption key outlives the process. WITHHELD from every page and /admin-api reply; it is handed over once, at issuance. From /.well-known/est/serverkeygen. |
appFederationAutoRedirect |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.21 |
TRUE if a person signing in to this application should be sent STRAIGHT to the partner named above, without the sign-in screen in between. This is home realm discovery done by configuration instead of by asking, which is what a deployment with one federated identity provider actually does. It is TRUE BY DEFAULT once a relationship is named, because naming one and then having to click a button is the state nobody wants; set it FALSE to keep the screen, where the partners are then the only buttons offered. An absent value therefore means “yes” here and not “unknown”, which is the opposite of what RFC 7591 section 2 makes an omitted boolean mean — said out loud because the two rules meet on one entry. WITH SEVERAL RELATIONSHIPS NAMED IT MEANS EXACTLY WHAT IT ALWAYS MEANT — “without the sign-in screen” — and what changes is what that leaves. With one it is a redirect straight to the partner. With several it is the chooser at /authn/select-idp: one button per partner and no password field, which is the sign-in screen’s job done without the sign-in screen. What it never means is “pick one for them”; there is no value of a boolean that can say which identity provider somebody’s employer is. FALSE with several named is therefore the SCREEN, with one button per partner under the password box — the same thing FALSE has always done, with the partners plural. With no relationship named it does nothing at all, rather than being an error: the two are edited separately and a value left behind by a relationship that was cleared should not refuse the next write. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
appFederationExpiresAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.22 |
When the registration ends, in SECONDS since the epoch: the Trust Chain’s own expiry, or oidfed.registrationLifetimeS if that comes first. From OpenID Federation (#134). |
appFederationRegistration |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.23 |
“automatic” (its first signed authentication request) or “explicit” (its Entity Configuration POSTed to /oidfed/register). From OpenID Federation (#134). |
appFederationRelationship |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.24 |
THE FEDERATION RELATIONSHIPS THIS APPLICATION’S USERS ARE AUTHENTICATED THROUGH — each value the fedId of an entry under ou=federations, in THIS trust realm, whose fedRole is service-provider. Both halves of that are checked when it is read rather than when it is written: an identity-provider-side relationship goes the other way (this service asserts to that partner, so there is nothing to sign in to), and the register is per realm, so an id that names a relationship in another realm names nothing here. IT HOLDS A LIST, and that is what makes an application able to offer more than one identity provider. ONE usable value with the auto-redirect on is the case this attribute was added for and it is unchanged: the browser goes straight to that partner. SEVERAL usable values draw /authn/select-idp, where the person chooses which one — home realm discovery narrowed to this application’s partners rather than performed against every relationship this service has. They need not share a protocol: a SAML 2.0 partner and an OpenID Connect one are two values here and two buttons there, because what the list names is where a person can be authenticated and not how. A value that names a relationship this service cannot use is REPORTED on the screen rather than dropped, one line per value: a list of three whose middle entry is disabled must not look like a list of two. It is WRITTEN BY NOBODY. No protocol presents it and no sighting derives it — an application’s home identity provider is an arrangement somebody made, not something this service can observe — so it is editable and it starts empty. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
appFederationTrustAnchor |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.25 |
The Trust Anchor its chain ended at. From OpenID Federation (#134). |
appFgaEnforced |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.26 |
TRUE when this application’s fine-grained policy is enforced. Absent or FALSE means it is not, which is the default. From this registry, when fine-grained authorization is switched. |
appFgaPolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.27 |
The entry name in ou=policies of the fine-grained authorization policy this application owns, which decides each authorization detail of the types it declares once appFgaEnforced is TRUE. From this registry, when the application is created. |
appFirstSeen |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.28 |
GeneralizedTime, when this identifier was first presented. From this registry. |
appGroupsClaim |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.29 |
TRUE or FALSE: does anything issued to this application carry a groups claim at all, overriding groups.claim. FALSE on one application is how a client that breaks on an unexpected claim is exercised without taking the claim away from everything else. From by hand. |
appGroupsClaimFromMemberOf |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.30 |
Where the groups are read from for this application, overriding groups.claimFromMemberOf — the person’s memberOf attribute, or a search of the groups container. The two agree in this directory; they are worth telling apart because a real directory’s memberOf can lag. From by hand. |
appGroupsClaimName |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.31 |
What the groups claim is CALLED for this application, overriding groups.claimName. This is the attribute that earns the group its place here: groups, roles, memberOf and a URI-shaped claim name are all ordinary, they differ per relying party in every real deployment, and a single service-wide name meant only one of them could be tested at a time. From by hand. |
appGroupsClaimValue |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.32 |
Whether the claim carries each group’s name or its whole DN, overriding groups.claimValue. Relying parties genuinely differ: one matches on cn and the next was written against an LDAP DN. From by hand. |
appHomePageUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.33 |
THE APPLICATION’S OWN HOME PAGE: where a person goes to reach it, and therefore where a sign-in to it starts. It is what /portal/applications links each row to, and an entry without one is drawn there with no link rather than with a guessed address. DECLARED and never derived — the redirect URIs beside it are callbacks and not front doors, so nothing computes this from them. http or https only, because it becomes an href. From RFC 7591 client_uri, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
appIdentifier |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.34 |
THE KEY: the identifier exactly as the protocol presented it. The entry’s own cn may be a digest of it where it is too long to be a readable RDN, so this is the attribute to search on — the same arrangement didSubject has on a DID-named person. From every protocol. |
appKind |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.35 |
What this application IS, one value per role it has been seen in. Several is the ordinary case and is the point: an OAuth client that asks for the openid scope is also a relying party. From every protocol. |
appLastSeen |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.36 |
GeneralizedTime, the most recent time. From this registry. |
appLastSession |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.37 |
The most recent sign-on session id. It is what appSessions is counted against — a different one increments the count — and it is on the entry rather than in memory because the entry is the store: without it a restart of nothing at all would recount the session already counted. From this registry. |
appLastUser |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.38 |
The most recent identity, for the same reason and with the same limitation: it counts a CHANGE of user rather than a distinct set, which is right for the ordinary case and undercounts somebody alternating between two applications. Stated in seen() where the trade is made. From this registry. |
appLaunchProtocol |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.39 |
WHICH PROTOCOL /launch/{app} uses for this application when the link names none and identity-provider-initiated sign-in is on for more than one: saml2, saml11, wsfed or oidc. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
appLocalePolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.40 |
THE LOCALE POLICY A PAGE OR A MAIL FOR THIS APPLICATION FALLS BACK TO: default (or empty), or the name of a named locale policy of this realm (Directory > Policies). It decides the language a page is drawn in when the request, the person and the browser name none a catalog answers, and the preferredLanguage a person this application causes to be created is given. Where the person is known it competes on precedence with the locale policy each of the person’s groups names (stsLocalePolicy): the lowest precedence applies, ties by name, and default where nothing names one. A name no policy of this realm holds — written past the console — names nothing and is logged (STS-I18N-0013): default applies, as a language is all it decides. A named locale policy this attribute names cannot be deleted (STS-I18N-0014). It is WRITTEN BY NOBODY: no protocol presents it, so it is editable and starts empty. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
appMayAct |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.41 |
The DN of ONE party — a person or another application — this application names as its delegate: a token about it carries RFC 8693 section 4.4’s may_act naming that party, as the issuance policy assigns it, and an exchange of that token by anybody else is refused. A person’s counterpart is stsMayAct. From by hand. |
appName |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.42 |
What to call it on a page. A registration supplies one; otherwise the identifier is the name, because inventing a friendly name for an opaque id would be inventing a fact. From RFC 7591 client_name, or the identifier. |
appNotDelegated |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.43 |
TRUE or FALSE, default FALSE: nobody may act for this application, in any protocol — NOT_DELEGATED, the application’s counterpart of a person’s stsNotDelegated. From by hand. |
appOwner |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.44 |
A person or a group of this realm who answers for the application (#604), by DN, as a group’s and a role’s owners are. Multi-valued, at most 25. Since #607 an owner may ADMINISTER the application through /admin-api with owner:read and owner:write, within what the access-control policy’s owner rule allows. The user portal lists what a person owns. From the application page’s Owners tab. |
appPasskeyPolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.45 |
THE PASSKEY POLICY A SIGN-IN TO THIS APPLICATION IS HELD TO: default (or empty), or the name of a named passkey policy of this realm (Directory > Policies). It competes on precedence with the passkey policy each of the person’s groups names (stsPasskeyPolicy): the lowest precedence applies, ties by name, and default where nothing names one. A name no policy of this realm holds — written past the console — names nothing and is logged (STS-AUTHN-0537). A named passkey policy this attribute names cannot be deleted (STS-AUTHN-0538). It is WRITTEN BY NOBODY: no protocol presents it, so it is editable and starts empty. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
appPasswordPolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.46 |
THE PASSWORD POLICY A PASSWORD SET WHILE SIGNING IN TO THIS APPLICATION IS HELD TO: default (or empty), or the name of a named password policy of this realm (Directory > Policies). It competes on precedence with the password policy each of the person’s groups names (stsPasswordPolicy): the lowest precedence applies, ties by name, and default where nothing names one. A door with no application in hand (the portal, the console, LDAP) ranks the groups’ alone. A name no policy of this realm holds — written past the console — names nothing, the group references still rank, and it is logged (STS-AUTHN-0539). A named password policy this attribute names cannot be deleted (STS-AUTHN-0540). It is WRITTEN BY NOBODY: no protocol presents it, so it is editable and starts empty. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
appPostLoginPolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.47 |
THE POST-LOGIN ACTIVITY POLICY A SIGN-IN TO THIS APPLICATION FOLLOWS: default (or empty), or the name of a named post-login policy of this realm (Directory > Policies). It competes on precedence with the post-login policy each of the person’s groups names (stsPostLoginPolicy): the lowest precedence applies, ties by name, and default where nothing names one. A named policy with its activity off EXCLUDES a sign-in to this application where it wins. It is read at the sign-in only: a started activity’s reminder mail and the progress report know no application, and select by the person’s groups alone. A name no policy of this realm holds — written past the console — names nothing and is logged (STS-AUTHN-0542). A named post-login policy this attribute names cannot be deleted (STS-AUTHN-0543). It is WRITTEN BY NOBODY: no protocol presents it, so it is editable and starts empty. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
appProtocol |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.48 |
The protocol families it has appeared in, accumulated. From every protocol. |
appRedirectUriObserved |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.49 |
A redirect_uri seen on an authorization request that this service answered. Kept apart from oauthRedirectUri because “registered” and “used” are different facts, and RFC 9700 section 2.1 is entirely about not confusing them: an exact-match check reads the registered list, and this one is evidence of what a client actually does. From OAuth 2.0 / OIDC. |
appRegistered |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.50 |
TRUE when this application went through dynamic client registration here, FALSE when it is simply a client_id that turned up. It records HOW the application got here and not what counts: RFC 9700 mode judges a client against its own oauthRedirectUri whenever the entry holds one, however it got there, and against the oauth2.redirectUris setting only when it holds none — which OAuth 2.1 mode refuses instead. An omitted token_endpoint_auth_method means client_secret_basic for a registered client and nothing for one made by hand. From POST /oauth2/register. |
appRegisteredBy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.51 |
How this application was registered, when it was: “administrator” (created on /admin/applications/new or through the management API), “rfc7591” (POST /oauth2/register), “ldap: |
appRegistrationAccessToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.52 |
Secret. The RFC 7592 registration access token, which is what guards the read, update and delete operations on this client. Sealed like oauthClientSecret wherever the process holds a durable key-encryption key (since 2026-10-01), and never written to the audit log. From POST /oauth2/register. |
appRegistrationJson |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.53 |
THE RFC 7591 REGISTRATION VERBATIM, as JSON on one attribute. It is here because RFC 7591 lets a client register arbitrary metadata and RFC 7592’s read has to hand back what was registered — which no fixed set of LDAP attributes can represent. It is the STARTING POINT when the record is reconstructed and not the last word: every member that also has an attribute above is then overwritten FROM that attribute, so an ldapmodify of oauthRedirectUri is what RFC 9700 mode enforces. Edit this only to change a member that has no attribute of its own. From POST /oauth2/register. |
appRequiredRole |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.54 |
A role somebody must hold before this application is issued anything — a token, an assertion, a WS-Federation response, a session. Multi-valued and ANY of them is enough. ABSENT MEANS EVERYBODY, the built-in role everybody holds, which is why an unconfigured application refuses nobody. The decision is made by the XACML PDP against the policy named by xacml.issuancePolicy, not by an if in an issuance site, so the reason for a refusal is a policy somebody can read. From by hand. |
appReturnAddressObserved |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.55 |
WHICH RETURN ADDRESSES ON THIS ENTRY WERE NEVER REGISTERED BY ANYBODY. Each value is <attribute> <address> — for example samlAssertionConsumerService https://sp.example.com/acs — and marks an address a DEVELOPMENT-mode request named, which development writes onto the entry because it believes every address. PRODUCT mode treats a marked address as NOT registered and refuses it exactly as it refuses one that is not on the entry at all, so a realm switched from development to product does not quietly trust what development learnt. An operator CONFIRMS one (the mark goes, the address stays), DISCARDS one (both go), or writes the address explicitly, which confirms it. Addresses recorded BEFORE this attribute existed carry no mark and cannot be told apart from registered ones — review those by hand. From a development-mode sighting. |
appScepChallenge |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.56 |
Secret. SCEP challenge passwords issued for this application, one JSON record each: the id, a SHA-256 digest of the secret, the profile, the expiry and when it was redeemed. WITHHELD from every page and /admin-api reply. From /admin/scep. |
appSessions |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.57 |
How many DISTINCT browser sign-on sessions have involved it. Counted from the session id that rides on the authentication funnel, so a direct grant with no browser session behind it adds nothing. From this registry. |
appSoftwareStatementIssuer |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.58 |
The iss of the software statement this client REGISTERED with, or absent when it presented none. Cleared by an RFC 7592 update that carries none, and by the registration being deleted. From POST /oauth2/register. |
appSoftwareStatementPublisher |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.59 |
The application the trust came through: the one declaring the issuer, or — for a statement this realm issued — the application it was issued for. From POST /oauth2/register. |
appSoftwareStatementTrusted |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.60 |
TRUE when that statement was verified against an issuer this realm trusts, FALSE when it was accepted unverified because oauth2.softwareStatementRequireTrustedIssuer was off. A client registered on a TRUE statement at an endpoint otherwise closed must present a trusted statement from the same issuer with every update. From POST /oauth2/register. |
appUsers |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.61 |
How many distinct identities have authenticated for it. The identities themselves are NOT listed here: an application used by two thousand people would otherwise put two thousand values on one entry. From this registry. |
authzenAttribute |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.63 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. ONE ROW OF THE AUTHZEN ATTRIBUTE CATALOGUE (#563), on the sts-authzen-api resource object: a JSON object {“object”, “property”, “attributeId”, “category”, “dataType”, “multiplicity”, “description”}. object is subject, resource, action or context; property the member’s name, or a dotted path into a nested object; attributeId the XACML attribute it is sent as; category (default the object’s own), dataType (default string) and multiplicity (single or bag). A property no row names is refused in every mode, and a row may not name this service’s own urn:sts:xacml: identifiers, subject-id, resource-id or action-id, nor a bare directory attribute name in a subject category. From the console (the AuthZEN page), the management API, or by hand. |
cn |
one | RFC | 2.5.4.3 |
The RDN value: the identifier itself, or app-<12 hex> where that would be longer than 64 characters. From this registry. |
description |
one | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
What this application is, in a sentence. One value: until somebody writes one, it says how the application first got here. From this registry. |
didAlsoKnownAs |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.67 |
ANOTHER IDENTIFIER FOR THE SAME APPLICATION, published as the DID document’s alsoKnownAs: an absolute URI such as the application’s web origin or its client_id URL. DID Core makes it a claim, not a proof; a relying party checks it. From the console, or by hand. |
didPrivateKeys |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.69 |
Secret. THE PRIVATE HALVES OF THE DID KEYS THIS SERVICE GENERATED, as a JSON array of private JWKs, SEALED at rest under the key-encryption key like an application’s RFC 7523 key pair. Kept so this service can sign the application’s Domain Linkage Credentials (the DIF Well-Known DID Configuration) on request; a key pasted into didPublicKeyJwk by hand has no private half here and cannot sign one. Written by Generate a key pair only. From the console’s Generate a key pair. |
didPublicKeyJwk |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.70 |
A PUBLIC KEY THE APPLICATION’S DID DOCUMENT PUBLISHES, one JWK per value, each a JsonWebKey2020 verification method named by its kid (its RFC 7638 thumbprint where it carries none) and listed under authentication and assertionMethod. Public members only: a value carrying d, p, q, dp, dq, qi, oth, k or priv is refused. Generate a key pair on the application’s page and the private half is handed out once and not kept here. From the console’s Generate a key pair, or by hand. |
didService |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.71 |
A SERVICE THE DID DOCUMENT NAMES, as |
enrollMaxCertificates |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.73 |
How many unexpired enrolled certificates (ACME, EST and SCEP together) this application may hold, overriding pki.enrollmentMaxCertificatesPerEntry (higher or lower). From by hand. |
estAllowedProfiles |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.74 |
THE EST PROFILES THIS APPLICATION MAY BE ISSUED. Where it lists something it OVERRIDES est.allowedProfiles for this application, wider or narrower; empty leaves the realm’s list. The five CA, OCSP and KDC profiles are never issued. From the console, or by hand. |
estBasicAuthentication |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.75 |
Whether EST accepts this application’s client id and secret (HTTP Basic, RFC 7030 section 3.2.3), overriding est.basicAuthentication: TRUE accepts it and FALSE refuses it whatever the realm says; unset leaves the realm to decide. From by hand. |
estCertificateAuthentication |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.76 |
Whether EST accepts a certificate this realm issued this application (TLS client authentication, RFC 7030 section 3.3.2), overriding est.certificateAuthentication: TRUE accepts it and FALSE refuses it; unset leaves the realm to decide. From by hand. |
estCertificateLifetimeDays |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.77 |
How long a certificate this application is issued over EST is valid, in days, overriding est.certificateLifetimeDays (longer or shorter). No certificate outlives its Issuing CA. From by hand. |
estDefaultProfile |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.78 |
THE PROFILE THIS APPLICATION IS ISSUED OVER EST WHEN A REQUEST NAMES NONE, overriding est.defaultProfile. Used only while the list in force for it allows it. From the console, or by hand. |
estServerKeyGeneration |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.79 |
Whether EST /serverkeygen (RFC 7030 section 4.4) may generate this application’s key, overriding est.serverKeyGeneration: TRUE allows it and FALSE refuses it; unset leaves the realm to decide. From by hand. |
federationPartnerId |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.171 |
WHAT A FEDERATION PARTNER CALLS ITSELF — a foreign identity provider’s entityID, or its issuer identifier where the relationship speaks OpenID Connect. THE RELATIONSHIP IS NOT HERE: the endpoints, the certificate and the attribute mapping live under ou=federations and are what /federation/acs/{id} actually verifies against (see federation/CLAUDE.md). This entry is the partner as a PARTY, and this attribute is the name it goes by — so a value here federates with nobody, which is the one place in this service where that sentence has teeth. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapAccessTokenFormat |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.173 |
The RFC 9767 token format for tokens issued to this client, or for this resource server: jwt-signed, jwt-encrypted, macaroon, biscuit or zcap. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapAccessTokenLifetimeS |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.174 |
The lifetime in seconds of access tokens issued to this client. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapAllowedAccess |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.175 |
The access types and reference strings this client may request, or this resource server may register. Empty means any. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapBearerTokens |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.176 |
FALSE refuses the bearer flag for this client with invalid_flag. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapClaimsAccessToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.177 |
THIS CLIENT’S OWN GNAP ACCESS-TOKEN JWT CLAIMS, as a JSON array of rows like the other custom-claim sets. Added to a jwt-signed token and to the JWT inside a jwt-encrypted token issued to this client, an application row replacing the realm row of the same name. The token’s own claims (access, flags, label, grant_id and the JWT names) cannot be overridden. Macaroon, biscuit and zcap tokens do not carry these rows. From the console’s Custom claims section. |
gnapClassId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.178 |
The client software’s class_id (section 2.3). A registered value takes precedence over the one a request carries. From GNAP, the console, or by hand. |
gnapDisplayUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.179 |
The client’s display.uri, shown on the approval page (section 2.3.2). From GNAP, the console, or by hand. |
gnapFinishUri |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.180 |
An INTERACTION FINISH URI (section 2.5.2) this client may be sent back to or pushed to. A return address: in product mode a finish URI not listed here is refused. From GNAP (observed, development), the console, or by hand. |
gnapInstanceId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.181 |
A STATIC instance identifier (RFC 9635 section 2.3.1): the string a client sends as client in place of its key. The key it must then prove is gnapKey or gnapKeyReference on this entry. Dynamic identifiers the authorization server hands out (section 3.5) are not written here. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapInteractionStartModes |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.182 |
The interaction start modes this client may use (redirect, app, user_code, user_code_uri). Empty means every mode the authorization server offers. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapJweKey |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.183 |
This resource server’s PUBLIC encryption key (a JWK) for jwt-encrypted tokens, so only this resource server can read them. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapKey |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.184 |
The client instance’s or resource server’s PUBLIC key, as the JSON key object of RFC 9635 section 7.1: a proof method and exactly one of jwk, cert or cert#S256. It is how a request by value is matched to this entry, by the key’s thumbprint. From GNAP (on first sight, development), the console, or by hand. |
gnapKeyIdentity |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.185 |
The thumbprint identity of gnapKey (jkt:… for a JWK, x5t:… for a certificate), written when GNAP creates the entry so the key can be found without re-reading it. From GNAP. |
gnapKeyProof |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.186 |
The proofing method a key reference is bound to (section 7.1.1: “MUST be bound to a single proofing mechanism”): httpsig, jwsd or jws. Default httpsig. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapKeyReference |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.187 |
A KEY REFERENCE (RFC 9635 section 7.1.1): the opaque string a client sends as key. It resolves to gnapSymmetricKey when that is set, and to gnapKey otherwise. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapLogoUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.188 |
The client’s display.logo_uri. Only a data: image is drawn; any other URI is shown as a link (section 11.16). From GNAP, the console, or by hand. |
gnapMacaroonKey |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.189 |
Secret. The macaroon ROOT KEY this resource server verifies its macaroon tokens with, base64url. Written by the authorization server when the resource server first registers a resource set; sealed with the key-encryption key when keys persist. From GNAP. |
gnapMtlsTrust |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.190 |
How a key this client proves by mutual TLS is trusted, for this client alone (#107): pki or pinned, as the realm’s gnap.mtlsTrust. It can only make the realm STRICTER — pki where the realm is pinned — and pinned is refused where the realm is pki (STS-REG-0196) and ignored if the realm is made pki afterwards. Empty follows the realm. Under pki the certificate must chain to the client truststore and be issued to this entry by this realm, or carry the one RFC 8705 subject parameter it registers (oauthTlsClientAuthSubjectDn or an oauthTlsClientAuthSan* attribute). From the console, or by hand. |
gnapOwnerLookupUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.191 |
Where this resource server answers who owns a resource (#432 phase 5): an https URL template holding {identifier} once, in its path, e.g. https://rs.example.com/owners/{identifier}. The authorization server fetches it with the identifier percent-encoded into that segment and reads {“owner”: “ |
gnapResourceServerUri |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.192 |
The locations this resource server answers for. An access right whose locations start with one of these is audienced to this entry, and a token for it is minted with this resource server’s format, JWE key and macaroon key. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapScopedSignals |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.193 |
FALSE opts this web application out of Shared Signals scoping: a stream it owns then carries events about everybody, like any other receiver’s. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapSkipInteraction |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.194 |
TRUE makes this a TRUSTED client instance (section 2.3.3): a grant that asks for no subject information is approved with no resource owner and no interaction, and one carrying a verified user assertion is approved for that person. Honoured only for a registered entry, never one GNAP created on sight. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapSymmetricAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.195 |
The algorithm a shared secret signs with: HS256 (default), HS384 or HS512 for jwsd and jws; hmac-sha256 for httpsig. From the console, or by hand. |
gnapSymmetricKey |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.196 |
Secret. A SHARED SECRET for a key reference, base64url, at least 32 bytes — the one case GNAP allows a symmetric key, because it never crosses the wire (section 7.1.2). Sealed with the key-encryption key when keys persist, withheld from LDAP readers in product mode. From the console, or by hand. |
krb5ClaimsPac |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.198 |
THIS SERVICE’S OWN PAC CLAIMS, as a JSON array of rows like the realm’s Kerberos PAC claims page. Added to the claims a service ticket for one of this application’s SPNs carries (those of the TGT it was issued from), an application row replacing the claim of the same name. Only while krb5.pacClaims is on. From the console’s Kerberos PAC claims section. |
krb5ForeignTgtDelegation |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.199 |
Families: krb5. inherit (the default) or deny: what this service says of a TGT delegated to it ACROSS A TRUST — ok-as-delegate on its tickets for a user of another realm. inherit follows the trust’s attributes ([MS-KILE] 3.3.5.7.5); deny refuses it whatever they say. It only narrows: nothing here enables what the trust does not. From by hand. |
krb5S4uSelfRealm |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.200 |
Families: krb5. THE KERBEROS REALMS WHOSE USERS THIS SERVICE MAY OBTAIN S4U2SELF TICKETS FOR, beside its own. EMPTY MEANS ITS OWN REALM ONLY. A value must be a realm this realm’s trusts accept tickets from — a trust holding an incoming key, or a realm a transitive one routes — and is checked at the write. From by hand. |
krb5ServiceKeyInfo |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.201 |
What krb5ServiceKeys holds, without the keys: the kvno, the enctypes, when the keys were made and whether they are sealed. Written in the same act as the keys, so the two cannot describe different generations. From /admin/kerberos/principals. |
krb5ServiceKeys |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.202 |
Secret. A SERVICE PRINCIPAL’S RANDOM LONG-TERM KEYS, one per enctype, in ONE value: a JSON document naming the SPN, the realm and the kvno beside the keys, SEALED under the key-encryption key wherever that key outlives the process. One value rather than one per enctype so that a key cannot be moved onto another entry or another kvno without the seal failing. Password-equivalent: it is WITHHELD from every page and every /admin-api reply, and the one time it leaves this service is as the keytab a create or a rotate hands over. From /admin/kerberos/principals. |
krb5ServicePrincipalName |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.203 |
THE SPN, e.g. HTTP/sts@EXAMPLE.COM — Kerberos v5’s identifier attribute. A Kerberos service is an application like the others here, and it is the one whose identifier this service may have created on demand (KRB5_SERVICE_DOMAINS). It accumulates, and here that is the ordinary case rather than the unusual one: one service commonly answers to several SPNs — HTTP/host and HTTP/host.example.com — and a real KDC holds them all against one account. From Kerberos v5. |
krb5TrustedForDelegation |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.204 |
TRUE or FALSE, default FALSE: this Kerberos service is TRUSTED FOR DELEGATION — unconstrained (Active Directory’s TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION). Its service tickets carry ok-as-delegate, which tells a client it may forward its TGT here; whoever holds a forwarded TGT can act as that person anywhere. A protected person’s TGT is never forwardable, so it is never forwarded however this is set. Constrained delegation (appAllowedToDelegateTo, appAllowedToActOnBehalfOf) is the safer alternative. From by hand. |
ldapBindDn |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.205 |
THE DN A DIRECTORY CLIENT BINDS AS on 389 or LDAPS 636. Nothing will ever write this and nothing will ever read it: in development mode EVERY BIND SUCCEEDS — any DN, any password, anonymous — and in product mode only a person binds, so an application reads the directory through SCIM instead. It is where an operator records which credential an application is expected to use, beside the rest of what that application is. From the console, or by hand. |
oauthAccessTokenClaim |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.209 |
THE IDENTITY CLAIMS THIS RESOURCE SERVER WANTS on the access tokens addressed to it (one of its oauthAudience values, or its client_id named as a scope), from OpenID Connect Core section 5.4’s profile, email, address and phone claims. Each is released only when the scope that covers it was GRANTED, and on a token for several resource servers only a claim every one of them declared goes in. Absent, the token carries none of these claims from this layer — preferred_username included. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthAccessTokenClaimsCombine |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.210 |
HOW THE CLIENT’S ACCESS-TOKEN CLAIMS AND THIS RESOURCE SERVER’S DECLARED CLAIMS (oauthAccessTokenClaim) ARE COMBINED on a token addressed to it: ‘union’ (the default), ‘intersection’ (only claims both carry), ‘client’ (only the client’s) or ‘resource’ (only the declared ones). Several resource servers that disagree are combined by intersection. Nothing a grant did not cover is released, whichever is chosen. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthAccessTokenTtlS |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.211 |
HOW LONG AN ACCESS TOKEN ISSUED TO THIS CLIENT LIVES, in seconds, overriding oauth2.accessTokenTtlS for it alone. It becomes the token’s exp, so it is stamped in at signing time and nothing here can shorten a token already issued. Set it to 30 on one client to watch that client refresh while every other client carries on. From by hand. |
oauthAllowedScope |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.212 |
THE SCOPES THIS CLIENT MAY BE ISSUED — RFC 7591 section 2’s scope, “the list that the client can use when requesting access tokens”. One scope token per value. Three kinds of scope read it differently. This service’s own protected scopes — admin:read and admin:write (/admin-api), report:use and report:admin (/report-api), the SCIM scopes (scim.scopeRead, scim.scopeWrite), the Shared Signals scopes (ssf.authScopeRead, ssf.authScopeWrite, and always ssf.read and ssf.manage) and the debugger permission — are issued ONLY to a client that lists them, IN BOTH MODES. For Shared Signals, write includes read: listing a write scope authorizes the read scope too, and listing only a read scope does not authorize a write scope. The resource server behind each asks again on every call, so removing a value here cuts off tokens already issued. An RFC 7591 registration may not declare them; an administrator does, here. Every other scope, in product mode, is issued only when listed here — or, when nothing is listed, when it is in the default set: openid, profile, email, address, phone, offline_access and this realm’s OpenID4VCI credential scopes. In development any scope is issued. A scope naming an application or a delegated permission keeps its own rules (the audience, and oauthDelegatedPermission) and need not be listed. A scope outside the list is refused invalid_scope at the authorization and token endpoints (RFC 6749 section 3.3), and taken off a refresh or a token exchange. Distinct from oauthScope, which is only what the client has asked for. From POST /oauth2/register (its scope), the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthAllowedTokenResponseTypes |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.213 |
The response types that issue an access token from the authorization endpoint — token, code token, id_token token, code id_token token — this client may use where RFC 9700 mode is in force (product mode always is). Honoured only while the realm waives RFC 9700 section 2.1.2 (oauth2.allowImplicitTokenResponses, never under OAuth 2.1 or FAPI); then a type not listed here is refused (unauthorized_client). EMPTY BY DEFAULT, and empty means none. Written by an administrator or the application’s owner while the realm allows these types, or by a dynamic registration within oauth2.dynamicRegistrationTokenResponseTypes. RFC 9700 section 2.1.2 says clients SHOULD NOT use them. From OAuth 2.0 / OIDC. |
oauthAssertionCertificate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.214 |
The leaf certificate, PEM, whose subject is this application and whose issuer is the realm’s Issuing CA. The same bytes as the first x5c member above, in the form a person can paste into openssl x509 -text. From /admin/pki. |
oauthAssertionCertificateChain |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.215 |
The Issuing CA and the Intermediate CA, PEM, in that order — what a leaf travels with. The ROOT is deliberately not in it: a root is a trust anchor, and a relying party that accepted one because it arrived in the chain would be accepting a certificate that vouched for itself. From /admin/pki. |
oauthAssertionExpiresAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.216 |
When the issued certificate expires, as a GeneralizedTime. It is a fact about the CERTIFICATE and not a policy: nothing here refuses an assertion because this date has passed — what refuses one is the certificate failing to build a path, which is checked where the chain is checked. Drawn on /admin/pki so that an operator can see what is about to stop working. From /admin/pki. |
oauthAssertionIssuer |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.217 |
THE iss VALUES THIS APPLICATION MAY PRESENT IN AN RFC 7523 SECTION 2.1 AUTHORIZATION GRANT, and it is one of the few DECLARED attributes here that is READ. A JWT bearer assertion IS the whole authorization — there is no browser, no password and no consent step in that grant — so accepting one from anybody would mean anybody who can reach this port getting an access token as anybody. This is therefore the second feature in this service with no permissive answer available, beside federation, and oauth2.jwtBearerRequireRegisteredIssuer is on by default. An assertion a client issues ABOUT ITSELF names its own client_id as iss and needs no value here: that lookup already succeeds through oauthClientId, and asking an operator to write the client_id down twice would be a configuration step with no decision in it. It accumulates, because one application legitimately asserts under a per-environment issuer name. From by hand. |
oauthAssertionJwks |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.218 |
THE PUBLIC KEYS THIS SERVICE ISSUED THIS APPLICATION, as a JWKS document, each key carrying x5c (its certificate chain) and x5t#S256. Written by the Issue control on /admin/pki and by POST /admin-api/pki/issue. It is a SECOND attribute beside oauthJwks and never overwrites it. A client that registered its own keys and was later issued a pair by an operator has two ways to sign, both of which somebody deliberately arranged — and writing over the first would silently end it the moment somebody pressed a button about the second. Both are read, ORed, by client_auth.js and by assertion_grant.js. Public key material, so like oauthJwks it is worth nothing to whoever reads this directory. From /admin/pki. |
oauthAssertionKeySource |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.219 |
WHERE THE RFC 7523 KEY PAIR ABOVE CAME FROM, and therefore who holds its private half. issued — generated here and signed by this realm’s Issuing CA, the private key on oauthAssertionPrivateKey. uploaded-realm-ca — a certificate this realm’s own certificate authority issued, uploaded in place of a generated pair. uploaded-external-ca — a certificate from another authority, uploaded with its whole chain up to a self-signed root, every link verified. For both uploaded values the APPLICATION holds the private key and this service never has. A fact about what was done and not a policy: no verifier reads it, and an entry written before it existed carries none — the console reads a sealed private key as issued there, which is the only thing that could have put one on the entry. From /admin/pki, or the application’s own page. |
oauthAssertionKid |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.220 |
The kid of the issued key, derived from the key material as every kid in this service is (RFC 7638). An assertion naming it in its JWS header narrows the verification to that key; one naming nothing is tried against every key registered for this application, which is correct rather than lax. From /admin/pki. |
oauthAssertionPrivateKey |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.221 |
Secret. THE PRIVATE KEY, PEM. SEALED AT REST WHEREVER THE KEY-ENCRYPTION KEY OUTLIVES THE PROCESS — AES-256-GCM through common/keystore.js, the same mechanism and the same key that seal this service’s own signing keys, common/pki.js’s three CA key pairs and an authenticator’s shared secret. So an ldapsearch on TCP 389 where every bind succeeds, an ldif file, a database row and a backup of either hold $aesgcm$… and not a usable key. The surfaces that come through this module — /admin/applications and GET /admin-api/applications, both behind a credential — are handed the PEM, because the seal protects the STORE rather than the console an operator collects an issued credential from; SEALED_FIELDS argues the split. In DEVELOPMENT mode it is written in the clear, which is the rule the authenticator secret beside it follows and for its reason: the key-encryption key there is ephemeral, so sealing an entry that survives a restart under a key that does not would make the private half permanent garbage while the certificate came back. It is never written to the audit log, and this service keeps NO SECOND COPY of it — common/pki.js hands it over once, at issuance, and forgets it. From /admin/pki. |
oauthAudience |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.222 |
THE AUDIENCE THIS APPLICATION ANSWERS TO — the aud an access token addressed to it carries, and what a client puts in RFC 8693 section 2.1’s audience (or resource) when it exchanges a token to reach this application. It is the OAuth spelling of a fact three other families here already record under their own names: wstrustAppliesTo is the same thing in a RequestSecurityToken and samlEntityId is the same thing in an assertion’s AudienceRestriction, and one attribute holding all three would be one string that has to mean whichever protocol asked last. It is DECLARED — nobody presents an audience as their own name, so nothing here writes it and it cannot be derived — and it is a URI rather than a client_id because that is what an audience is: the resource, not the client that calls it. Several values is the ordinary case (a per-environment hostname), which is why it accumulates. IT IS READ, WHICH MAKES IT THE EXCEPTION among the declaration attributes beside it. The token exchange looks an audience UP here — forAudience() — so that a delegation recorded for https://esb1.example.com names the application esb1 on /admin/delegation and in its picture, instead of drawing a box for a URL that nothing else in the register mentions. It is a LOOKUP and not a permission: an audience nobody registered is exchanged for exactly as before and recorded verbatim, because a service that refused would remove a test case rather than add one. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthAuthorizationDetailsType |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.223 |
Families: oauth2, oidc, gnap. An ACCESS TYPE this application, as a resource server, owns — one per value, read by RFC 9396 authorization_details and by GNAP access rights alike. A bare type name, or a JSON object {“type”, “description”, “locations”, “schema”, “actions”, “datatypes”, “privileges”, “required”, “interaction”, “consentActions”, “bearer”, “maxLifetimeS”, “acr”, “derivableFrom”, “introspectionClaims”, “limits”}: locations are the addresses a right of this type may name (the permission base URI and oauthAudience always count), schema a JSON Schema every right of it must satisfy, actions, datatypes and privileges the values it may name, required the members it must carry, bearer: false that a token carrying it is sender-constrained, maxLifetimeS the longest such a token lives, derivableFrom the types it may be derived from (RFC 9767 section 4), introspectionClaims what this resource server is told about the person at introspection, and limits the JSON Schema (a subset) a right’s limits must meet. interaction (always, default, never), consentActions and acr decide, for GNAP, whether the resource owner is asked and how strongly signed in (#432 phase 6). An undeclared type is refused invalid_authorization_details by RFC 9396 in every mode, and by GNAP in product mode. From the console (the Access types tab), the management API, the RFC 9728 import, or by hand. |
oauthAuthorizationDetailsTypes |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.224 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. RFC 9396 section 10 authorization_details_types: the ONLY authorization_details types this client may use, one per value. EMPTY MEANS any type this authorization server supports. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthAuthorizationEncryptedResponseAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.225 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. JARM section 3 authorization_encrypted_response_alg: the JWE key management algorithm a JWT-secured authorization response is encrypted to this client with. EMPTY MEANS NOT ENCRYPTED. An asymmetric algorithm, to oauthJwks or oauthJwksUri. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthAuthorizationEncryptedResponseEnc |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.226 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. JARM section 3 authorization_encrypted_response_enc: the JWE content encryption. EMPTY MEANS A128CBC-HS256 once oauthAuthorizationEncryptedResponseAlg is set; it may not be set without that attribute. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthAuthorizationSignedResponseAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.227 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. JARM section 3 authorization_signed_response_alg: the JWS algorithm of this client’s JWT-secured authorization responses (response_mode jwt, query.jwt and the rest). EMPTY MEANS RS256 (PS256 under FAPI 1.0 Advanced). none is refused (JARM section 3). From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthBackchannelAuthenticationRequestSigningAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.228 |
Families: oidc. CIBA backchannel_authentication_request_signing_alg: when set, every authentication request from this client must be a signed request object with this algorithm (section 7.1.1). From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API. |
oauthBackchannelClientNotificationEndpoint |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.229 |
Families: oidc. CIBA backchannel_client_notification_endpoint: the https URL a ping or a push is POSTed to, under the outbound policy. Required for ping and push. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API. |
oauthBackchannelLogoutSessionRequired |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.230 |
TRUE if this client requires sid in the Logout Token — Back-Channel Logout 1.0 section 2.2’s backchannel_logout_session_required. This service puts sid AND sub in every Logout Token it sends, so the flag is always honoured; it is recorded because “false” and “not stated” are different facts about a client, as for the front-channel flag. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, or by hand. |
oauthBackchannelLogoutUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.231 |
WHERE THIS SERVICE POSTS A LOGOUT TOKEN WHEN THE USER SIGNS OUT — OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0 section 2.2’s backchannel_logout_uri. Every sign-out of a session this client was issued an authorization response on sends one, server-to-server, after the sign-out has answered, through the outbound policy (https with the certificate verified; no internal address in product mode). SINGLE-valued, like the front-channel URI: the specification defines one per client. https with no fragment; http only for a confidential client and only where the outbound policy sends over http (federation.outboundAllowHttp, development mode; section 2.2, #123). From POST /oauth2/register, the console, or by hand. |
oauthBackchannelTokenDeliveryMode |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.232 |
Families: oidc. CIBA backchannel_token_delivery_mode: poll, ping or push. A client with none may not use the Backchannel Authentication Endpoint at all. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API. |
oauthBackchannelUserCodeParameter |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.233 |
Families: oidc. TRUE: every authentication request from this client carries the person’s user_code (CIBA section 7.1), a secret the person set on /portal/ciba, which stops a client that knows only a name from sending them requests. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API. |
oauthClaimAttributesAccessToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.234 |
THIS APPLICATION’S OWN SELECTION of directory attributes for its access tokens, as a JSON array of attribute names from the realm’s Custom claims catalogue. When present it REPLACES the realm’s selection for tokens issued to this client; absent, the realm’s is used. From the console’s Custom claims section. |
oauthClaimAttributesIdToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.235 |
THIS APPLICATION’S OWN SELECTION of directory attributes for its ID Tokens, a JSON array of catalogue attribute names, replacing the realm’s selection when present. From the console’s Custom claims section. |
oauthClaimAttributesUserinfo |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.236 |
THIS APPLICATION’S OWN SELECTION of directory attributes for the UserInfo response answered to it, a JSON array of catalogue attribute names, replacing the realm’s selection when present. From the console’s UserInfo claims section. |
oauthClaimsAccessToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.237 |
THIS APPLICATION’S OWN ACCESS TOKEN CLAIMS, as a JSON array of rows like the realm’s Custom claims page. Added to the realm’s access token claims for tokens issued to this client, and an application row replaces the realm row of the same name. From the console’s Custom claims section. |
oauthClaimsCombineAccessToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.238 |
HOW THE REALM’S ACCESS-TOKEN CLAIMS AND THIS APPLICATION’S OWN ARE COMBINED (#395), the typed rows and the ticked directory attributes alike: application (only this application’s own), union (the realm’s and its own), intersection (only what both hold) or realm (only the realm’s). Unset, its rows are added to the realm’s and win by name, and its selection replaces the realm’s. An application holding nothing of its own gets the realm’s whatever this says. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthClaimsCombineIdToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.239 |
HOW THE REALM’S ID TOKEN CLAIMS AND THIS APPLICATION’S OWN ARE COMBINED (#395), the typed rows and the ticked directory attributes alike: application (only this application’s own), union (the realm’s and its own), intersection (only what both hold) or realm (only the realm’s). Unset, its rows are added to the realm’s and win by name, and its selection replaces the realm’s. An application holding nothing of its own gets the realm’s whatever this says. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthClaimsCombineUserinfo |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.240 |
HOW THE REALM’S USERINFO CLAIMS AND THIS APPLICATION’S OWN ARE COMBINED (#395), the typed rows and the ticked directory attributes alike: application (only this application’s own), union (the realm’s and its own), intersection (only what both hold) or realm (only the realm’s). Unset, its rows are added to the realm’s and win by name, and its selection replaces the realm’s. An application holding nothing of its own gets the realm’s whatever this says. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthClaimsIdToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.241 |
THIS APPLICATION’S OWN ID TOKEN CLAIMS, as a JSON array of rows like the realm’s Custom claims page. Added to the realm’s ID Token claims for this client, winning by name. From the console’s Custom claims section. |
oauthClaimsRedirectUri |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.242 |
Where /uma/claims may send the requesting party back to this client after gathering claims (UMA 2.0 Grant section 3.3.2, claims_redirect_uri). Matched exactly; a claims_redirect_uri not listed here is told to the person and never redirected to. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthClaimsUserinfo |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.243 |
THIS APPLICATION’S OWN USERINFO CLAIMS, as a JSON array of rows like the realm’s UserInfo claims page. Added to the realm’s UserInfo claims answered to this client, winning by name. From the console’s Custom claims section. |
oauthClientId |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.244 |
THE CLIENT_ID, and the identifier attribute of three families: an OpenID Connect relying party IS an OAuth client, and a wallet collecting a credential at the OpenID4VCI issuer authenticates as one, so all three declare their name here rather than in three attributes that would be three spellings of one fact. Usually equal to appIdentifier, which is what a protocol sighting writes and what a create writes when this is left empty (#393); a SECOND value is a client_id this application also answers to — a per-environment id — and is why this accumulates rather than being assigned. A list typed on the create is the whole list. Absent on an entry no OAuth family has been declared for. From OAuth 2.0 / OIDC / OpenID4VCI. |
oauthClientSecret |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.245 |
Secret. THE SECRETS THIS SERVICE MINTED OR WAS GIVEN. Each value is SEALED under the key-encryption key wherever the process holds a durable one (since 2026-10-01), so a directory read, a database row and a backup hold ciphertext; without one (development) it is in the clear. The console and /admin-api, behind a credential, show it opened. Never written to the audit log. SEVERAL SINCE 2026-10-01, EACH A RECORD: {“id”,”secret”,”created”,”expires”,”description”}, the two times in seconds since the epoch and expires 0 for never. Every unexpired secret authenticates; the NEWEST unexpired one is the one this service signs and encrypts with and the client_secret RFC 7591 and 7592 return. A bare value (an ldapmodify, a set) is a secret with no expiry; a set REPLACES every secret, and the Credentials section adds, removes and rotates them one at a time, at most oauth2.clientSecretsMax. From POST /oauth2/register. |
oauthCommandEndpoint |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.246 |
Families: oidc. OpenID Provider Commands command_endpoint (#151): the https URL a Command Token is POSTed to, under the outbound policy. A client with none is sent no command. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API. |
oauthConfidential |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.247 |
TRUE or FALSE, the determination the token endpoint authentication method makes, written by this registry so the answer can be read. none, or no method on an application created by hand, is FALSE; any other method is TRUE. RFC 9700 reads oauthTokenEndpointAuthMethod (isConfidential() in oauth2_bcp.js), so this attribute is not edited. A create may state it only when the value agrees, and a disagreement is refused (STS-REG-0363). An OAuth or OpenID Connect application created with no method and no credential is still recorded as none. From this registry. |
oauthDefaultAcrValues |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.251 |
Families: oidc. OpenID Connect Registration default_acr_values: the acr values requested for this client when a request names neither acr_values nor an essential acr claim — space-separated, most preferred first. EMPTY requests nothing. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthDefaultMaxAge |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.252 |
Families: oidc. OpenID Connect Registration default_max_age: the oldest sign-in, in whole seconds, this client accepts when a request names no max_age — an older one signs the person in again. 0 means a sign-in this second. EMPTY requires nothing. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthDelegatedPermission |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.253 |
A PERMISSION THIS APPLICATION HAS BEEN GRANTED ON ANOTHER ONE — the whole permission identifier, base URI and name together: https://example.com/write. It is the DELEGATION RELATIONSHIP, and it is held on the CLIENT rather than on the resource for Entra’s reason and one more: the client is the party that will name it in a scope, so the entry that answers “may this request be honoured” is the entry the request identifies. IT IS READ, and it is read in the one place that decides what a token says. A scope value matching a defined permission becomes the access token’s aud (the base URI) and its scope (the name) — see oauth2.js’s audienceScopes(). In PRODUCT MODE an ungranted permission is refused invalid_scope at the authorization and token endpoints, always. In development it is reported and REFUSES nothing unless oauth2.delegatedPermissionsEnforced is on, which is off by default: a client under test is exercised by both answers. A VALUE THAT RESOLVES TO NO DEFINED PERMISSION IS NOT AN ERROR AND IS NOT HIDDEN. The resource’s entry may have been deleted, or the permission removed from under it; /admin/delegation shows such a grant as DANGLING, which is the same three-state honesty the rest of this console applies to a name it cannot resolve. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthDidClaimWithPairwise |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.254 |
Families: oidc. TRUE: this client may be told the person’s preferred DID (the did claim, oauth2.didClaim) although it uses pairwise or ephemeral subject identifiers. Anything else, and for a public-subject client it does not matter: never. A pairwise or ephemeral sub exists so that this client cannot correlate the person with other clients, and a DID is the same value at every client that is told it, which defeats that — set it only where this client is meant to know the person by their DID anyway. Not settable by a registration. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthFrontchannelLogoutSessionRequired |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.255 |
TRUE if this client requires iss and sid on the notification above — Front-Channel Logout 1.0 section 2’s frontchannel_logout_session_required. It matters because an RP with several sessions in one browser cannot tell which one ended without the sid, and RFC 7591 section 2 makes an omitted boolean FALSE rather than unknown — so an absent value here means the client did not ask, which is a different fact from the client not having registered. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, or by hand. |
oauthFrontchannelLogoutUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.256 |
WHERE THIS CLIENT IS TOLD THAT THE USER SIGNED OUT — OpenID Connect Front-Channel Logout 1.0 section 2’s frontchannel_logout_uri. The sign-out page loads it in a hidden iframe, with iss and sid on the query string when the client asked for them. It is SINGLE-valued because the specification defines one URI per client, unlike the redirect URIs beside it; a client with none registered is not notified at all and is listed on /logout as such rather than silently skipped. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, or by hand. |
oauthGlobalConsent |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.257 |
A SCOPE NOBODY IS ASKED ABOUT WHEN THEY SIGN IN TO THIS APPLICATION. One value per scope, written exactly as a client puts it in a scope parameter — openid, profile, or a whole delegated permission identifier such as https://example.com/write. It is an OVERRIDE and not a record. With oauth2.consentRequired on (which is the default), the authorization endpoint draws /oauth2/consent for any scope this person has not agreed to for this application; a scope named here is skipped for EVERYBODY, and nothing is written to anybody’s entry. So removing a value asks everybody again — including the people who would have said yes — where removing a person’s own oauthConsent asks only them. It is keyed on the pair and not on the scope alone. Consenting read here consents it for THIS application; an application registered five minutes later that spells the same word is still asked. A value that names no permission any application defines is not an error and is not hidden — most scopes are not permissions. It must be a legal RFC 6749 section 3.3 scope token, because a value with a space in it could never match one scope; an ldapmodify reaches this attribute like every other and is not checked, and /admin/consent shows what it put there. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthGlobalConsentWithdrawn |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.258 |
WHEN A GLOBAL CONSENT WAS WITHDRAWN, as <when> <scope> with the instant to the millisecond. The refresh grant refuses a refresh token granted before it that stood on that override, even after the override is added back — a withdrawn grant is not revived by the next one. One value per scope; a later withdrawal replaces the earlier. Written by the consent register and never by a form. From the consent register, when a global consent is withdrawn. |
oauthGrantType |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.259 |
The grant types this client may use — RFC 7591 section 2’s grant_types, from a registration or written by an administrator. The token endpoint refuses any other grant (unauthorized_client), in every mode; an empty list restricts nothing. What the client has actually used is oauthGrantTypeObserved. From OAuth 2.0 / OIDC. |
oauthGrantTypeObserved |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.260 |
A grant type this client was seen using at the token endpoint. A record, not a permission: oauthGrantType is what it may use. From OAuth 2.0 / OIDC. |
oauthHttpSignedRequests |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.261 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. FAPI 2.0 HTTP Signatures, for this client alone: TRUE refuses, with 401, a request to a resource server with this client’s access token that does not carry a valid “fapi-2-request” signature (RFC 9421) by a key in its jwks or jwks_uri. FALSE or empty defers to oauth2.httpSignatures. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthIdTokenEncryptedResponseAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.262 |
Families: oidc. OpenID Connect Registration id_token_encrypted_response_alg: the JWE key management algorithm its ID Tokens (and Logout Tokens) are encrypted to it with, after signing. EMPTY MEANS NOT ENCRYPTED. An asymmetric algorithm, and the key is taken from oauthJwks or oauthJwksUri. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthIdTokenEncryptedResponseEnc |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.263 |
Families: oidc. OpenID Connect Registration id_token_encrypted_response_enc: the JWE content encryption. EMPTY MEANS A128CBC-HS256 once oauthIdTokenEncryptedResponseAlg is set; it may not be set without that attribute. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthIdTokenSignedResponseAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.264 |
Families: oidc. OpenID Connect Registration id_token_signed_response_alg: the JWS algorithm this client’s ID Tokens are signed with — and its back-channel Logout Tokens and Command Tokens. EMPTY MEANS RS256 (PS256 under FAPI 1.0 Advanced). Any algorithm in id_token_signing_alg_values_supported; an HMAC one is keyed with the client secret. none is refused. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthIdTokenTtlS |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.265 |
The same for the OIDC ID Token, overriding oauth2.idTokenTtlS. Separate from the access token’s because the two go to different readers: an ID Token is consumed once at sign-in and an access token is presented for as long as it lasts. From by hand. |
oauthInitiateLoginUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.266 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. WHERE A SIGN-IN TO THIS CLIENT IS STARTED BY A THIRD PARTY: OpenID Connect Core section 4’s initiate_login_uri, which /launch/{app} and the user portal send a person to with iss, login_hint and target_link_uri. https only, with no fragment. From RFC 7591 initiate_login_uri, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthIntrospectionEncryptedResponseAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.267 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. RFC 9701 section 6 introspection_encrypted_response_alg: the JWE key management algorithm the signed introspection response is ENCRYPTED to this application with, making it a Nested JWT. EMPTY MEANS NOT ENCRYPTED. One of the asymmetric algorithms (RSA-OAEP, RSA-OAEP-256, ECDH-ES and its key-wrap variants), and the key is taken from this entry’s oauthJwks, or the set its oauthJwksUri answers (#120). The symmetric families are refused: they are for a document encrypted TO this service. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthIntrospectionEncryptedResponseEnc |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.268 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. RFC 9701 section 6 introspection_encrypted_response_enc: the JWE content encryption algorithm. EMPTY MEANS A128CBC-HS256 once oauthIntrospectionEncryptedResponseAlg is set. It MUST NOT be set without that attribute, and a write that tries is refused; an entry left holding one alone (by ldapmodify, or by clearing the algorithm) makes the JWT introspection response fail with the reason rather than go out unencrypted. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthIntrospectionSignedResponseAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.269 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. RFC 9701 section 6 introspection_signed_response_alg: the JWS algorithm of the JWT introspection response this application receives when it asks /oauth2/introspect with Accept: application/token-introspection+jwt. EMPTY MEANS RS256, the section’s default. Any algorithm in introspection_signing_alg_values_supported — every asymmetric one this service holds a key for, and HS256/384/512 keyed with this application’s own client_secret. none is refused: section 5 says the response MUST be cryptographically secured. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthIssuedSoftwareStatement |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.270 |
THE SOFTWARE STATEMENT THIS REALM LAST ISSUED FOR THIS APPLICATION, as the compact JWS, typed software-statement+jwt, with sub naming this application. A client presenting it at POST /oauth2/register is registered with the members it fixes. NOT A SECRET — RFC 7591 section 2.3 expects a statement to ship with every copy of the software — and not a record of every statement issued: issuing again replaces this value, and the earlier statement still verifies until it expires or the realm’s signing key changes. From the application’s own page, or POST /admin-api/applications/issue-software-statement. |
oauthJwks |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.271 |
THE CLIENT’S PUBLIC KEYS, as a JWKS document — what private_key_jwt is verified against (RFC 7591 jwks). This is the asymmetric credential RFC 9700 section 2.5 RECOMMENDS, and it is the one credential attribute here that is NOT a secret: it is public key material, worth nothing to anybody who reads it, which is the whole point of preferring it to a shared secret. From POST /oauth2/register, or by hand. |
oauthJwksUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.272 |
RFC 7591 jwks_uri, https. FETCHED since #120, when a key is needed, under federation/federation_http.ts’s outbound policy (https, no redirect, a size cap, internal addresses refused in product mode), cached for oauth2.clientJwksCacheS and fetched again for an unknown kid at most every oauth2.clientJwksRefetchS. Never beside oauthJwks: RFC 7591 section 2 allows one or the other. From POST /oauth2/register. |
oauthLogoUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.273 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. THE CLIENT’S LOGO: OpenID Connect Registration section 2’s logo_uri, drawn on the sign-in and consent screens beside the client’s name. The person’s browser loads it from this address; this service never fetches it. An absolute https URL. From RFC 7591 logo_uri, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthMaxAuthAgeS |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.748 |
How long ago this client was authenticated, in seconds, before an authorization request must authenticate again, even when the request sends no max_age, overriding oauth2.maxAuthAgeS. 0 or an empty value adds no bound of this attribute’s own, and an ordinary client then follows the realm setting, whose default is 0. For the admin console, the user portal and the reports application the value in force is the shorter of a positive number here and authn.sessionLifetimeS, so raising the realm never lengthens them. Those three cannot be cleared, 0 is refused, and a different positive number confirmed on the save is how the bound changes (#825). From by hand. |
oauthNativeSso |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.274 |
Families: oidc. TRUE lets this client ask for the device_sso scope — and so be handed a device_secret — and take part in a Native SSO token exchange, as the first app or the second. Anything else, the default, refuses both. Both apps of an exchange must hold it AND share oauthNativeSsoGroup. A registration may set it only through a trusted software statement, because the group is the boundary and a client may not choose its own. From the console, the management API, or a TRUSTED software statement at POST /oauth2/register. |
oauthNativeSsoGroup |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.275 |
Families: oidc. The Native SSO group: the apps that may share one device session — in practice one vendor’s. A token exchange is refused unless the app that received the ID Token and the app asking share it. 1 to 64 of letters, digits and . _ : -; an empty or malformed value takes the client out of Native SSO. From the console, the management API, or a TRUSTED software statement at POST /oauth2/register. |
oauthPermission |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.276 |
ONE PERMISSION THIS APPLICATION EXPOSES, one value each. The value is the permission’s NAME — read, write, Widgets.ReadWrite.All — optionally followed by \| and a description: write\|Change widgets on somebody's behalf. The FIRST \| is the delimiter and every later one belongs to the description, so a description may contain the character and a name may not. The name must be a legal OAuth scope token (RFC 6749 section 3.3 — no space, no double quote, no backslash), because that is what a client will put in a scope parameter and what comes back on the token’s scope claim. A name or a description containing an operator error code is refused too: both are returned on every page that lists the permission, and a code is recorded rather than sent. Nothing enforces either rule when an ldapmodify writes the value; this module and both consoles do. A PERMISSION MUST EXIST BEFORE ANYTHING CAN BE GRANTED IT, which is the one ordering rule this feature has and is checked in updateApplication() so that the console form and the management API cannot disagree about it. It is checked on the GRANT and not here: this attribute is the definition, and a definition nobody has used yet is the ordinary first step rather than a mistake. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthPermissionBaseUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.277 |
THE BASE URI EVERY PERMISSION THIS APPLICATION DEFINES HANGS OFF, and the thing that makes a permission name globally unique here. A permission is identified by this value followed by its name — base https://example.com/ and name write are the permission https://example.com/write — which is what a client puts in a scope and what the access token is then AUDIENCED to. Entra ID calls it the Application ID URI and spells it api://<guid>; the shape is the same and nothing here requires that scheme. IT IS NORMALISED TO END IN A SEPARATOR when it is written through this module — a trailing / is added where there is no /, # or : at the end — because base + name is a plain concatenation and https://example.com + write would otherwise produce https://example.comwrite. An ldapmodify reaches this attribute like every other and is not normalised, so a base written by hand means exactly what it says. SINGLE-VALUED, and it is the one attribute in this group that could not be widened without deciding something: two bases would mean every permission on the entry had two identifiers, and the lookup that turns a scope into an audience would have to pick one to put in aud. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthPermissionClaims |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.278 |
THE CLAIMS EACH OF THIS RESOURCE SERVER’S PERMISSIONS CARRIES, as a JSON object from a permission name (one of its oauthPermission values) to a list of attribute names from the realm’s claim catalogue. An access token addressed to this application on which a permission was GRANTED carries the person’s values of that permission’s attributes, under the catalogue’s claim names; granting the permission is the grant of those claims, a standard OpenID Connect one included. Combined with the client’s claims as oauthAccessTokenClaimsCombine says. From the console’s Scope claims tab. |
oauthPolicyUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.279 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. THE CLIENT’S PRIVACY POLICY: OpenID Connect Registration section 2’s policy_uri, linked from the sign-in and consent screens. An absolute https URL. From RFC 7591 policy_uri, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthPostLogoutRedirectUri |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.280 |
Registered post_logout_redirect_uris, which RP-Initiated Logout matches against exactly, in every mode (#124). From POST /oauth2/register. |
oauthRedirectUri |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.281 |
Registered redirect URIs from a registration, and any redirect_uri this service has ACCEPTED for the application beside them. The two are not the same claim and the registry does not merge them silently — see appRedirectUriObserved. From OAuth 2.0 / OIDC. |
oauthRefreshIdleSeconds |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.282 |
RFC 9700 MODE ONLY: how long a refresh chain may sit unused before it is cut off, overriding oauth2.refreshIdleSeconds for this client. It is measured from the last time any token in the CHAIN was redeemed rather than from issuance, so a busy client keeps its grant and a quiet one does not. Outside RFC 9700 mode nothing reads it, which is a property of the setting rather than of this attribute. For the admin console, the user portal and the reports application the value in force is the shorter of a positive number here and the realm setting; those three cannot be cleared, 0 is refused, and a different positive number confirmed on the save is how it changes (#825). From by hand. |
oauthRefreshTokenTtlS |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.283 |
The same for the refresh token, overriding oauth2.refreshTokenTtlS. A value at or below oauthAccessTokenTtlS is legal and is a grant that can never usefully be renewed — /admin/token-lifetimes reports that combination for the service-wide pair, and it is just as reachable here. For the admin console, the user portal and the reports application the value in force is the shorter of a positive number here and the realm setting; those three cannot be cleared, 0 is refused, and a different positive number confirmed on the save is how it changes (#825). From by hand. |
oauthRequestObjectEncryptionAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.284 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. OpenID Connect Registration request_object_encryption_alg: when set, a request object from this client MUST be encrypted (RFC 9101 section 6.1) with this JWE key management algorithm — to this realm’s request object key published in /oauth2/jwks (use: enc) for RSA-OAEP and ECDH-ES, or to this client’s own client_secret for the symmetric families. EMPTY MEANS encryption is optional. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthRequestObjectEncryptionEnc |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.285 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. OpenID Connect Registration request_object_encryption_enc: the JWE content encryption a request object from this client must use. EMPTY MEANS A128CBC-HS256 once oauthRequestObjectEncryptionAlg is set; it may not be set without that attribute. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthRequestObjectSigningAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.286 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. OpenID Connect Registration request_object_signing_alg: the ONLY JWS algorithm a request object from this client is accepted in. EMPTY MEANS ANY algorithm in request_object_signing_alg_values_supported. none may be registered only where an unsigned request object is accepted at all — development mode, with no signed one required. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthRequestUri |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.287 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. OpenID Connect Registration request_uris: the request_uri values (RFC 9101 section 5.2) this client may send, one per line. THE AUTHORIZATION ENDPOINT FETCHES A request_uri ONLY WHEN IT IS ONE OF THESE, compared exactly once any #fragment is removed — a request_uri nobody registered is refused invalid_request_uri and never dialled, which is what keeps the fetch from being a server-side request forgery. https, or http in development mode only. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthRequirePushedAuthorizationRequests |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.288 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. RFC 9126 section 6 require_pushed_authorization_requests, for this client alone: TRUE refuses an authorization request from it that does not carry a request_uri issued at /oauth2/par, with invalid_request. FALSE or empty defers to oauth2.requirePushedAuthorizationRequests. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthRequireSignedRequestObject |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.289 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. RFC 9101 section 10.5 require_signed_request_object, for this client alone: TRUE refuses an authorization request from it that carries no request or request_uri, and a request object signed with none, with invalid_request. FALSE or empty defers to oauth2.requireSignedRequestObject. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthResourceMetadata |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.290 |
THE PROTECTED RESOURCE METADATA DOCUMENT (RFC 9728) THIS APPLICATION WAS CONFIGURED FROM, as compact JSON. Its resource is the default name, oauthPermissionBaseUri and oauthAudience of an entry created from it, and its scopes_supported the permissions; every other member — authorization_servers, jwks_uri, bearer_methods_supported, the DPoP members — is recorded here and nowhere else. It is DECLARATION ONLY: nothing reads it back, nothing re-fetches it, and changing it changes none of the attributes it filled in. A value written through this module must be a JSON object with a resource; an ldapmodify is not checked. From an RFC 9728 import, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthResourceMetadataUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.291 |
WHERE THE PROTECTED RESOURCE METADATA DOCUMENT WAS FETCHED FROM, when it was fetched rather than pasted or uploaded. Recorded and never dialled again: the fetch is an administrator’s act on /admin/applications/new or POST /admin-api/applications/load-resource-metadata, and nothing refreshes it. From an RFC 9728 import, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthResponseType |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.292 |
The response_type values this client may ask for — RFC 7591 section 2’s response_types, from a registration or written by an administrator, each value one response type (“code”, “code id_token”). The authorization endpoint refuses any other (unauthorized_client), in every mode; an empty list restricts nothing. What the client has actually asked for is oauthResponseTypeObserved. From OAuth 2.0 / OIDC. |
oauthResponseTypeObserved |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.293 |
A response_type this client was seen asking for at the authorization endpoint. A record, not a permission: oauthResponseType is what it may ask for. From OAuth 2.0 / OIDC. |
oauthRevokeRefreshOnLogout |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.294 |
TRUE or FALSE: does signing out revoke this client’s refresh tokens, overriding oauth2.revokeRefreshOnLogout. FALSE is the interesting case and it is why this is worth having per client — a client that can refresh its way back after a sign-out is a real defect in real deployments, and this makes it reproducible for ONE client while the rest behave. From by hand. |
oauthRoleGatedPermission |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.295 |
A PERMISSION THIS APPLICATION DEFINES THAT IS ISSUED ONLY TO A SUBJECT HOLDING A ROLE THAT AUTHORIZES IT. One value each, the permission’s NAME as oauthPermission gives it (write, not the full identifier). A person or an application asking for a gated permission is issued it only while they hold a role whose rolePermission names the full identifier (base + name); otherwise it is left off the token (RFC 6749 section 3.3), and a request asking for nothing else is refused invalid_scope. A permission not listed here is issued as it always was, which is what keeps every existing client working until somebody opts in. The name must be one of this entry’s own permissions when it is written through this module; an ldapmodify is not checked, and a value naming no defined permission gates nothing, because no request can name it. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthSamlAssertionCertificate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.296 |
The leaf certificate this service ISSUED this application for RFC 7522, PEM, whose subject is the application and whose issuer is the realm’s Issuing CA. Written by the Issue control on /admin/pki with the SAML 2.0 purpose chosen, and by POST /admin-api/pki/issue with purpose: "saml". It is a DIFFERENT certificate over a DIFFERENT key pair from oauthAssertionCertificate beside it, and its subjectAltName carries the RFC 7522 profile URI so that a certificate read out of context says which profile it was issued for. From /admin/pki. |
oauthSamlAssertionCertificateChain |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.297 |
The Issuing CA and the Intermediate CA, PEM, in that order — what the leaf above travels with. The ROOT is deliberately not in it, for the reason the JWT chain row gives: a relying party that accepted one because it arrived in the chain would be accepting a certificate that vouched for itself. From /admin/pki. |
oauthSamlAssertionExpiresAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.298 |
When the issued RFC 7522 certificate expires, as a GeneralizedTime. A fact about the CERTIFICATE and not a policy, exactly as oauthAssertionExpiresAt is: nothing here refuses an assertion because this date has passed. Drawn on /admin/pki so that an operator can see what is about to stop working. From /admin/pki. |
oauthSamlAssertionIssuer |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.299 |
THE <Issuer> VALUES THIS APPLICATION MAY PRESENT IN AN RFC 7522 SECTION 2.1 AUTHORIZATION GRANT. It is oauthAssertionIssuer’s sibling for the SAML 2.0 profile and it is READ for the same reason: a bearer assertion IS the whole authorization — no browser, no password, no consent step — so accepting one from anybody would mean anybody who can reach this port getting an access token as anybody. oauth2.saml2BearerRequireRegisteredIssuer is on by default. It is a SEPARATE attribute from the JWT one and not a shared list: a party trusted to assert in one format has not thereby been trusted to assert in the other, and an operator who declared an issuer for RFC 7523 must not silently have declared it for RFC 7522. Compared by Simple String Comparison (RFC 3986 section 6.2.1), which RFC 7522 section 3 item 1 asks for — no case folding and no trailing-slash tolerance. It accumulates, for the reason the JWT one does. From by hand. |
oauthSamlAssertionKeySource |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.300 |
Where the RFC 7522 key pair above came from, in the vocabulary oauthAssertionKeySource uses and for its reason: issued, uploaded-realm-ca or uploaded-external-ca. It is a SEPARATE attribute from the JWT one because the two key pairs are separate — one may be issued here while the other is somebody else’s certificate. From /admin/pki, or the application’s own page. |
oauthSamlAssertionPrivateKey |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.301 |
Secret. THE PRIVATE KEY of the RFC 7522 pair, PEM. SEALED AT REST WHEREVER THE KEY-ENCRYPTION KEY OUTLIVES THE PROCESS, by the same mechanism and under the same key as oauthAssertionPrivateKey beside it — see that row, which argues the whole of it. This service keeps NO SECOND COPY: common/pki.js hands it over once, at issuance, and forgets it. From /admin/pki. |
oauthSamlAssertionSigningCertificate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.302 |
THE CERTIFICATE THIS PARTY SIGNS ITS RFC 7522 ASSERTIONS WITH, PEM, registered by value. The analogue of oauthJwks for a profile whose signatures are XML Signature rather than JWS — there is no JWKS in SAML, the thing a party registers IS a certificate. Several PEM blocks may be in one value, because a party rotating a certificate holds two for as long as assertions signed by the old one are still in flight. Public key material, so like oauthJwks it is worth nothing to whoever reads this directory. A CERTIFICATE ARRIVING IN THE ASSERTION’S OWN <ds:KeyInfo> IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR THIS. It is used to choose among what is registered here and never as a key in its own right, which is where this profile is stricter than RFC 7523: a chain to this realm’s Root proves the REALM issued a key and says nothing about WHICH application holds it, so accepting one would let an application’s RFC 7523 leaf sign a SAML assertion. From by hand. |
oauthSamlAssertionThumbprint |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.303 |
The SHA-256 thumbprint of the issued certificate, base64url. It is what oauthAssertionKid is for the JWT profile and it is spelt differently because the two formats carry different handles: a JWS header names a kid and an XML Signature carries the certificate itself, so what matches a presented |
oauthScope |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.304 |
Scopes this application has ASKED FOR, accumulated as it asks. SIGHTED, never declared: nothing is allowed or refused by it. What the application may be issued is oauthAllowedScope. From OAuth 2.0 / OIDC. |
oauthSectorIdentifierUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.305 |
Families: oidc. OIDC Core section 8.1 sector_identifier_uri: an https URL whose HOST is the sector a pairwise sub is derived for, so several redirect hosts of one organisation see one subject. A REGISTRATION that names one has it FETCHED and must be listed in the JSON array it serves, every redirect URI of it; one written here by an administrator is the administrator’s statement and is not fetched. Empty: the sector is the host of the redirect URIs, which must then all share one. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthSoftwareStatementIssuer |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.306 |
THE iss VALUES WHOSE SOFTWARE STATEMENTS THIS APPLICATION VOUCHES FOR at POST /oauth2/register (RFC 7591 section 2.3) — the application is the software PUBLISHER, and a statement naming one of these issuers is verified against its jwks or its RFC 7523 key pair from /admin/pki, or an x5c this realm issued to it. It is READ: a statement from an issuer nobody declares is refused unapproved_software_statement while oauth2.softwareStatementRequireTrustedIssuer is on, and a trusted one fixes the registered metadata and may open a closed registration endpoint. A SEPARATE attribute from oauthAssertionIssuer: a party trusted to say who a person is has not thereby been trusted to say what software may register as. A statement this realm issued itself needs no declaration. It accumulates, for the reason the assertion issuers do. From by hand. |
oauthSpInitiatedSso |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.307 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. TRUE or FALSE: does /oauth2/authorize answer this client when it was not just launched, overriding oauth2.spInitiatedSso. FALSE answers only an authorization request that follows a /launch of this client on the same session within oauth2.launchWindowS, once per launch, and refuses any other with unauthorized_client. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthStepUpAcrValues |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.308 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. RFC 9470 section 3: the acr values this application, as a resource server, requires of the authentication behind an access token — space-separated, most preferred first. A token whose acr meets none is challenged 401 insufficient_user_authentication with these as acr_values. The levels 0 < 1 < mfa are ordered; hwk is met by a password with a security key; phr and phrh only by the phishing-resistant authentication they name (#723); any other value only by that exact acr. EMPTY requires nothing. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthStepUpMaxAge |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.309 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. RFC 9470 section 3’s max_age: the oldest authentication, in whole seconds, this application accepts behind an access token. A token whose auth_time is older, or absent, is challenged 401 insufficient_user_authentication with max_age. 0 means an authentication this second. EMPTY requires nothing. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthSubjectType |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.310 |
Families: oidc. OIDC Core section 8 subject_type: public (the default, and what an empty value means) gives every client the same sub; pairwise gives this client one of its own, derived from the person, the sector and a secret every node shares, so two clients of different sectors cannot correlate one person; ephemeral (#149) gives it a random one for each authentication, the same for everything that authentication issues and never again after. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthThirdPartyInitiatedLogin |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.311 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. TRUE or FALSE: may /launch/{app} — and the user portal’s Sign in link — send a person to this client’s oauthInitiateLoginUri (OpenID Connect Core section 4), overriding oauth2.thirdPartyInitiatedLogin. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthTlsClientAuthSanDns |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.312 |
RFC 8705 section 2.1.2 tls_client_auth_san_dns: a dNSName the certificate this client authenticates with must carry, compared without regard to case or a trailing dot, never as a wildcard. One of the five subject parameters; see oauthTlsClientAuthSubjectDn. From by hand / POST /oauth2/register. |
oauthTlsClientAuthSanEmail |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.313 |
RFC 8705 section 2.1.2 tls_client_auth_san_email: an rfc822Name the certificate must carry, the domain compared without regard to case and the local part exactly (RFC 5280 section 7.5). One of the five subject parameters. From by hand / POST /oauth2/register. |
oauthTlsClientAuthSanIp |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.314 |
RFC 8705 section 2.1.2 tls_client_auth_san_ip: an iPAddress the certificate must carry, IPv4 or IPv6, compared as the address rather than its spelling. One of the five subject parameters. From by hand / POST /oauth2/register. |
oauthTlsClientAuthSanUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.315 |
RFC 8705 section 2.1.2 tls_client_auth_san_uri: a uniformResourceIdentifier the certificate must carry, compared exactly. One of the five subject parameters. From by hand / POST /oauth2/register. |
oauthTlsClientAuthSubjectDn |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.316 |
RFC 8705 section 2.1.2 tls_client_auth_subject_dn: the subject DN of the PKI certificate this client authenticates with, in RFC 4514 form. Compared as a NAME since 2026-09-13 (common/certificate_subject.js: attribute types folded, values caseIgnoreMatch, the AVAs of a multi-valued RDN in any order) and only against a certificate whose chain VERIFIED. One of the FIVE subject parameters, and a client registers at most one — a second is refused (STS-REG-0131, STS-REG-0135). With none, tls_client_auth still authenticates a certificate this realm issued to THIS application. IT IS ALSO THE IDENTIFIER ATTRIBUTE OF THE mtls FAMILY, and it is SINGLE-VALUED while every other identifier here accumulates, because RFC 8705 says the certificate matches “the single expected subject”. From by hand. |
oauthTlsClientCertificateBoundAccessTokens |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.317 |
RFC 8705 section 3.4 tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens, TRUE or FALSE. TRUE is this client DECLARING that its tokens are certificate-bound, and it is held to that in EVERY mode: a token request from it over a connection with no client certificate is refused (STS-OAUTH-0487) rather than answered with an unbound token, which section 3.4 leaves to the authorization server. FALSE or absent changes nothing — a client presenting a certificate still gets a bound token. From by hand / POST /oauth2/register. |
oauthTlsClientCertificateThumbprint |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.318 |
For RFC 8705 section 2.2 self_signed_tls_client_auth: the base64url SHA-256 of the DER of the certificate this client authenticates with. THIS SERVICE’S OWN NAME, kept beside what the RFC names: since 2026-09-13 a certificate also authenticates the client when it is the x5c[0] of a key in the jwks it registered (section 2.2.2). Fetch a certificate’s thumbprint with GET /tls/sign-in, or compute it: openssl x509 -outform DER | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64url. From by hand. |
oauthTokenEndpointAuthMethod |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.319 |
How it authenticates — every method it may use at the token endpoint, any one of which a request may present. none (a public client) cannot be held with any other. RFC 7591 section 2 makes client_secret_basic the default when a registration omits it, which is why an omission means CONFIDENTIAL rather than unknown. From POST /oauth2/register. |
oauthTokenEndpointAuthSigningAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.320 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. OIDC Core section 9 / RFC 7591 token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg: the ONE JWS algorithm this client’s authentication assertion must be signed with. An assertion signed with any other is refused, in every mode. Empty: any algorithm the method allows. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthTokenExchangeRefreshToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.321 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. WHETHER AN RFC 8693 TOKEN EXCHANGE PERFORMED BY THIS CLIENT GETS A refresh_token BESIDE THE EXCHANGED ACCESS TOKEN, overriding oauth2.tokenExchangeRefreshToken for it alone. One of three words: never, when-requested (the service-wide default — the client asks with RFC 8693 section 2.1’s requested_token_type and gets one only if it did) or always. IT IS READ ON THE CLIENT PERFORMING THE EXCHANGE and not on the audience, because the refresh token is handed to the client: it is that party’s credential to hold, revoke and eventually redeem. The subject the exchange is ABOUT has no entry in this registry at all in the interesting case, since the whole point of an exchange is a subject_token from somewhere else. IT APPLIES TO THE OAUTH 2.0 AND OPENID CONNECT FAMILIES AND TO NO OTHER, and unlike every other attribute here that is ENFORCED. An entry declared for neither is turned away by both console doors and by the management API, naming the family to tick first — because a value here is a policy about the token endpoint, and an entry no token request can ever name would carry it looking as though it were in force. The block above this row argues it. ldapmodify reaches this attribute like every other and is not checked. A VALUE THAT IS NOT ONE OF THE THREE WORDS IS NOT AN ERROR AT WRITE TIME AND IS NOT SILENT: settingFor() warns naming the entry, the attribute and what it holds, and the service-wide setting decides — the same three-state honesty every other override on this entry gets. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthTosUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.322 |
Families: oauth2, oidc. THE CLIENT’S TERMS OF SERVICE: OpenID Connect Registration section 2’s tos_uri, linked from the sign-in and consent screens. An absolute https URL. From RFC 7591 tos_uri, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthUserinfoEncryptedResponseAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.323 |
Families: oidc. OpenID Connect Registration userinfo_encrypted_response_alg: the JWE key management algorithm the UserInfo response is encrypted to this client with (after signing, where it is signed). EMPTY MEANS NOT ENCRYPTED. An asymmetric algorithm, to oauthJwks or oauthJwksUri. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthUserinfoEncryptedResponseEnc |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.324 |
Families: oidc. OpenID Connect Registration userinfo_encrypted_response_enc: the JWE content encryption. EMPTY MEANS A128CBC-HS256 once oauthUserinfoEncryptedResponseAlg is set; it may not be set without that attribute. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oauthUserinfoSignedResponseAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.325 |
Families: oidc. OpenID Connect Registration userinfo_signed_response_alg: the JWS algorithm the UserInfo response to this client is signed with, making it application/jwt carrying iss and aud. EMPTY (or none) MEANS plain JSON, unless it is encrypted. From POST /oauth2/register, the console, the management API, or by hand. |
oid4vpClientId |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.326 |
THE VERIFIER’S CLIENT_ID in an Authorization Request asking for a presentation — OpenID4VP’s identifier attribute. This service’s own Verifier takes its from configuration (oid4vp.clientId) rather than from a caller, so that record appears the first time a presentation is verified; a value declared here is a FOREIGN verifier somebody is configuring. From OpenID4VP. |
saml11ArtifactTtlS |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.341 |
How long a SAML 1.1 artifact minted for this relying party can be resolved for, in seconds, overriding saml11.artifactTtlS. The Browser/Artifact profile’s SOAP responder is what redeems it, once. From by hand. |
saml11AssertionLifetimeMin |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.342 |
The SAML 1.1 equivalent of saml2AssertionLifetimeMin, overriding saml11.assertionLifetimeMin for this relying party. Separate from the 2.0 attribute for the reason the two SETTINGS are separate: the profiles are separate implementations consumed differently, and an application declared for both legitimately wants two answers. From by hand. |
saml11ClaimAttributes |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.343 |
THIS RELYING PARTY’S OWN SELECTION of directory attributes for its SAML 1.1 assertions (SAML 1.1, WS-Federation, WS-Trust), a JSON array of catalogue attribute names, replacing the realm’s selection when present. From the console’s Custom SAML attributes section. |
saml11ClaimsCombine |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.344 |
HOW THE REALM’S SAML 1.1 ATTRIBUTES AND THIS APPLICATION’S OWN ARE COMBINED (#395), the typed rows and the ticked directory attributes alike: application (only this application’s own), union (the realm’s and its own), intersection (only what both hold) or realm (only the realm’s). Unset, its rows are added to the realm’s and win by name, and its selection replaces the realm’s. An application holding nothing of its own gets the realm’s whatever this says. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
saml11CustomAttributes |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.345 |
THIS RELYING PARTY’S OWN SAML 1.1 ATTRIBUTES, as a JSON array of rows like the realm’s Custom SAML attributes page (a namespace allowed). Added to the realm’s SAML 1.1 attributes in assertions for this audience (SAML 1.1, WS-Federation, WS-Trust), winning by name. From the console’s Custom SAML attributes section. |
saml11IdpInitiatedSso |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.346 |
TRUE or FALSE: may a SAML 1.1 sign-in to this relying party START here — /saml11/sso/{rp} with a TARGET and no shire, or /launch/{app} — overriding saml11.idpInitiatedSso. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
saml11NameIdFormat |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.347 |
The NameIdentifier Format used for this relying party, overriding saml11.nameIdFormat. SAML 1.1 has no request message, so nothing can ask for a format and this is the only thing that decides it — which makes it the more useful of the two per-application format attributes. From by hand. |
saml11SignAssertion |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.348 |
TRUE or FALSE: sign the SAML 1.1 |
saml11SignResponse |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.349 |
TRUE or FALSE: sign the SAML 1.1 |
saml11SpInitiatedSso |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.350 |
TRUE or FALSE: is a SAML 1.1 sign-in this relying party started — the Shibboleth 1.3 AuthnRequest profile, a request carrying shire — answered, overriding saml11.spInitiatedSso. The request is an unsigned URL, so FALSE closes the door rather than proving who opened it. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
saml11SsoConsent |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.744 |
TRUE or FALSE: is a person asked, once, before SAML 1.1 signs them in to this application from a session they already have, overriding saml11.ssoConsent (ASVS 5.0.0 7.6.2). FALSE suits an application everybody in the realm is expected to use; a global consent on the entry answers for everyone and keeps the record of who agreed. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
saml2ArtifactTtlS |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.351 |
How long an artifact minted for this service provider can be resolved for, in seconds, overriding saml2.artifactTtlS. An artifact is ALSO one-shot however long this is — resolving it destroys it, which section 3.6.4.1 requires and no lifetime can express. From by hand. |
saml2AssertionLifetimeMin |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.352 |
HOW LONG THIS SERVICE PROVIDER’S ASSERTIONS ARE VALID, in minutes, overriding saml2.assertionLifetimeMin for it alone. What it becomes is Conditions/NotOnOrAfter and the bearer SubjectConfirmationData/NotOnOrAfter alike, widened at both ends by saml.clockSkewS — which is NOT per application, because it is a fact about the clocks in this estate rather than about one relying party. From by hand. |
saml2ClaimAttributes |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.353 |
THIS SERVICE PROVIDER’S OWN SELECTION of directory attributes for its SAML 2.0 assertions, a JSON array of catalogue attribute names, replacing the realm’s selection when present. From the console’s Custom SAML attributes section. |
saml2ClaimsCombine |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.354 |
HOW THE REALM’S SAML 2.0 ATTRIBUTES AND THIS APPLICATION’S OWN ARE COMBINED (#395), the typed rows and the ticked directory attributes alike: application (only this application’s own), union (the realm’s and its own), intersection (only what both hold) or realm (only the realm’s). Unset, its rows are added to the realm’s and win by name, and its selection replaces the realm’s. An application holding nothing of its own gets the realm’s whatever this says. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
saml2CustomAttributes |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.355 |
THIS SERVICE PROVIDER’S OWN SAML 2.0 ATTRIBUTES, as a JSON array of rows like the realm’s Custom SAML attributes page (a nameFormat allowed). Added to the realm’s SAML 2.0 attributes in assertions for this audience, winning by name. From the console’s Custom SAML attributes section. |
saml2EncryptAssertion |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.356 |
TRUE or FALSE: encrypt the assertion issued to THIS service provider, overriding saml2.encryptAssertion. This is the one of the four most worth having per application — an estate where one service provider requires encryption and the others cannot read it is the ordinary case, and a service-wide switch could not express it. From by hand. |
saml2EncryptionAlgorithm |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.358 |
The block cipher used for this service provider — aes256-gcm, aes128-gcm, aes256-cbc or aes128-cbc — overriding saml2.encryptionAlgorithm. A value that is not one of those four is IGNORED with a warning and the service-wide choice is used, exactly as an unparseable number would be. From by hand. |
saml2EncryptLogoutNameId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.357 |
TRUE or FALSE: send |
saml2IdpInitiatedSso |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.359 |
TRUE or FALSE: may this identity provider START a sign-in to this service provider — an unsolicited Response (saml-profiles-2.0-os section 4.1.5) from /saml2/unsolicited or /launch/{app} — overriding saml2.idpInitiatedSso. TRUE only for a service provider that expects one: the Response carries no InResponseTo, so it cannot tell one it was sent from one pushed into its browser. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
saml2KeyTransportAlgorithm |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.360 |
How the content key is wrapped for this service provider — rsa-oaep-mgf1p, rsa-oaep (SHA-256, MGF1-SHA-256; #168) or rsa-1_5 — overriding saml2.keyTransportAlgorithm. An appliance that accepts only rsa-1_5 is the reason this is per application rather than a decision made once for the whole service. From by hand. |
saml2NameIdFormat |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.361 |
The NameID Format used for this service provider when its AuthnRequest’s NameIDPolicy asks for none, overriding saml2.nameIdFormat. A request that DOES name a format is still answered with the one it named — this is the default, not a restriction, and it is deliberately NOT checked against samlNameIdFormat beside it, which is the list of formats this service provider has ASKED for. From by hand. |
saml2SignAssertion |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.362 |
TRUE or FALSE: sign the |
saml2SignResponse |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.363 |
TRUE or FALSE: sign the |
saml2SpInitiatedSso |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.364 |
TRUE or FALSE: is this service provider’s own |
saml2SsoConsent |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.743 |
TRUE or FALSE: is a person asked, once, before SAML 2.0 signs them in to this application from a session they already have, overriding saml2.ssoConsent (ASVS 5.0.0 7.6.2). FALSE suits an application everybody in the realm is expected to use; a global consent on the entry answers for everyone and keeps the record of who agreed. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
samlAcsEndpoint |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.365 |
An |
samlAssertionConsumerService |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.366 |
THE ASSERTION CONSUMER SERVICE URL — where a SAML response is posted back to, and the redirect URI of both SAML families. It held WS-Federation’s wreply as well until 2026-08-25; that moved to wsfedReplyUrl, because the SAML pages read this attribute for the Single Logout fallback and a wreply arriving in it made a WS-Federation application look as though it had named a SAML ACS. CHECKED IN PRODUCT MODE ONLY: development sends a response wherever the request asked and records the address here; product delivers only to an address already on this list, and a sighting there never adds one. What development RECORDS here is marked on appReturnAddressObserved, and product refuses a marked address until an operator confirms it — so a realm switched from development to product does not trust what development learnt. Values recorded before that mark existed carry none and still need reviewing. From SAML 2.0 / SAML 1.1. |
samlAuthnRequestSigned |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.367 |
TRUE when the last AuthnRequest from this service provider carried a signature — an enveloped ds:Signature on the POST binding, or the Signature parameter of section 3.4.4.1 on the Redirect binding. ASSIGNED rather than accumulated, because it is a fact about the last request and a history of booleans would say nothing. From SAML 2.0. |
samlAuthnRequestVerification |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.368 |
WHAT CHECKING THE LAST REQUEST’S SIGNATURE FOUND: verified, failed, unsigned or no-certificate (signed, and nothing registered to check it against), then the binding and the algorithm. Assigned, like samlAuthnRequestSigned beside it. From SAML 2.0. |
samlEncryptionCertificate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.369 |
THE CERTIFICATE AN ASSERTION IS ENCRYPTED TO, base64 DER or PEM. Written by the metadata fetch from the |
samlEntityId |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.370 |
THE SERVICE PROVIDER’S ENTITYID — the assertion audience, and the identifier attribute of BOTH SAML families. SAML 1.1 has no entityID of its own in the protocol (there is no request message for one to travel in) and what stands in for it — Shibboleth’s providerId, the path segment, or the TARGET’s origin — names the same party, so one attribute holds it rather than two that would disagree the first time an application was declared for both. Accumulates: an application answering to two entityIDs is one application. IT IS READ, as the SECOND half of forAppliesTo(): a WS-Trust AppliesTo and the AudienceRestriction of the assertion issued for it are one string, so an application that registered it here rather than on wstrustAppliesTo still gets its own box on the delegation map. The same lookup, and since #496 the AppliesTo it resolves is refused in product when the application it names is not registered (appRegisteredBy). From SAML 2.0 / SAML 1.1. |
samlNameIdFormat |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.371 |
Every NameID Format this service provider has asked for in a NameIDPolicy, accumulated. It is evidence rather than configuration: this identity provider answers with whatever was asked for, including a format nobody has ever heard of, so a value here does not restrict the next request. From SAML 2.0. |
samlObservedSigningCertificate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.372 |
THE CERTIFICATE THE LAST SIGNED REQUEST CARRIED IN ITS ds:KeyInfo, base64 DER, when it is not one of the registered samlSigningCertificate values. OBSERVED, NOT TRUSTED: a key a request brings with it proves nothing about who sent the request, so it verifies nothing in either mode. Development still encrypts an assertion to it when the entry holds no other certificate; product does not. An operator CONFIRMS it (it moves onto samlSigningCertificate) or DISCARDS it, on the SAML 2.0 page or with POST /admin-api/saml2/confirm-signing-certificate and /discard-signing-certificate. ONE value — the last — so a stream of requests carrying made-up keys cannot grow the entry. From a signed SAML 2.0 request. |
samlResponseBinding |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.373 |
The ProtocolBinding values it has asked its responses back on — HTTP-POST, HTTP-Redirect or HTTP-Artifact. Several is the ordinary case for a service provider being exercised, which is what makes this a list. From SAML 2.0. |
samlSigningCertificate |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.374 |
THE SERVICE PROVIDER’S REGISTERED SIGNING CERTIFICATES, base64 DER, one per value. A signed AuthnRequest, LogoutRequest or LogoutResponse from this service provider is VERIFIED against these — in every mode — and refused when it verifies against none. Written by consuming its metadata (every KeyDescriptor use=”signing” or with no use), by the SAML 2.0 console page, by POST /admin-api/saml2/set-signing-certificate, by confirming the observed certificate below, or by hand. Its key must make an XML signature this service verifies — RSA, EC, EdDSA, DSA, ML-DSA or SLH-DSA (STS-REG-0160). It is NEVER written from a request: the certificate a request carries in its ds:KeyInfo goes on samlObservedSigningCertificate. Values written before 2026-09-17 were captured off requests and carry no provenance — review them before trusting them. Public key material, so unlike oauthClientSecret it is worth nothing to whoever reads this directory. From consumed metadata, the SAML 2.0 page, or by hand. |
samlSingleLogoutService |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.375 |
WHERE A |
samlSloEndpoint |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.376 |
An |
samlSpAuthnRequestsSigned |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.377 |
TRUE when the metadata says AuthnRequestsSigned=”true”: an unsigned request from this service provider is then refused whatever saml2.requireSignedAuthnRequests says, and the metadata this identity provider serves it says WantAuthnRequestsSigned=”true”. From consumed metadata. |
samlSpMetadata |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.378 |
THE SERVICE PROVIDER’S METADATA DOCUMENT, cached verbatim. It is what the refresh action stores, and what uploading one on the SAML 2.0 page (or POST /admin-api/saml2/upload-metadata) stores for a service provider whose metadata this service cannot reach. CONSUMING it (2026-09-17) writes its AssertionConsumerService and SingleLogoutService endpoints as REGISTERED return addresses (samlAssertionConsumerService, samlAcsEndpoint, samlSingleLogoutService, samlSloEndpoint), its signing certificates (samlSigningCertificate), its encryption certificate (samlEncryptionCertificate), its NameIDFormats, AuthnRequestsSigned and WantAssertionsSigned, and its validUntil and cacheDuration. Setting this attribute by hand stores the document and consumes NOTHING — use the upload. IT IS KEPT AS WELL AS THE EXTRACT so that a reader can see what was actually consumed. A certificate with no document behind it is a value nobody can check. From a metadata fetch, or by hand. |
samlSpMetadataCacheDuration |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.379 |
The EFFECTIVE cacheDuration of the consumed document (the shortest in its chain), as the xs:duration it carried. Once it has elapsed since the document was consumed, the document is STALE: the background refresher fetches it again where it can (saml2.spMetadataRefresh), and it keeps working until its validUntil. From consumed metadata. |
samlSpMetadataConsumedAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.380 |
When the document was last consumed, and how: <ISO instant> <refresh\|upload\|mdq> — mdq for one fetched from the Metadata Query responder, which the background refresher can fetch again. From consumed metadata. |
samlSpMetadataSignature |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.381 |
What checking the consumed document’s own signature found: verified, unsigned, or signed-not-verified (signed, and no samlSpMetadataSigningCertificate to check it against). From consumed metadata. |
samlSpMetadataSigningCertificate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.382 |
THE CERTIFICATE THIS SERVICE PROVIDER’S METADATA MUST BE SIGNED WITH, base64 DER. With it set, a document that is unsigned, or whose signature does not verify against it, is REFUSED and nothing on the entry changes. Without it a signed document is consumed and recorded as signed-not-verified: the trust act is then the operator’s choice of URL (or document), which is what an explicit refresh or upload is. From by hand. |
samlSpMetadataUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.383 |
WHERE THIS SERVICE PROVIDER’S METADATA IS PUBLISHED. It is fetched by the “refresh metadata” action on the application page and by POST /admin-api/applications/refresh-metadata, and NEVER while a flow is running — an assertion that had to wait on somebody else’s web server to be issued would make every sign-in as reliable as that server. What the fetch writes is everything consuming the document writes — see samlSpMetadata below. This is the SECOND outbound-request surface in this service; federation was the first and is the only other. It follows the same refusals — the URL must be one this entry carries, the scheme must be http or https, and the request times out. From by hand. |
samlSpMetadataValidUntil |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.384 |
The EFFECTIVE validUntil of the consumed document — the earliest on any enclosing EntitiesDescriptor, the EntityDescriptor and its SPSSODescriptor. A document already expired is refused when consumed; once this passes, every request from the service provider is REFUSED (STS-SAML-0074) until a newer document is consumed. From consumed metadata. |
samlSpNameIdFormat |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.385 |
The |
samlSpWantAssertionsEncrypted |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.386 |
TRUE when the consumed metadata publishes a KeyDescriptor marked use=”encryption” — the service provider saying it has a key for encrypted assertions, which SAML 2.0 metadata has no attribute of its own for (the interoperability profiles read the key as the request). The assertion is then ENCRYPTED to that key in every mode, whatever saml2.encryptAssertion says. From consumed metadata. |
samlSpWantAssertionsSigned |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.387 |
TRUE when the metadata says WantAssertionsSigned=”true”: the assertion is signed even where saml2.signAssertion (or saml2SignAssertion) is off — in product mode; development honours the setting, which is a test case, and logs that the service provider asked otherwise. From consumed metadata. |
scepAllowedProfiles |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.388 |
THE SCEP PROFILES THIS APPLICATION MAY BE ISSUED. Where it lists something it OVERRIDES scep.allowedProfiles for this application, wider or narrower; empty leaves the realm’s list. The five CA, OCSP and KDC profiles are never issued. From the console, or by hand. |
scepCertificateLifetimeDays |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.389 |
How long a certificate this application is issued over SCEP is valid, in days, overriding scep.certificateLifetimeDays (longer or shorter). No certificate outlives its Issuing CA. From by hand. |
scepDefaultProfile |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.390 |
THE PROFILE THIS APPLICATION IS ISSUED OVER SCEP WHEN A REQUEST NAMES NONE, overriding scep.defaultProfile. Used only while the list in force for it allows it. From the console, or by hand. |
scimClientAuthMethod |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.391 |
Families: scim-client. HOW A REQUEST IS AUTHENTICATED (RFC 7644 section 2): basic (HTTP Basic with scimClientUsername and scimClientPassword), oauth2 (a client_credentials token from scimClientTokenEndpoint, sent as a Bearer token), or none (only the TLS client certificate, when one is configured). From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientBaseUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.392 |
Families: scim-client. THE REMOTE SCIM BASE URI (RFC 7644 section 1.3), the /v2 segment included where the service provider uses one: https://idp.example.com/scim/v2. https only (section 7.2); no query, fragment or user information (section 7.1). From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientCaCertificates |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.393 |
Families: scim-client. PEM certificates of a CA the service provider’s TLS certificate chains to, trusted beside the public roots. The certificate and its host name are always verified. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientCells |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.394 |
Families: scim-client. WHICH CELLS PUSH TO THE SERVICE PROVIDER, each a cell id; none (the default) means every cell. A cell not listed sends nothing for this client, so the people homed there are not pushed. Ignored when the service is one cell. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientDeprovision |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.395 |
Families: scim-client. WHAT HAPPENS THERE when a person is deleted here or leaves the scope: deactivate (active false, the default) or delete. A disabled account here is always active false there. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientEnabled |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.396 |
Families: scim-client. TRUE to push changes and reconcile; FALSE (the default) keeps the configuration and sends nothing. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientGroupMode |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.397 |
Families: scim-client. WHICH GROUPS ARE PUSHED, each with its in-scope members only: none, selected (scimClientGroups), member-groups (every group an in-scope person is in) or all. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientGroups |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.398 |
Families: scim-client. selected groups: each a group’s cn or DN. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientId |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.399 |
WHAT A PROVISIONING CLIENT AT /scim/v2 IS CALLED — the OAuth client_id it presents a token from, or the username it sends in Basic. That surface authenticates its CALLER in any of the six schemes RFC 7644 section 2 names rather than an application identifier, so it writes nothing here; the value is a declaration, and the SCIM gate is what decides whether a credential is demanded at all. From the console, or by hand. |
scimClientJurisdiction |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.400 |
Families: scim-client. WHERE THE SERVICE PROVIDER IS, as a jurisdiction code of the cell map (us, eu, ca, …). In a service deployed as cells, each person’s home cell asks the issuance policy whether that person’s data may go there (release-attributes, purpose scim-provision) before it pushes them; a refusal leaves them out of scope — not pushed, and deprovisioned if they were. Empty is an unknown jurisdiction, which the strict default never releases to. Ignored when the service is one cell. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientMaxRequestsPerSecond |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.401 |
Families: scim-client. HOW MANY REQUESTS A SECOND the service provider is sent, at most: every delivery, lookup, discovery read and reconciliation page waits for its turn rather than failing. Empty or 0 (the default) is no limit. In a service deployed as cells each cell that pushes may send this divided by the number of such cells, rounded up. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientOAuthClientAuth |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.402 |
Families: scim-client. oauth2: how the client authenticates at the token endpoint — client_secret_basic (the default) or client_secret_post (RFC 6749 section 2.3.1). From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientOAuthClientId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.403 |
Families: scim-client. oauth2: the client_id this client is registered under there. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientOAuthClientSecret |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.404 |
Secret. Families: scim-client. oauth2: the client secret. Sealed, withheld and never logged. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientOAuthResource |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.405 |
Families: scim-client. oauth2: an RFC 8707 resource indicator sent with the token request, where the authorization server wants one. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientOAuthScope |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.406 |
Families: scim-client. oauth2: the scope asked for, space-separated (scim:write, for this service’s own /scim/v2). Empty asks for none. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientPassword |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.407 |
Secret. Families: scim-client. basic: the password. Sealed with the key-encryption key when keys persist, WITHHELD from every page, /admin-api reply and directory read, and never logged. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientReconcileMinutes |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.408 |
Families: scim-client. HOW OFTEN THE WHOLE SCOPE IS RECONCILED, in minutes, by the cluster scheduler: every person and group in scope is pushed, and what the service provider holds under an externalId of this realm’s and no longer in scope is deprovisioned. 0 (the default) reconciles only when an administrator asks. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientScopeFilter |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.409 |
Families: scim-client. filter scope: an RFC 4515 LDAP filter a person’s entry must match, such as (department=Sales). From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientScopeGroups |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.410 |
Families: scim-client. groups scope: the groups whose members are pushed, each a group’s cn or DN. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientScopeMode |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.411 |
Families: scim-client. WHO IS PUSHED: all (every person in the realm), groups (the members of scimClientScopeGroups) or filter (the people scimClientScopeFilter matches). Somebody who leaves the scope is deprovisioned there. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientTlsCertificate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.412 |
Families: scim-client. The client certificate, PEM, its chain after it. Public. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientTlsPrivateKey |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.413 |
Secret. Families: scim-client. The client certificate’s private key, PEM. Sealed, withheld and never logged. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientTlsSource |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.414 |
Families: scim-client. THE TLS CLIENT CERTIFICATE presented to the service provider: none (the default), issued (by this realm’s CA, from its tls-client Issuing CA, revocable on /admin/pki) or uploaded (scimClientTlsCertificate and scimClientTlsPrivateKey). It is presented whatever scimClientAuthMethod says. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientTokenEndpoint |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.415 |
Families: scim-client. oauth2: the token endpoint of the authorization server the service provider trusts. https only. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
scimClientUsername |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.416 |
Families: scim-client. basic: the user name the service provider knows this client by. From Protocols → SCIM → Clients, or by hand. |
secretDestCaCertificates |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.418 |
Families: secret-destination. vault: the PEM certificates of the CA the Vault listener chains to, trusted beside the public roots. Certificates are public; the certificate is always verified. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestCredential |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.419 |
Secret. Families: secret-destination. THE DESTINATION’S WRITE CREDENTIAL, which may write versions of named secrets and should be able to do nothing else: aws, a JSON {“accessKeyId”, “secretAccessKey”[, “sessionToken”]}; gcp, a service account key file’s JSON; azure, a JSON {“tenantId”, “clientId”, “clientSecret”}; vault, a token. Separate from the read-only credentials this service reads its own key-encryption key and database password with. Sealed with the key-encryption key when keys persist, WITHHELD from every page, /admin-api reply and directory read, and never logged. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestDirectory |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.420 |
Families: secret-destination. file (DEVELOPMENT MODE ONLY): the absolute directory a secret name is a file in. The file must already exist; a name that leaves the directory is refused. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestEndpoint |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.421 |
Families: secret-destination. azure: the vault URL (https:// |
secretDestField |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.422 |
Families: secret-destination. vault, with the password payload: the field of the version the password is written to; value when empty, which is the field this service’s own Vault reads default to. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestMount |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.423 |
Families: secret-destination. vault: where the KV version 2 engine is mounted; secret when empty. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestPayload |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.424 |
Families: secret-destination. WHAT A PUSH WRITES: password (the bare password, the default) or json — {“username”, “password”, “realm”, “rotatedAt”}, the object a reader takes the password out of by its field, as this service’s own secret reads do (keys.kekField and the like). In Vault, whose versions are maps, password writes the one field secretDestField names. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestProject |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.425 |
Families: secret-destination. gcp: the project a short secret name is in, so that a service account names its secret as sts-svc-backup rather than projects/ |
secretDestProvider |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.426 |
Families: secret-destination. WHICH SECRETS MANAGER THIS DESTINATION IS: aws (Secrets Manager, PutSecretValue), gcp (Secret Manager, AddSecretVersion), azure (Key Vault, setSecret), vault (a HashiCorp Vault or OpenBao KV version 2 engine, a write with check-and-set) or file (development mode only). A key management service is not a destination: it stores keys, not secrets. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestRegion |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.427 |
Families: secret-destination. aws: the AWS region the secrets are in (us-east-1). From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
spiffeWorkloadId |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.461 |
A SPIFFE ID this application is expected to hold — spiffe:// |
ssfAllowedEvents |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.463 |
Families: ssf. WHICH SHARED SIGNALS EVENT TYPES A STREAM OWNED BY THIS APPLICATION MAY BE SENT. One value per line, each either a whole profile — caep (the eight session events) or risc (the fourteen account events) — or one event type URI, such as https://schemas.openid.net/secevent/caep/event-type/session-revoked. EMPTY MEANS UNRESTRICTED. SSF’s own verification and stream-updated events are always allowed. It is ENFORCED twice: a stream this application creates or updates is agreed only the types allowed here (anything else it asked for is absent from events_delivered, and the stream’s log says why), and every delivery checks it again, so removing a value stops existing streams receiving that type. The owner is whoever authenticated to /ssf/stream, matched against this entry’s identifier or its ssfReceiverId values. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfCaepIncludeReasons |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.464 |
Families: ssf. TRUE or FALSE: send reason_admin and reason_user on the CAEP events this receiver’s streams carry. Both are OPTIONAL members (CAEP 1.0 section 2), so either answer conforms. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfCaepOmitEventTimestamp |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.465 |
Families: ssf. TRUE or FALSE: leave event_timestamp (OPTIONAL, CAEP 1.0 section 2) off the CAEP events this receiver’s streams carry. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfCaepReasonLanguage |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.466 |
Families: ssf. The BCP 47 language tag the CAEP reason members are keyed under on this receiver’s streams. They stay objects keyed by a tag either way. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfDeadLetterMaxPerStream |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.467 |
Families: ssf. How many dead letters one of this receiver’s streams keeps. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfDeliveryEndpoint |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.468 |
WHERE THIS RECEIVER EXPECTS ITS EVENTS PUSHED — an RFC 8935 delivery endpoint. It is a DECLARATION and nothing reads it: a push goes to the endpoint on the STREAM, which the receiver named when it created one, and this service will not take a URL to dial from an application entry: a URL recorded here is a note about what a receiver is, and a URL on a stream is a URL this service opens a connection to. The two are deliberately not the same store. From the console, or by hand. |
ssfInactivityAction |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.469 |
Families: ssf. What happens to one of this receiver’s streams when its inactivity timeout passes. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfInactivityTimeoutS |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.470 |
Families: ssf. Seconds: inactivity_timeout (SSF 1.0 section 8.1.1, transmitter-supplied) on this receiver’s streams; 0 means none. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfMaxQueuedEvents |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.471 |
Families: ssf. How many undelivered events one of this receiver’s streams holds. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfMaxStreams |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.472 |
Families: ssf. How many streams this receiver may hold at once. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfMaxSubjectsPerStream |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.473 |
Families: ssf. How many subjects one of this receiver’s streams may name. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfMinVerificationInterval |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.474 |
Families: ssf. Seconds: min_verification_interval (SSF 1.0 section 8.1.1, transmitter-supplied) on this receiver’s streams. A receiver asking for a shorter one is refused. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfPollMaxEvents |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.475 |
Families: ssf. The most events one poll of this receiver’s stream returns (RFC 8936 lets a transmitter return fewer than maxEvents). From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfPushRetries |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.476 |
Families: ssf. How many times a failed push to this receiver is tried again before it becomes a dead letter. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfPushRetryDelayMs |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.477 |
Families: ssf. Milliseconds between push attempts to this receiver. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfPushTimeoutMs |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.478 |
Families: ssf. Milliseconds to wait for this receiver’s push endpoint to answer. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfReceiverId |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.479 |
WHAT A SHARED SIGNALS RECEIVER IS CALLED — whatever it authenticated as when it created a stream at /ssf/stream, which is also the aud of every Security Event Token that stream carries. Unlike the four declaration-only identifiers above it, this one IS written by the protocol: creating a stream records a sighting, because a receiver authenticating and being agreed a stream is exactly the kind of event this registry exists to hold. It still grants nothing — a stream is what decides what a receiver gets, and it carries its own audience. From SSF, the console, or by hand. |
ssfRiscIncludeReasons |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.480 |
Families: ssf. TRUE or FALSE: send reason_admin and reason_user on the RISC events that define them, on this receiver’s streams. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfRiscOmitEventTimestamp |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.481 |
Families: ssf. TRUE or FALSE: leave event_timestamp off the RISC events that define it, on this receiver’s streams. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfRiscReasonLanguage |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.482 |
Families: ssf. The BCP 47 language tag the RISC reason members are keyed under on this receiver’s streams. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfSigningAlgorithm |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.483 |
Families: ssf. The JWS algorithm this receiver’s Security Event Tokens are signed with. Each is one this transmitter publishes a key for in its JWKS, so the receiver can always verify. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfStreamStatusOnCreate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.484 |
Families: ssf. The status a stream this receiver creates starts in. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
ssfVerificationEveryS |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.485 |
Families: ssf. Seconds between the verification events this transmitter sends on this receiver’s streams by itself; 0 means none. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
stsOwnerProtected |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.590 |
TRUE: the application’s owners may not administer it through /admin-api (#607) — an administrator’s mark, read by the access-control policy’s owner rule as urn:sts:xacml:object-protected. Absent is FALSE. From POST /admin-api/ownership/set-protected. |
umaOwnsResources |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.697 |
TRUE when this UMA 2.0 resource server may register resources it OWNS ITSELF, through a protection API token obtained with client_credentials. Absent or FALSE, the default, means a PAT must be a person’s (the code flow) and that person owns what it registers. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
vcCredentialClaimAttributes |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.698 |
Families: oid4vci. THIS CLIENT’S OWN SELECTION of the directory attributes a Verifiable Credential carries, a JSON array of catalogue attribute names. When present it REPLACES the realm’s Credential claims selection for credentials issued on this client’s access tokens; the issuer metadata still advertises the realm’s. From the console’s Credential claims section. |
wsfedAssertionLifetimeMin |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.699 |
How long the SAML 1.1 assertion inside a WS-Federation sign-in response for THIS relying party is valid, in minutes, overriding wsfed.assertionLifetimeMin. It sets the assertion’s Conditions and the wsu:Lifetime of the RequestSecurityTokenResponse around it, so the envelope and the document inside it cannot disagree. It is separate from saml11AssertionLifetimeMin: one application may speak both, and a WS-Federation session and a Browser/POST assertion are not consumed the same way. From by hand. |
wsfedIdpInitiatedSso |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.700 |
TRUE or FALSE: may this identity provider START a sign-in to this relying party — /wsfed/initiate/{rp} or /launch/{app}, posting to its registered wsfedReplyUrl — overriding wsfed.idpInitiatedSso. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
wsfedRealm |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.701 |
THE WTREALM from a wsignin1.0 request (section 13.2.1) — WS-Federation’s identifier attribute. Accumulates, for the reason every identifier here does. From WS-Federation. |
wsfedReplyUrl |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.702 |
WHERE A SIGN-IN RESPONSE IS POSTED BACK TO for this application: the wreply of section 13.2.1, WS-Federation’s redirect URI. It was written into samlAssertionConsumerService until 2026-08-25, which put a wreply in the attribute the SAML pages read for an assertion consumer service and for the Single Logout fallback — one attribute holding two protocols’ return addresses, so a WS-Federation application appeared to have a SAML ACS it had never named. Two facts, two attributes. Like the SAML one beside it this is CHECKED IN PRODUCT MODE ONLY: development refuses no wreply, because a service that refused would remove a test case rather than add one; product posts only to an address on this list and a sighting never adds one. A wreply development recorded is marked on appReturnAddressObserved and product refuses it until it is confirmed; values recorded before that mark existed carry none and still need reviewing before a realm is switched to product. From WS-Federation, the console, or by hand. |
wsfedSignOutUri |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.703 |
WHERE A wsignoutcleanup1.0 PING IS SENT for this application — WS-Federation’s logout URI, and the one this table did not have until 2026-08-30. DECLARED, not observed, which makes it the sibling of samlSingleLogoutService rather than of wsfedReplyUrl: a cleanup is sent when a SESSION ends, and by then the request that would have carried a wreply is long over. A DECLARED ADDRESS OUTRANKS AN OBSERVED ONE (#747). cleanupTargetsFor() pings every value here for a realm the session signed into, and the wreply the sign-in response went to, which session.wsfedRealms records, only where this is empty. From by hand. |
wsfedSpInitiatedSso |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.704 |
TRUE or FALSE: is this relying party’s own wsignin1.0 answered, overriding wsfed.spInitiatedSso. A wsignin1.0 is an unsigned URL, so FALSE closes the door rather than proving who opened it. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
wsfedSsoConsent |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.745 |
TRUE or FALSE: is a person asked, once, before WS-Federation signs them in to this application from a session they already have, overriding wsfed.ssoConsent (ASVS 5.0.0 7.6.2). FALSE suits an application everybody in the realm is expected to use; a global consent on the entry answers for everyone and keeps the record of who agreed. From the console, the management API, or by hand. |
wstrustAcceptEncryptedElements |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.772 |
Families: wstrust. TRUE or FALSE: accept XML Encryption anywhere in a request whose AppliesTo is this application, a header or the body, with no request map naming it, overriding wstrust.acceptEncryptedElements. Off, ciphertext is accepted only where wstrustEncryptRequestElements names it — each element restored from it must be one an expression selects, or inside one — and ciphertext with no map is an InvalidRequest. Either way a ciphertext must open with this realm’s keys. From by hand. |
wstrustAppliesTo |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.705 |
THE APPLIESTO ADDRESS from a RequestSecurityToken — the service the token is issued FOR, and WS-Trust’s identifier attribute. Accumulates. IT IS READ, which it was not before 2026-08-27, and it is oauthAudience’s exception arriving through a second protocol: an OnBehalfOf or ActAs asking for a token to reach https://esb.example.com is recorded on /admin/delegation against the APPLICATION that registered that address, so a chain of delegated hops draws as one picture rather than as boxes named after URLs that nothing else in it mentions. In development a LOOKUP and not a permission — an AppliesTo nobody registered is issued for and recorded verbatim; in product it is refused (#496). See forAppliesTo(), which asks this attribute first and samlEntityId behind it. From WS-Trust. |
wstrustDecryptionCertificate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.773 |
Families: wstrust. THE CERTIFICATE A WS-TRUST REQUEST FOR THIS APPLICATION IS ENCRYPTED TO, PEM. While it is set, a request for this application is decrypted with its private key and not the realm’s, and a request for it encrypted to the realm’s key is a FailedCheck. Public: the application page and GET /admin-api/applications give it out. From Directory → Applications → the application → Credentials, or POST /admin-api/applications/issue-wstrust-decryption-key and upload-wstrust-decryption-key. |
wstrustDecryptionCertificateChain |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.774 |
Families: wstrust. The certificates of the certificate authority that issued wstrustDecryptionCertificate, PEM, the Issuing CA first, for a key pair issued here. Empty for an uploaded one. From Directory → Applications → the application → Credentials. |
wstrustDecryptionKeySource |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.776 |
Families: wstrust. Where the decryption key pair came from: issued (generated here and certified by the realm’s CA) or uploaded. From Directory → Applications → the application → Credentials. |
wstrustDecryptionPrivateKey |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.775 |
Secret. Families: wstrust. The private key of wstrustDecryptionCertificate, PEM. Sealed where keys persist, withheld from every page, every /admin-api answer and every directory read, and never logged. From Directory → Applications → the application → Credentials. |
wstrustEncryptionAlgorithm |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.768 |
Families: wstrust. The block cipher used for this application’s WS-Trust responses — aes256-gcm, aes128-gcm, aes256-cbc or aes128-cbc — overriding wstrust.encryptionAlgorithm. A wst:EncryptionAlgorithm element may name this cipher, by its short name or its XML Encryption URI, only while response encryption is on for this application. From by hand. |
wstrustEncryptionCertificate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.769 |
Families: wstrust. THE CERTIFICATE A WS-TRUST RESPONSE IS ENCRYPTED TO, base64 DER or PEM. When it is set it is the recipient, and a certificate that cannot be read is a fault rather than a step down to the next source. When it is unset the recipient is the certificate element wstrustResponseRecipientXPath selects, or, when that expression is also unset, the first signer certificate element the request’s WS-Security signature names. From by hand. |
wstrustEncryptRequest |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.764 |
Families: wstrust. TRUE or FALSE: require the elements this application’s request map names to arrive encrypted, overriding wstrust.encryptRequest. On, a request whose AppliesTo is this application is a FailedCheck when the map is empty, an expression matches an element that arrived in the clear, or an expression matches nothing that was restored from ciphertext. Which ciphertext is opened at all is wstrustAcceptEncryptedElements; the AppliesTo is read from the opened request, and a ciphertext that will not open is a FailedCheck either way. From by hand. |
wstrustEncryptRequestElements |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.765 |
Families: wstrust. THE ELEMENTS OF A WS-TRUST REQUEST THAT MUST ARRIVE ENCRYPTED, one XPath 1.0 expression each. The subset is /, //, *, an element name, prefix:local, a union with \|, and predicates local-name(), namespace-uri() and @attr, joined by and. Each expression must select at least one element that was restored from ciphertext: an xenc:EncryptedData of type Element or Content, or a WS-Security 1.1 EncryptedHeader. An expression outside that subset is a RequestFailed. A SOAP header, the SOAP body, or any element may be named, for any token type. From by hand. |
wstrustEncryptResponse |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.766 |
Families: wstrust. TRUE or FALSE: replace the elements this application’s response map names with xenc:EncryptedData, overriding wstrust.encryptResponse. The response is built in the clear and then those elements are replaced, for any token type. A fault stays in the clear. On, and the encryption cannot be completed — no recipient, a map that matches nothing, or a cipher the recipient’s certificate will not take — the request is a fault in both modes. From by hand. |
wstrustEncryptResponseElements |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.767 |
Families: wstrust. THE ELEMENTS OF A WS-TRUST RESPONSE THAT ARE ENCRYPTED, one XPath 1.0 expression each, the same subset as wstrustEncryptRequestElements. A SOAP header, the SOAP body, or any element may be named. An expression that matches nothing in the response that was built is a fault. From by hand. |
wstrustJwtScope |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.706 |
Families: wstrust. THE OAUTH 2.0 SCOPES A WS-TRUST JWT FOR THIS APPLICATION CARRIES, one scope value each (#485). A JWT WS-Trust issues with this application as the AppliesTo (wst:TokenType urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt) carries them in its scope claim, space-delimited (RFC 9068 section 2.2.3); with none set it carries no scope. A SAML token is unaffected. EACH IS JUDGED AS AN OAUTH ACCESS TOKEN’S IS, with this application as the client: oauthAllowedScope declares what it may be issued (in product; this service’s protected scopes in every mode), and the issuance policy’s per-scope question decides. A value the policy drops is LEFT OFF the token and audited (STS-OAUTH-0579), never issued. A write naming an undeclared scope is accepted here, because the declaration may change and development grants undeclared scopes: declare it on oauthAllowedScope too. A value the policy will drop is WARNED about where it is set (#488): beside this field, in the Save reply, and as warnings on the /admin-api write replies and the application’s view. From by hand. |
wstrustKeyTransportAlgorithm |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.770 |
Families: wstrust. How the content key is wrapped for this application’s WS-Trust responses — rsa-oaep-mgf1p, rsa-oaep (SHA-256, MGF1-SHA-256) or rsa-1_5 — overriding wstrust.keyTransportAlgorithm. A recipient whose certificate is EC is encrypted to by ECDH-ES whatever this says. A wst:EncryptWith element may name this algorithm, by its short name or its XML Encryption URI, only while response encryption is on for this application. From by hand. |
wstrustResponseRecipientXPath |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.771 |
Families: wstrust. AN XPATH EXPRESSION SELECTING THE CERTIFICATE ELEMENT A WS-TRUST RESPONSE IS ENCRYPTED TO: a ds:X509Certificate or a BinarySecurityToken whose ValueType ends in #X509v3. The same subset as the element maps. When it is set and it selects nothing, or it selects an element that is not one of those two, there is no recipient and the next source is not tried. A selected certificate element whose text is not a certificate is a completed-encryption fault, and the next source is not tried. When it is unset the recipient is the first signer certificate element the request’s WS-Security signature names — the BinarySecurityToken that signature’s reference points at, or a ds:X509Certificate in that signature’s KeyInfo. A thumbprint, a Subject Key Identifier or an issuer and serial is not a certificate element. From by hand. |
Names and the subject
| Key | appIdentifier |
| Filing name | cn. The identifier, or app- plus twelve hex digits when the identifier is longer than 64 characters. |
| Derived | subject. urn:sts:application: |
| Registration | appRegistered, appRegisteredBy |
| Declared families | appAllowedProtocol |
| Seen families | appProtocol |
Relationships
| Link | Values | Owns the target | Held by | What it is |
|---|---|---|---|---|
appRequiredRole |
several | no | this application | Roles whose holders may use this application. |
appFederationRelationship |
several | no | this application | Federation relationships this application is tied to. |
appAuthnPolicy |
one | no | this application | The named authentication policy it signs in under. |
appPasskeyPolicy |
one | no | this application | The named passkey policy a sign-in is held to. |
appLocalePolicy |
one | no | this application | The named locale policy it falls back to. |
appPasswordPolicy |
one | no | this application | The named password policy a password set here uses. |
appPostLoginPolicy |
one | no | this application | The named post-login profile a sign-in follows. |
appFgaPolicy |
one | yes | this application | The fine-grained policy entry in ou=policies that it owns. |
stsDeviceApplication |
several | no | device | The applications that used this device. |
Attribute source
TypeSpec model AttributeSource.
Container ou=attributesources.
Held in the catalogue. No SCHEMA module.
The source is one JSON value, stsAttributeSourceData.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsAttributeSource |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.6 |
structural | top | This service’s class for one attribute source. |
top |
RFC | 2.5.6.0 |
abstract | The abstract class every entry carries. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
cn |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.3 |
The source id, the RDN. |
stsAttributeSourced |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.503 |
On a person: |
stsAttributeSourceData |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.501 |
The whole definition as one JSON value. No password. |
stsAttributeSourceSeen |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.502 |
On a person: |
Claims provider
TypeSpec model ClaimProvider.
Container ou=claimproviders.
Held in the catalogue. No SCHEMA module.
The record is one JSON value, stsClaimProviderData.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsClaimProvider |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.8 |
structural | top | This service’s class for this register. |
top |
RFC | 2.5.6.0 |
abstract | The abstract class every entry carries. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
stsClaimProviderData |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.537 |
The claims provider’s whole record as one JSON value: its issuer, endpoints, client identifier, authentication method, scope, the claims it answers and how they are delivered. Written by the console and the management API. |
stsClaimProviderSecret |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.538 |
Secret. The client secret this service presents to the claims provider, sealed where a key-encryption key is configured. Withheld from every directory read. |
Device
TypeSpec model Device.
Container ou=devices.
Recorded in ./devices.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
device |
RFC | 2.5.6.14 |
structural | top | cn, and the standard owner and description. |
stsDevice |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.9 |
auxiliary | top | Every stsDevice* attribute below: the owner’s kind, the applications, the keys, attestation, compliance, status, the descriptive labels, the enrolment and Native SSO. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
cn |
one | RFC | 2.5.4.3 |
The device id, a UUID. |
description |
one | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
Its label. |
owner |
one | RFC | 2.5.4.32 |
The DN of its one owner: a person or an application. |
stsDeviceAndroidKey |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.543 |
The id of each key attested by an Android chain whose serials were kept, derived from stsDeviceKey on every write so the Android attestation recheck reads only the devices holding one (#615). |
stsDeviceApplication |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.544 |
The DN of every application that used it. |
stsDeviceAttestation |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.545 |
attested when any key’s attestation was verified, else self-asserted. Derived on every write. |
stsDeviceBrowser |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.546 |
JSON: a remembered browser’s state (#265) — the token generation, when it and the one before were issued, the browser it was bound to, and when the second factor was last given on it. No token and no secret. |
stsDeviceCompliance |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.547 |
compliant or not-compliant; absent is unknown. |
stsDeviceComplianceChange |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.548 |
JSON: the last compliance change — status, previous, at, source (admin, mdm, test-control, caep), actor, reason. |
stsDeviceCredentialId |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.549 |
The credential id of each linked WebAuthn key, derived from stsDeviceKey on every write so a sign-in finds its device by index. |
stsDeviceEnrolment |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.550 |
JSON: method (native-sso, admin, portal, est, scep), at, actor. |
stsDeviceKey |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.551 |
One JSON value per key: id, kind (x509, jwk, webauthn), thumbprint, label, added, addedBy, proof, attestation and the public material. Never a secret. |
stsDeviceKeyThumbprint |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.552 |
|
stsDeviceLastUsed |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.553 |
When it was last used, ISO 8601. |
stsDeviceModel |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.554 |
Descriptive. |
stsDeviceOs |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.555 |
Descriptive. |
stsDeviceOwnerKind |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.556 |
person or application. |
stsDevicePlatform |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.557 |
ios, ipados, android, macos, windows, linux, chromeos or other. |
stsDeviceRiskChange |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.558 |
JSON: the last risk level change — level, previous, at, source (risk, compromise, admin), actor, reason. |
stsDeviceRiskLevel |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.559 |
LOW, MEDIUM or HIGH (CAEP’s risk levels); absent is unassessed. Set by risk scoring and by a compromise. |
stsDeviceSecretHash |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.560 |
Secret. SHA-256 of its Native SSO device_secret. Withheld from every LDAP read. |
stsDeviceSession |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.561 |
The sign-on session the secret is good for. |
stsDeviceStatus |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.562 |
compromised; absent is active. |
stsDeviceStatusChange |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.563 |
JSON: the last status change. |
Federation relationship
TypeSpec model FederationRelationship.
Container ou=federations.
Recorded in ../federation/federation.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
applicationProcess |
RFC | 2.5.6.11 |
structural | top | The same registered class ou=applications uses, and for the same reason: it is the one that fits a party in a protocol at all, and it brings cn, description, seeAlso, ou and l with it. |
stsFederation |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.10 |
auxiliary | top | INVENTED. No registered LDAP schema has a federation partner, because every product that stores one (AD FS, Shibboleth, Keycloak, Ping) keeps it in its own database. These are this service’s own names in the way stsApplication’s already are. |
top |
RFC | 2.5.6.0 |
abstract | The abstract class every entry carries. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
cn |
one | RFC | 2.5.4.3 |
The RDN value, equal to fedId. Unlike an application entry there is no digest case here: an id that would not fit is refused at creation rather than hashed. From this register. |
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
One line per thing that has happened to this relationship. From this register. |
fedAcceptSignout |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.80 |
HONOUR THE PARTNER’S SIGN-OUT: a SAML LogoutRequest, an OpenID Connect Back-Channel or Front-Channel logout, a WS-Federation cleanup. ON by default — the partner is the authority on the person’s sign-on, and when it ends a session or disables an account there, this is the only signal that reaches here. Off, every one of them is refused (STS-FED-0123) and the session here lives its whole lifetime. From this register. |
fedAllowedTenants |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.83 |
MICROSOFT, ANY TENANT ONLY: the tenant ids whose people may sign in, one per value. fedPeer then holds {tenantid}, filled from each token’s tid, and a token from a tenant not listed is refused. Empty refuses every tenant. From this register. |
fedAllowUnencrypted |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.81 |
ACCEPT A PLAINTEXT ASSERTION IN PRODUCT MODE. OFF by default, and off means a SAML 2.0 or WS-Federation assertion, or an OpenID Connect id_token by form_post, that is NOT encrypted to this relationship’s key is refused (STS-FED-0140). WARNING: turning it on lets the partner send the person’s NameID, mail, groups and every other attribute IN CLEAR through their browser — its history, its extensions and every TLS-terminating proxy on the way. Turn it on only for a partner that cannot encrypt, and prefer asking it to. Development mode accepts plaintext whatever this says. From this register. |
fedAllowUnsolicited |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.82 |
Accept a response this service did not ask for — SAML 2.0’s unsolicited Response, and SAML 1.1’s ONLY mode of operation. OFF by default for SAML 2.0 and forced ON for SAML 1.1, because that profile has no request to be in response to. Turning it on for SAML 2.0 removes the InResponseTo check, which is worth knowing rather than worth hiding. From this register. |
fedApplication |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.84 |
THE POINTER, and the whole of what this side stores about the partner: the identifier of its entry in ou=applications. Its entityID, its assertion consumer service, its redirect URIs and its certificate live THERE, where every protocol module already reads them. Copying any of them here would be the two-stores failure this repository is arranged to avoid. From this register. |
fedApplicationUse |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.85 |
THE SAME TWO COUNTS, SPLIT BY THE APPLICATION THE SIGN-IN WAS FOR — one value per application, packed as application\|authentications\|users\|lastUser\|lastSeen. It exists because fedAuthentications answers “how much has crossed this relationship” and the map at /admin/federation/map has to answer “how much has crossed it FOR EACH of the applications configured to use it”, which is a different question the moment a second application names the same partner. IT IS SERVICE-PROVIDER SIDE ONLY, and that is not an omission. An identity-provider-side relationship names exactly ONE application (fedApplication), so its per-application count IS fedAuthentications and a second attribute holding the same number under another name is the copy that comes to disagree. A VALUE IS WRITTEN ONLY FOR A PAIR THIS SERVICE IS CONFIGURED FOR, checked against the live configuration at the moment of the write rather than trusted from the request — see applicationConfiguredFor(). Without that check this attribute would be an unbounded list of strings anybody who can reach /federation/login/{id} chose, on the one entry in this directory whose contents decide whether an assertion is refused. \| IN EITHER FREE-TEXT FIELD IS REPLACED BY ~ ON THE WAY IN, which is the trade this format makes and it is stated rather than discovered: this is a packed counter drawn on a picture, not an identifier anything joins on. The application a row is FILED under is compared in the same packed spelling throughout, so a pair round-trips to itself whatever it is called. From this register. |
fedAttributeMap |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.86 |
ONE VALUE PER MAPPING, written <incoming name>=<LDAP attribute>. What is NOT listed here still arrives — federation_map.js has a default table covering the ordinary OIDC claims, the SAML urn:oid: names and the WS-Federation claim URIs — so this is for the partner’s own inventions rather than for the names everybody uses. From this register. |
fedAuthentications |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.87 |
How many credentials have crossed this relationship. ASSIGNED on every change — a counter that accumulated values would be nonsense — and it is a live number in a directory entry, which a real directory would not hold. From this register. |
fedAuthnMechanism |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.88 |
HOW THIS SERVICE AUTHENTICATES THE PERSON when this partner asks it to: password, password-mfa, webauthn, spnego — a Kerberos ticket the browser already holds, with no screen at all — wallet — a credential this realm issued, presented from the person’s wallet — or federation, which sends them on to another relationship and is what makes this service an identity BRIDGE between two protocols. EMPTY MEANS THIS RELATIONSHIP SAYS NOTHING, which is not the same as password: it falls through to appFederationRelationship on the application entry and then to the sign-in screen, which is exactly what every relationship did before this attribute existed. From this register. |
fedAuthnRelationship |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.89 |
WHICH RELATIONSHIP THE PERSON IS SENT TO, when the mechanism is federation. It names a SERVICE-PROVIDER-side relationship in THIS realm — the register is per realm, so an id from another one names nothing here — and it is checked when it is USED rather than when it is written, because the relationship it names can be disabled or deleted afterwards by somebody who never looked at this entry. Ignored by every other mechanism, and required by this one: readinessOf() names it. From this register. |
fedAuthorizeParams |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.90 |
EXTRA AUTHORIZATION REQUEST PARAMETERS, one per value, written <name>=<value>, for a provider that needs one (Twitch’s claims, to be sent an address). OpenID Connect and OAuth 2.0 only. The parameters this service sets itself — response_type, client_id, redirect_uri, state, scope, nonce, code_challenge, code_challenge_method, response_mode, request and request_uri — are refused here, because one of them changed here would undo a check this service makes. From this register. |
fedAutocreateUsers |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.91 |
DYNAMIC PROVISIONING: create a directory entry the first time this partner signs somebody in. Written TRUE when a relationship is created in development and FALSE in product (mode.defaultsFederatedAutocreate()); a relationship that stores neither reads the same way. OFF means the person must ALREADY have an entry here — provisioned ahead of time, by SCIM or by hand — and a sign-in for somebody who does not is refused, because a session needs an entry to be the subject of. (Until 2026-09-14 OFF gave a session and no entry; a stable subject made that state impossible.) From this register. |
fedBinding |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.92 |
Which binding the outbound SAML AuthnRequest goes on: HTTP-Redirect (the default, and what every identity provider supports) or HTTP-POST. It says nothing about the response, which arrives on whatever binding the partner sends it on and is accepted on all of them. From this register. |
fedClientCertificate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.750 |
Secret. OPENID CONNECT, fedFapi 1-advanced ONLY (#931). THE TLS CLIENT CERTIFICATE this service presents when it dials the partner’s token and UserInfo endpoints: one JSON row holding a clientAuth certificate from this realm’s TLS Client Issuing CA (subject CN=federation |
fedClientId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.93 |
THIS SERVICE’S client_id AT THE PARTNER. Ours, issued by them — not to be confused with an oauthClientId on an application entry, which is a client’s id here. From this register. |
fedClientSecret |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.94 |
Secret. THIS SERVICE’S SECRET AT THE PARTNER, in the clear, in a directory where every bind succeeds. It is a REAL credential at a REAL foreign service, which is a stronger statement than anything else in this directory — see the header. Never written to the audit log and never printed on a page. From this register. |
fedClientSigningKey |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.95 |
Secret. APPLE ONLY: THE PRIVATE KEY this service signs its client secret with (the .p8 file Apple issued, a P-256 key in PKCS #8 PEM). It is a credential at Apple. It is sealed under the key-encryption key wherever keys persist, never shown and never written to the audit log. A client secret signed with it lives five minutes and is minted per token request. From this register. |
fedContentEncryptionAlgorithm |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.96 |
THE CIPHER OVER THE ASSERTION OR THE ID TOKEN, and the only one accepted: aes256-gcm (the default) or aes128-gcm for XML, A256GCM (the default) or A128GCM for JOSE. AES-CBC — XML Encryption’s aes-cbc and JOSE’s ACBC-HS* — is refused in every mode: the XML form is the padding oracle of Jager and Somorovsky (2011), and a partner that can do GCM in one can in the other. From this register. |
fedDiscovery |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.97 |
OPENID CONNECT ONLY. TRUE reads the partner’s endpoints and its jwks_uri from its discovery document, {fedPeer}/.well-known/openid-configuration, at the start of every sign-in (OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 section 4), whose issuer must be fedPeer exactly; fedSsoUrl, fedTokenUrl, fedUserinfoUrl and fedJwksUri are then not read. The address is derived from fedPeer, which an administrator configured, and never from a request. FALSE, the default: the endpoints are configured by hand. From this register. |
fedEmailsUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.98 |
A SECOND PROFILE ENDPOINT, for a provider that publishes a person’s verified address apart from the rest (GitHub’s /user/emails). Dialled with the same access token and under the same policy as fedUserinfoUrl, and only for a relationship whose provider profile reads it. Its failure costs the address, never the sign-in. From this register. |
fedEnabled |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.99 |
TRUE/FALSE. A relationship is created DISABLED and nothing about it does anything until it is turned on: a half-configured partner that silently accepted assertions would be the failure this whole register exists to prevent. From this register. |
fedEncryptionKey |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.100 |
Secret. THE KEY TABLE: one JSON row per key this relationship decrypts with — its kid, its key type, current or previous, its certificate and chain under this realm’s Intermediate, and the private key, SEALED under the key-encryption key wherever keys persist. A previous row is kept until its retiresAt and then removed by the scheduler job federation.encryption-key-retire. Written only by create, rotate and that job; WITHHELD from every LDAP search in product and from every page and /admin-api reply, which publish the public half. The key type is a column so a hybrid post-quantum key can be a row beside the classical one once one is registered. From this register. |
fedEncryptionKeyType |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.101 |
THE KIND OF KEY A PARTNER ENCRYPTS TO: rsa-3072 (the default for SAML 2.0 and WS-Federation) or ec-p256 (the default for OpenID Connect) — or, for OpenID Connect only, a post-quantum one (#82): x-wing (HPKE-10-KE, ML-KEM-768 + X25519) or ml-kem-768 (ML-KEM-768), an AKP key published in the relationship’s JWKS with no certificate, from Internet-Drafts few partners implement yet. Changing it issues a new key of that kind at once and keeps the old one for federation.encryptionKeyGraceS, as a rotation does. From this register. |
fedEndSessionUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.102 |
THE PARTNER’S OpenID Connect end_session_endpoint (RP-Initiated Logout 1.0), from its discovery document. When a person signs out HERE, the sign-out page offers to send them there with the partner’s own ID Token as id_token_hint, this relationship’s client_id, and this relationship’s single logout endpoint as post_logout_redirect_uri — which the partner must have registered. The ID Token is kept on the session only while this is set. Empty: the partner is not told. From this register. |
fedFapi |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.749 |
OPENID CONNECT ONLY. The FAPI client profile used when this service signs a person in at the partner (#931). Empty, the default, is today’s OpenID Connect relying party. 1-advanced (FAPI 1.0 Advanced) forces response type code id_token, PKCE S256 and a PS256 request object by value, presents the relationship’s TLS client certificate (fedClientCertificate) to the token and UserInfo endpoints so the partner can bind its access tokens to it (RFC 8705), authenticates with private_key_jwt or, where fedTokenAuth is tls_client_auth, with that certificate, and does not use DPoP. 2-security (FAPI 2.0 Security Profile) forces discovery, a pushed authorization request, response type code, PKCE S256, private_key_jwt and DPoP. 2-message-signing adds a PS256 request object inside that push and a signed authorization response (JARM). A 2.x profile forces private_key_jwt whatever fedTokenAuth says. This service does not act as a CIBA client, and only 1-advanced presents a client certificate. From this register. |
fedFirstSeen |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.103 |
GeneralizedTime: when this relationship was first USED, which is not when it was created. From this register. |
fedHomeRealmDomain |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.104 |
HOME-REALM DISCOVERY (#148): an authorization request whose OpenID Connect Enterprise Extensions domain_hint is one of these goes straight to this partner’s sign-in, unless the application names a partner of its own. Compared case-insensitively and exactly. A routing hint only — who is ADMITTED is fedSubjectDomain’s. From this register. |
fedId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.105 |
THE KEY: a short name an operator chose, unique across both roles. It is the RDN as well, unlike an application’s, because this register is CONFIGURED rather than observed — nobody has to accept whatever a protocol presented, so the id can simply be required to be RDN-safe and short. From this register. |
fedIdTokenSignedResponseAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.106 |
OPENID CONNECT ONLY. THE ONE ALGORITHM the partner signs this relationship’s ID Tokens and Logout Tokens with — what was registered at the partner as id_token_signed_response_alg (OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 3.1.3.7 step 7, Back-Channel Logout 1.0 section 2.6). A token signed with any other is refused, even one the partner’s key verifies. Empty, the default: any algorithm of the verifying key’s family that federation.jwtAlgorithms allows. Set it: an empty one accepts a token signed by another of the partner’s keys under another algorithm. From this register. |
fedInitiateLogin |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.107 |
OPENID CONNECT ONLY. TRUE answers this relationship’s login initiation endpoint, /federation/initiate-login/{id}, which the partner registers as initiate_login_uri (OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 4): a sign-in the PARTNER starts, naming itself in iss, which must be fedPeer. A login_hint is passed on, and a target_link_uri is followed only to a path on this service. FALSE, the default, refuses it: a page anywhere could otherwise start a sign-in in a person’s browser. From this register. |
fedJwks |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.108 |
The partner’s public keys as a JWKS document, verbatim. Read BEFORE fedJwksUri and never refreshed, so a relationship carrying this makes no outbound request for keys at all. From this register. |
fedJwksUri |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.109 |
The partner’s JWKS. FETCHED — which is the exact opposite of what oauthJwksUri on an application entry does, and the difference is the whole argument in federation_http.js: that one is a URL an unauthenticated caller REGISTERED, this one is a URL an administrator CONFIGURED. Leave it empty and paste the keys into fedJwks instead if this service is not to make the call. From this register. |
fedKeyId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.110 |
APPLE ONLY: the id of the Sign in with Apple key, the kid of the client secret this service signs. From this register. |
fedKeyManagementAlgorithm |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.111 |
HOW THE PARTNER WRAPS OR AGREES THE CONTENT KEY, and the only one accepted. XML (SAML 2.0, WS-Federation): rsa-oaep — XML Encryption 1.1’s RSA-OAEP with SHA-256 and MGF1-SHA-256 — for an RSA key, ecdh-es (ConcatKDF, kw-aes256) for an EC one. JOSE (an OpenID Connect ID Token): RSA-OAEP-256 or RSA-OAEP for an RSA key, ECDH-ES, ECDH-ES+A128KW or ECDH-ES+A256KW for an EC one. WARNING: RSA-OAEP is OAEP over SHA-1, offered for a partner that has nothing newer; RSA-OAEP-256 is the one to use. rsa-1_5 and RSA1_5 are refused in every mode (Bleichenbacher). Empty means the default for the key type. From this register. |
fedLastError |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.112 |
WHY THE LAST ATTEMPT FAILED, in this service’s own words. It is the most useful attribute here and it is why refusals are recorded rather than only logged: a federation that does not work fails at somebody else’s service, and “the signature did not verify against the configured certificate” is the sentence that ends the argument about whose end is broken. From this register. |
fedLastErrorAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.113 |
GeneralizedTime for the line above. Separate, so that an old error beside a recent success reads as history rather than as the current state. From this register. |
fedLastSeen |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.114 |
GeneralizedTime, the most recent use. From this register. |
fedLastUser |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.115 |
The most recent identity. On the entry rather than in memory because the entry is the store. From this register. |
fedLocalEntityId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.116 |
WHAT THIS SERVICE IS CALLED TO THIS PARTNER, when that is not the name this service derives. Empty — the default — derives it from the base URL the browser reached this service at ( |
fedMayAssertAdministrators |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.117 |
LET THIS PARTNER SIGN IN A CONSOLE ADMINISTRATOR. OFF by default, and off means a person in the Admin Read or Admin Write roster — or holding REMOTE_PEPS — is refused whatever else is true, a valid link included (STS-FED-0093). Turning it on makes this partner’s signing key a key to the console for every administrator linked to it. From this register. |
fedName |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.118 |
What to call the partner on a page. The id is the name when none is given, because inventing a friendly name would be inventing a fact. From this register. |
fedPeer |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.119 |
THE PARTNER’S OWN IDENTIFIER, in whatever its protocol calls it: a SAML entityID, an OpenID Connect issuer, a WS-Federation wtrealm. On a service-provider-side relationship it is CHECKED — an assertion whose Issuer is not this string is refused — which is why it is not merely documentation, and since 2026-09-12 it is REQUIRED there: a relationship without it is not fully configured. From this register. |
fedProtocol |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.120 |
One of saml2, saml11, wsfed, oidc, oauth2 — the five sign-in protocols — or ssf, a partner that only sends Shared Signals and signs nobody in. From this register. |
fedProvider |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.121 |
THE CONSUMER OR SOCIAL PROVIDER THIS RELATIONSHIP IS (google, discord, github, generic-oidc, generic-oauth2), or empty for an enterprise partner. Set when the relationship is created and never changed: the provider’s profile wrote its endpoints onto this entry then, and supplies at every sign-in where the subject, the address and its verification come from. A relationship naming a provider is in the consumer category, which a realm turns on with federation.consumerProviders. From this register. |
fedProvisionCap |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.122 |
HOW MANY PEOPLE THIS RELATIONSHIP MAY CREATE. 0 is unlimited. Empty is unlimited for an enterprise partner; a CONSUMER or social provider’s relationship is never unlimited by default: it is created with federation.consumerProvisionCap (10000 unless the realm says otherwise) written here, and an empty value means that setting. At the cap a new subject is refused STS-FED-0090; a person already linked still signs in. ldap.maxEntries remains the realm ceiling. Not a count of sign-ins — fedUsers is that. From this register. |
fedProvisionGroups |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.123 |
BUILD GROUP MEMBERSHIPS FROM THE PARTNER’S TOKEN (#358). OFF by default, and a missing value is off. On, each group name the assertion carries becomes a membership of the person this sign-in provisioned, on every successful sign-in. A group created this way is marked with this relationship. A name that already exists and is not marked as this relationship’s is ignored, audited (STS-FED-0161) and the sign-in continues. A group that grants something by being held — a console group, a role’s member group, an owner group, a group a policy names — is never created or joined (STS-FED-0164). It does not satisfy fedSubjectGroup: that rule runs before anybody is added. From this register. |
fedProvisionIdleMinutes |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.124 |
DISABLE A PERSON THIS RELATIONSHIP IS THE ONLY SIGN-IN PATH FOR, once federationLastSeen is older than this many minutes. Empty or 0 is off: nobody is disabled for being idle. The entry and the link are kept. A person with a local userPassword, or a link through another relationship, is left alone. A partner’s account-disabled signal is separate (STS-FED-0156) and blocks only that partner’s sign-ins. From this register. |
fedRefreshEverySeconds |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.125 |
With fedRefreshTokens on: how often, in seconds, a session’s tokens are refreshed. Empty: when the access token expires (its expires_in), or hourly where the partner names no expiry. The scheduler job federation.partner-refresh looks every fifteen seconds. From this register. |
fedRefreshTokens |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.126 |
OPENID CONNECT ONLY. TRUE keeps the refresh token the partner issues at sign-in, sealed, with the session it started, and uses it to keep that session’s identity current (OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 12): every fedRefreshEverySeconds the session’s tokens are refreshed, a new ID Token must name the same iss and sub, and UserInfo must still answer for that sub. A refresh the partner refuses, or an answer that fails those checks, ENDS the session. The token dies with the session. FALSE, the default: the partner’s tokens are used once, at sign-in, and discarded — nothing here holds a credential at another service, and the partner’s own sign-out and Shared Signals are what end the session early. From this register. |
fedRegister |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.127 |
OPENID CONNECT ONLY, with fedDiscovery. TRUE has this service REGISTER ITSELF at the partner (OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0, RFC 7591) at the registration_endpoint its discovery document names, whenever the relationship holds no fedClientId or holds one registered with another issuer — at the start of a sign-in, or by an administrator’s register-partner. The client_id and secret the partner issues are written to fedClientId and fedClientSecret (sealed). What is registered is this relationship: its assertion consumer service, response type, client authentication, the algorithms set here and, for request objects, the public key that signs them. FALSE, the default: the client is registered at the partner by hand. From this register. |
fedRegisteredIssuer |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.128 |
The issuer fedClientId was registered with by fedRegister. Written by the registration; clear it, with fedClientId, to register again at the next sign-in. From this register. |
fedRelease |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.129 |
WHICH ATTRIBUTES ARE RELEASED TO THIS PARTNER, by claim or attribute name. It FILTERS what /admin/claims, /admin/saml-attributes and the groups claim would otherwise put in an artifact for this audience, and it can touch nothing else — not sub, not iss, not exp, not a NameID. NO VALUES HERE MEANS NO POLICY, not release nothing; see the header, where the difference is argued. From this register. |
fedRequestObject |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.130 |
OPENID CONNECT ONLY. Send the authorization request as a Request Object (OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 6, RFC 9101): request (by value) or request_uri (by reference — the partner fetches it, once, from /federation/request/{id}/{handle}). Signed under fedRequestObjectSigningAlg with this realm’s key. Empty, the default: a plain authorization request. From this register. |
fedRequestObjectSigningAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.131 |
The algorithm a Request Object is signed with: RS256 (the default), PS256 or ES256 under this realm’s key, or none — an UNSIGNED one, which Core 6.2 allows only by reference over https; a warning: the partner then has only the TLS of the fetch to say this service wrote it. From this register. |
fedRequireSignedLogout |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.132 |
REQUIRE THE PARTNER’S SAML LogoutRequest AND LogoutResponse TO BE SIGNED, as saml-profiles-2.0-os section 4.4.4.1 says they MUST be. ON by default and ALWAYS on in product mode, where turning it off is refused (STS-FED-0132). Off — development only — accepts an UNSIGNED logout message, which lets anybody who can name a person’s partner session end it: a partner under test that cannot sign yet is the only reason to. A signature that IS present is verified either way. From this register. |
fedResponseMode |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.133 |
HOW THE AUTHORIZATION RESPONSE COMES BACK. Empty, the default: query for code, and form_post (OAuth 2.0 Form Post Response Mode) for an OpenID Connect response type carrying an ID Token or an access token. form_post, which Sign in with Apple requires whenever a name or an address is asked for, arrives as a cross-site POST, so a browser sends it no SameSite=Lax cookie. fragment, OpenID Connect only, is the default of those response types in the specification: the answer is in the URL fragment, and a page with one script here posts it on. It puts the ID Token in the browser’s history, which form_post does not: use it only for a partner that cannot post. query cannot carry an ID Token or an access token. From this register. |
fedResponseType |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.134 |
code (the default), id_token, or one of OpenID Connect’s other four: id_token token (implicit), code id_token, code token and code id_token token (hybrid). id_token with form_post is the shape that needs NO back channel and therefore no token endpoint, no client secret and no outbound request — which is the only way to federate with an OIDC partner from a deployment that has no egress at all. An ID Token from the authorization endpoint must carry the nonce, and c_hash and at_hash wherever a code or an access token came with it. From this register. |
fedRole |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.135 |
WHICH END THIS SERVICE IS: service-provider (it consumes) or identity-provider (it asserts). One relationship is one direction — see the header. From this register. |
fedScope |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.136 |
The scope asked of the partner. openid profile email is the default for an OIDC relationship and there is no default for an OAuth 2.0 one, because what an OAuth 2.0 authorization server will give you is entirely local to it. From this register. |
fedSignalEmailMatch |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.138 |
LET THIS PARTNER’S SHARED SIGNALS NAME A PERSON BY MAIL. OFF by default: a Security Event Token from a transmitter with this partner’s issuer names a person by iss_sub, through the person’s federationLink. On, an email subject matches the one person with that mail address as well — an address is not an identifier (OpenID Connect Core section 5.7), so only for a partner whose addresses this realm trusts. From this register. |
fedSignalsBearer |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.139 |
Secret. A BEARER TOKEN THE PARTNER ISSUED, instead of client credentials. Sealed like fedSignalsClientSecret, and used whenever it is set. From this register. |
fedSignalsClientId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.140 |
THIS SERVICE’S client_id FOR THE PARTNER’S STREAM MANAGEMENT. Empty uses fedClientId. From this register. |
fedSignalsClientSecret |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.141 |
Secret. THE SECRET FOR fedSignalsClientId, SEALED under the key-encryption key wherever keys persist and never shown. Empty uses fedClientSecret, sealed the same way. From this register. |
fedSignalsDelivery |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.142 |
HOW THE PARTNER’S EVENTS ARRIVE: poll (RFC 8936, the ssf.foreign-poll job, the default) or push (RFC 8935, to /federation/signals/{id} with an authorization header only this realm and the partner know). Read when the stream is created; delete and create it again to change it. From this register. |
fedSignalsEnabled |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.143 |
RECEIVE THIS PARTNER’S SHARED SIGNALS. OFF by default on a sign-in relationship, and the whole point of an ssf one, where it is written ON at creation. Off, no push is accepted for this relationship and the poll job skips it; fedEnabled must be on as well. From this register. |
fedSignalsEvents |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.144 |
THE EVENT TYPE URIS THE STREAM ASKS FOR (events_requested). None asks for whatever the partner supports. From this register. |
fedSignalsIssuer |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.145 |
THE PARTNER’S SSF ISSUER, when it is not fedPeer. Empty — the default — uses fedPeer, which is right for an OpenID Connect partner whose transmitter shares its issuer. A SAML 2.0 or WS-Federation partner’s entityID is usually NOT its SSF issuer URL, so set it there. The configuration document is fetched from /.well-known/ssf-configuration under it (SSF 1.0 section 7) and must name it, and every SET’s iss must be it. From this register. |
fedSignalsScope |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.146 |
The scope asked for with client credentials. Empty asks for ssf.read ssf.manage, the CAEP Interoperability Profile’s two (section 2.7.3). From this register. |
fedSignalsTokenUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.147 |
WHERE THIS REALM GETS AN ACCESS TOKEN FOR THE PARTNER’S STREAM MANAGEMENT, by client credentials. Empty uses fedTokenUrl — the same authorization server the sign-in relationship already dials. From this register. |
fedSigningCertificate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.148 |
THE PARTNER’S SIGNING CERTIFICATE, base64 DER — the same spelling a ds:X509Certificate carries and the same one samlSigningCertificate uses on an application entry, so one certificate has one spelling across this service. It is what every SAML and WS-Federation assertion is verified against, and it is the single attribute standing between this service and an endpoint anybody could assert anything at. From this register. |
fedSignRequest |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.137 |
Sign the outbound AuthnRequest with THIS service’s key. OFF by default: most identity providers do not require it, and a partner that does will refuse the request in a way that names the problem. When it is on, the certificate to configure at the partner is the one on this service’s own SAML metadata. From this register. |
fedSloBinding |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.149 |
Which binding a LogoutRequest or LogoutResponse this service sends the partner goes on: HTTP-Redirect (the default; the signature is over the query string) or HTTP-POST (an enveloped signature, on a real form with a real button — no script). A message FROM the partner is accepted on either. From this register. |
fedSloUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.150 |
THE PARTNER’S SAML 2.0 SingleLogoutService — where this service sends a signed |
fedSsoUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.151 |
WHERE THE BROWSER IS SENT. The partner’s SAML Single Sign-On service, its SAML 1.1 inter-site transfer service, its WS-Federation passive endpoint, or its OAuth 2.0 authorization endpoint. Required in every protocol, because a relationship with nowhere to send anybody cannot begin. From this register. |
fedSubjectClaim |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.152 |
PLAIN OAUTH 2.0 ONLY: the member of the profile endpoint’s answer that is the partner’s stable identifier for the person, as a dotted path (id, data.id). Empty keeps what this service has always done — sub, then id, then user_id. It is the SUBJECT, the half of a federation link that must never change, which is not the username (fedUsernameSource). An OpenID Connect partner’s subject is the ID Token’s sub, which OpenID Connect Core section 5.7 makes the only stable one, and a consumer provider’s is its profile’s. From this register. |
fedSubjectDomain |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.153 |
A RULE ON TOP OF THE POLICY: the mail domain the partner SENT (the mapped mail, or the mapped username where it is an address) must be one of these, and so must the local entry’s mail where it has one. Compared case-insensitively and exactly: example.com does not admit sub.example.com. Empty: no domain rule. From this register. |
fedSubjectGroup |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.154 |
A RULE ON TOP OF THE POLICY: the person must be a member of one of these groups, each a cn or a DN. An entry this sign-in would CREATE is in no group, so with this set nobody is created. Empty: no group rule. From this register. |
fedSubjectPattern |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.155 |
A RULE ON TOP OF THE POLICY: a regular expression the local entry’s DN must match WHOLE (it is anchored for you), such as uid=[^,]+,ou=users,.* — for an entry this sign-in would create, the DN it would be created at. At most 256 characters, no backreference and no quantifier applied to a group that is itself quantified, and it is tested against at most 1024 characters, so a pattern cannot be made to backtrack for minutes. Empty: no pattern. From this register. |
fedSubjectPolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.156 |
HOW THE PARTNER’S SUBJECT BECOMES A LOCAL PERSON. The subject is the partner’s own stable identifier — iss + sub, a persistent NameID and the partner’s entity ID — and a person carries it as a federationLink. link-at-first-sign-in (the default; empty means it): a linked subject signs in; an unlinked one naming an existing person must first sign in HERE as that person — password, and a second factor where one is held or required — and only then is the link recorded and the partner’s attributes written; one naming nobody gets a new entry namespaced to this relationship where provisioning is on. pre-linked: only a link signs anybody in. jit-namespaced: an unlinked subject always gets a NEW entry, |
fedTeamId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.157 |
APPLE ONLY: the Apple Developer team id, the iss of the client secret this service signs for every token request. From this register. |
fedTokenAuth |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.158 |
HOW THIS SERVICE AUTHENTICATES AT THE PARTNER’S TOKEN ENDPOINT: client_secret_basic (the default, which RFC 6749 section 2.3.1 says a server MUST support) or client_secret_post, for a partner that reads the secret only from the body. With no fedClientSecret this service is a public client and neither applies. tls_client_auth (RFC 8705 section 2.1) authenticates with the relationship’s TLS client certificate (fedClientCertificate) and sends no assertion and no secret; it is for fedFapi 1-advanced alone, and a relationship naming it without that profile is not ready. From this register. |
fedTokenUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.159 |
The partner’s token endpoint, for the authorization code flow. THIS IS ONE OF THE TWO URLS THIS SERVICE WILL ACTUALLY DIAL — see federation_http.js, which is the only outbound request in this repository and argues why a configured URL is a different thing from a registered one. From this register. |
fedTrustAnchor |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.160 |
OPENID CONNECT ONLY. The Entity Identifier of one of this realm’s Trust Anchors (/admin/oidfed). Set, the OP named by fedPeer is resolved through its Trust Chain to that anchor, its endpoints and keys are the openid_provider metadata the chain vouches for, and this service registers with it AUTOMATICALLY under its own Entity Identifier, signing its requests and token-endpoint authentication with its ES256 key — so fedSsoUrl, fedTokenUrl, fedJwks, fedJwksUri, fedClientId and fedClientSecret are not read. Empty, the relationship is configured by hand as always. From this register. |
fedUpdateUserAttributes |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.161 |
Update the person’s directory attributes on EVERY sign-in from the latest assertion or token. ON by default, which is what this service always did. OFF writes the partner’s attributes only when this sign-in CREATED the entry, so a pre-provisioned person — or one somebody has since edited — keeps what the directory says. Which relationship and issuer a person came through is recorded either way. From this register. |
fedUserinfo |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.751 |
OPENID CONNECT ONLY. TRUE, the default (and what an empty value means): the partner’s UserInfo endpoint is asked with the access token at sign-in and at every refresh, and what it answers for the same sub is added to the ID Token’s claims (OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 5.3). FALSE: UserInfo is never asked, whatever fedUserinfoUrl or the discovery document names, and the person’s claims are the ID Token’s alone — for a partner whose UserInfo this relationship may not call, such as a FAPI 1.0 Advanced authorization server that serves its resource elsewhere. From this register. |
fedUserinfoSignedResponseAlg |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.162 |
OPENID CONNECT ONLY. The algorithm a SIGNED UserInfo answer must be signed with — what was registered at the partner as userinfo_signed_response_alg (OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 5.3.2). A signed answer is verified against the partner’s keys whether or not this is set; set, one under another algorithm is not used. Empty, the default: a JSON answer, or a signed one under any algorithm of its key’s family. From this register. |
fedUserinfoUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.163 |
The partner’s UserInfo endpoint, or any endpoint that answers JSON about the bearer of an access token. OPTIONAL for OIDC, where the ID Token usually carries enough, and the ONLY source of attributes for a plain OAuth 2.0 partner whose access token is opaque. The second URL this service will dial. From this register. |
fedUsernameSource |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.164 |
WHICH INCOMING VALUE IS LOOKED UP AT LINK-AT-FIRST-SIGN-IN, and matched under any-existing — a claim name for OIDC/OAuth 2.0, a SAML Attribute Name for the others. Empty means the subject itself: the NameID, or sub. It does not name an entry this sign-in CREATES: that name is the relationship and the partner’s stable subject (#358). From this register. |
fedUsers |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.165 |
How many distinct identities have crossed it. Counted against fedLastUser, so it counts a CHANGE of user rather than a set: right for the ordinary case and an undercount for somebody alternating between two partners. Stated here because it is a number on a page. From this register. |
fedWebFinger |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.166 |
OPENID CONNECT ONLY, with fedDiscovery. TRUE answers /federation/webfinger/{id}, where a PERSON types an identifier (acct:user@host or a URL) and this service asks that host who the person’s OpenID Provider is (OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 section 2, RFC 7033). A WARNING: the host dialled is one a caller chose — this service’s one argued exception of that kind among the federation requests, under the outbound policy (no internal address in product mode, no redirect, the cap). The issuer found must begin with fedPeer, which bounds it to the partner an administrator configured; the person is shown the issuer and continues only by pressing a button. FALSE, the default, refuses. From this register. |
Group
TypeSpec model Group.
Container ou=groups.
Held in the catalogue. No SCHEMA module.
No SCHEMA export. A group grants nothing by being a group.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
groupOfNames |
RFC | 2.5.6.9 |
structural | top | The class the container’s own groups carry. |
groupOfUniqueNames |
RFC | 2.5.6.17 |
structural | top | Also treated as a group. |
groupOfURLs |
not stated | Also treated as a group. The page states no RFC number. | |||
posixGroup |
RFC | 1.3.6.1.1.1.2.2 |
structural | top | RFC 2307. Also treated as a group. |
top |
RFC | 2.5.6.0 |
abstract | The abstract class every entry carries. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
cn |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.3 |
The group’s name, which names the entry (cn= |
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
What the group is for, as an administrator wrote it. |
displayName |
one | RFC | 2.16.840.1.113730.3.1.241 |
The name OpenID Provider Commands metadata shows for the group, where it differs from cn. |
federationRelationship |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.172 |
On a group a federation relationship’s group provisioning created: that relationship’s id. A later sign-in through the relationship may add people only to groups carrying its mark. |
mail |
several | RFC | 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.3 |
The address a notice to the group is sent to (#989). The operator’s to set; nothing verifies it. |
member |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.31 |
The group’s members, one DN per value. Deleting a person leaves their DN here: the directory keeps no referential integrity. |
memberUid |
several | RFC | 1.3.6.1.1.1.1.12 |
The members of a posixGroup (RFC 2307), one bare username per value, read beside member. |
scimExternalId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.417 |
SCIM’s externalId of a Group, which /scim/v2 stores verbatim (models/scim/scim.tsp). The People section names it on people and groups. |
stsAttributePolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.495 |
The named attribute policy this group’s members are held to, or default. Set on the group’s page or with POST /admin-api/groups/set-policy, which accepts only a policy the realm holds. |
stsAuthnPolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.520 |
The named authentication policy this group’s members are held to, or default. Set on the group’s page or with POST /admin-api/groups/set-policy, which accepts only a policy the realm holds. |
stsLocalePolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.573 |
The named locale policy this group’s members are held to, or default. Set on the group’s page or with POST /admin-api/groups/set-policy, which accepts only a policy the realm holds. |
stsPasskeyPolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.608 |
The named passkey policy this group’s members are held to, or default. Set on the group’s page or with POST /admin-api/groups/set-policy, which accepts only a policy the realm holds. |
stsPasswordPolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.619 |
The named password policy this group’s members are held to, or default. Set on the group’s page or with POST /admin-api/groups/set-policy, which accepts only a policy the realm holds. |
stsPostLoginPolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.633 |
The named post-login policy this group’s members are held to, or default. Set on the group’s page or with POST /admin-api/groups/set-policy, which accepts only a policy the realm holds. |
uniqueMember |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.50 |
The members of a groupOfUniqueNames group, one DN per value, read as member is. |
Kerberos trust
TypeSpec model KerberosTrust.
Container ou=kerberosTrusts.
Held in the catalogue. No SCHEMA module.
One entry per trust with another Kerberos realm.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsKrb5Trust |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.11 |
structural | top | This service’s class for this register. |
top |
RFC | 2.5.6.0 |
abstract | The abstract class every entry carries. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
flatName |
one | other standard | The partner’s NetBIOS domain name ([MS-ADTS] 6.1.6.7). A mirror of the record, written with it. | |
securityIdentifier |
one | other standard | The partner domain’s SID, where the trust names one ([MS-ADTS] 6.1.6.7). A mirror of the record, written with it. | |
stsKrb5TrustData |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.570 |
The trust’s whole record as one JSON value: the partner Kerberos realm, its NetBIOS name and domain SID, the type, the trust attributes and which keys are held. The attributes beside it mirror it for an ldapsearch. Written by the console and the management API. |
stsKrb5TrustKeys |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.571 |
Secret. The trust’s keys or shared passwords, as one JSON value sealed where keys persist. Withheld from every directory read. |
trustAttributes |
one | other standard | The trust’s attribute bits as one integer ([MS-ADTS] 6.1.6.7.9). A mirror of the record, written with it. | |
trustDirection |
one | other standard | 1 inbound, 2 outbound, 3 both ([MS-ADTS] 6.1.6.7.12). Derived from which keys the trust holds: the incoming key accepts the partner’s tickets, the outgoing key refers this realm’s people to the partner. | |
trustPartner |
one | other standard | The partner Kerberos realm, lower-cased, as Active Directory’s trustedDomain object names it ([MS-ADTS] 6.1.6.7). A mirror of the record, written with it. | |
trustType |
one | other standard | 2 where the partner is an Active Directory domain (the record names its SID), 3 for any other Kerberos realm ([MS-ADTS] 6.1.6.7.15). Derived, written with the record. |
OpenID Federation entry
TypeSpec model Oidfed.
Container ou=oidfed.
Held in the catalogue. No SCHEMA module.
One entry per federation key, subordinate, anchor or mark.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsOidfedEntry |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.13 |
structural | top | This service’s class for this register. |
top |
RFC | 2.5.6.0 |
abstract | The abstract class every entry carries. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
stsOidfedData |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.585 |
The entry’s record as one JSON value, of the shape its kind says. Written by the console, the management API and the federation endpoints. |
stsOidfedEntityId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.586 |
The Entity Identifier the entry concerns, where it concerns one. Written by this service. |
stsOidfedEvent |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.587 |
A subordinate’s event history, one JSON event per value, on its events entry. Appended by this service. |
stsOidfedKeys |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.588 |
Secret. The realm’s Federation Entity Keys, one JSON row per value, on the keys entry. Withheld from every directory read. |
stsOidfedKind |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.589 |
What the entry holds: keys, subordinate, anchor, mark-type, issued-mark, held-mark, mark-policy, events, suspension or collection. Written by this service. |
Operational attributes
TypeSpec model Operational.
Held in the catalogue. No SCHEMA module.
Returned or computed for an entry. Not a container.
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
createTimestamp |
one | RFC | 2.5.18.1 |
RFC 4512 generalized time. |
entryDN |
one | RFC | 1.3.6.1.1.20 |
RFC 5020. Computed at search time. |
entryUUID |
one | RFC | 1.3.6.1.1.16.4 |
RFC 4530. Assigned at creation and kept through a rename. |
memberOf |
several | not stated | A person’s groups, derived from member. Never stored. | |
modifyTimestamp |
one | RFC | 2.5.18.2 |
RFC 4512 generalized time. |
stsEntryUuidAlias |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.566 |
The losing entryUUID of a two-process create race. |
Person
TypeSpec model Person.
Container ou=users.
Held in the catalogue. No SCHEMA module.
No SCHEMA export. One person is one entry, RDN uid.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
inetOrgPerson |
RFC | 2.16.840.1.113730.3.2.2 |
structural | organizationalPerson | RFC 2798 inetOrgPerson. |
organizationalPerson |
RFC | 2.5.6.7 |
structural | person | RFC 4519 organizationalPerson. |
person |
RFC | 2.5.6.6 |
structural | top | RFC 4519 person. |
top |
RFC | 2.5.6.0 |
abstract | The abstract class every entry carries. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
alsoKnownAs |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.4 |
Other names the person is known by, released as the Identity Assurance also_known_as claim. This service’s own name. |
authnMethod |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.62 |
On any entry whose person authenticated somewhere that STATES how they did it — which today is the sign-in screen and nothing else, because amr is an OIDC vocabulary and a Kerberos AS-REQ has nothing to put in it. There is no standard attribute type for “this account authenticated with more than one factor”: the nearest things in the wild are Active Directory’s msDS-* attributes, which are Microsoft’s own names for something else entirely, and pretending to be one of those would be worse than obviously not being one. |
birthFamilyName |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.64 |
The person’s family name at birth, released as the Identity Assurance birth_family_name claim. This service’s own name. |
birthGivenName |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.65 |
The person’s given name at birth, released as the Identity Assurance birth_given_name claim. This service’s own name. |
birthMiddleName |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.66 |
The person’s middle name at birth, released as the Identity Assurance birth_middle_name claim. This service’s own name. |
c |
one | RFC | 2.5.4.6 |
The country of the person’s address, released in the address claim: an ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code, stored upper-case. Single-valued in RFC 4519. |
cn |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.3 |
The person’s common name, released as the name claim. On person’s MUST list, so it cannot be emptied. An administrator, the person on /portal, SCIM or a federated sign-in writes it; in development an entry this service creates gets an invented one. |
departmentNumber |
several | RFC | 2.16.840.1.113730.3.1.2 |
The person’s department, released as the department claim and mapped by SCIM. |
didMethod |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.68 |
On the entries a DECENTRALIZED IDENTIFIER seeds, and load-bearing rather than decorative: the entry is NAMED by a hash of the DID (didPlan() says why), so didSubject is the only place the identifier itself survives and the only thing locateEntry() can find the entry by. There is no standard attribute type for “the DID this entry is”, which is unsurprising — DID Core postdates the LDAP schema documents by two decades and nobody registered one. |
didSubject |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.72 |
On the entries a DECENTRALIZED IDENTIFIER seeds, and load-bearing rather than decorative: the entry is NAMED by a hash of the DID (didPlan() says why), so didSubject is the only place the identifier itself survives and the only thing locateEntry() can find the entry by. There is no standard attribute type for “the DID this entry is”, which is unsurprising — DID Core postdates the LDAP schema documents by two decades and nobody registered one. |
displayName |
one | RFC | 2.16.840.1.113730.3.1.241 |
The name shown for the person, released as the nickname claim. Single-valued in RFC 2798. |
employeeNumber |
one | RFC | 2.16.840.1.113730.3.1.3 |
The person’s employee number, released as the employee_number claim and mapped by SCIM. Single-valued in RFC 2798. |
employeeType |
several | RFC | 2.16.840.1.113730.3.1.4 |
The person’s relationship to the organisation, such as employee or contractor, released as the employee_type claim and mapped by SCIM. |
federationAttribute |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.167 |
WHERE THIS PERSON CAME FROM, on an entry a FEDERATED sign-in created. Five names, and they exist because this is the one path in this service where an entry is created out of somebody ELSE’S assertion — every other entry under ou=users was made because a credential was presented HERE, and the difference matters to whoever reads the directory afterwards. A person with federationIssuer on their entry has never authenticated to this service at all. federationAttribute is the useful one and the one with no analogue anywhere else here: it lists which of this entry’s OTHER attributes came off a foreign assertion rather than out of the invented-persona sweep. Both kinds are ordinary directory attributes and look identical, and applyVcAttributes() fills in mail, givenName and the rest for everybody — so without this there is no way to tell a real email address a partner sent from one this service made up, which is exactly the question a federated directory entry raises. Nothing reads it; it is there to be read. federationLink (#109, 2026-09-22) is the one that DECIDES anything: a partner’s subject paired with the relationship it came through, <relationship> <issuer> <subject> — see federation/federation_links.ts. It replaced federationSubject, which recorded subjects without saying which partner asserted each and so could not be a link. |
federationIssuer |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.168 |
WHERE THIS PERSON CAME FROM, on an entry a FEDERATED sign-in created. Five names, and they exist because this is the one path in this service where an entry is created out of somebody ELSE’S assertion — every other entry under ou=users was made because a credential was presented HERE, and the difference matters to whoever reads the directory afterwards. A person with federationIssuer on their entry has never authenticated to this service at all. federationAttribute is the useful one and the one with no analogue anywhere else here: it lists which of this entry’s OTHER attributes came off a foreign assertion rather than out of the invented-persona sweep. Both kinds are ordinary directory attributes and look identical, and applyVcAttributes() fills in mail, givenName and the rest for everybody — so without this there is no way to tell a real email address a partner sent from one this service made up, which is exactly the question a federated directory entry raises. Nothing reads it; it is there to be read. federationLink (#109, 2026-09-22) is the one that DECIDES anything: a partner’s subject paired with the relationship it came through, <relationship> <issuer> <subject> — see federation/federation_links.ts. It replaced federationSubject, which recorded subjects without saying which partner asserted each and so could not be a link. |
federationLastSeen |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.169 |
WHERE THIS PERSON CAME FROM, on an entry a FEDERATED sign-in created. Five names, and they exist because this is the one path in this service where an entry is created out of somebody ELSE’S assertion — every other entry under ou=users was made because a credential was presented HERE, and the difference matters to whoever reads the directory afterwards. A person with federationIssuer on their entry has never authenticated to this service at all. federationAttribute is the useful one and the one with no analogue anywhere else here: it lists which of this entry’s OTHER attributes came off a foreign assertion rather than out of the invented-persona sweep. Both kinds are ordinary directory attributes and look identical, and applyVcAttributes() fills in mail, givenName and the rest for everybody — so without this there is no way to tell a real email address a partner sent from one this service made up, which is exactly the question a federated directory entry raises. Nothing reads it; it is there to be read. federationLink (#109, 2026-09-22) is the one that DECIDES anything: a partner’s subject paired with the relationship it came through, <relationship> <issuer> <subject> — see federation/federation_links.ts. It replaced federationSubject, which recorded subjects without saying which partner asserted each and so could not be a link. |
federationLink |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.170 |
WHERE THIS PERSON CAME FROM, on an entry a FEDERATED sign-in created. Five names, and they exist because this is the one path in this service where an entry is created out of somebody ELSE’S assertion — every other entry under ou=users was made because a credential was presented HERE, and the difference matters to whoever reads the directory afterwards. A person with federationIssuer on their entry has never authenticated to this service at all. federationAttribute is the useful one and the one with no analogue anywhere else here: it lists which of this entry’s OTHER attributes came off a foreign assertion rather than out of the invented-persona sweep. Both kinds are ordinary directory attributes and look identical, and applyVcAttributes() fills in mail, givenName and the rest for everybody — so without this there is no way to tell a real email address a partner sent from one this service made up, which is exactly the question a federated directory entry raises. Nothing reads it; it is there to be read. federationLink (#109, 2026-09-22) is the one that DECIDES anything: a partner’s subject paired with the relationship it came through, <relationship> <issuer> <subject> — see federation/federation_links.ts. It replaced federationSubject, which recorded subjects without saying which partner asserted each and so could not be a link. |
givenName |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.42 |
The person’s given name, released as the given_name claim. Written as cn is. |
hobaPublicKey |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.197 |
The person’s RFC 7486 HOBA client public keys, one value per key as <kid> <base64 DER>, registered at /.well-known/hoba/register. Public. |
l |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.7 |
The locality (city) of the person’s address, released in the address claim. |
labeledURI |
several | RFC | 1.3.6.1.4.1.250.1.57 |
A web page about the person: an http or https URL, optionally followed by a label. Released as the website claim. |
mail |
several | RFC | 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.3 |
The person’s email address, released as the email claim. Written by its own control (set-mail) rather than the attribute editor, because a change is verified and the former address is told. |
manager |
several | RFC | 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.10 |
The DN of the person’s manager. The shape of a DN is checked; the entry it names need not exist here. |
mfaAuthenticated |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.206 |
On any entry whose person authenticated somewhere that STATES how they did it — which today is the sign-in screen and nothing else, because amr is an OIDC vocabulary and a Kerberos AS-REQ has nothing to put in it. There is no standard attribute type for “this account authenticated with more than one factor”: the nearest things in the wild are Active Directory’s msDS-* attributes, which are Microsoft’s own names for something else entirely, and pretending to be one of those would be worse than obviously not being one. |
mfaLastAuthTime |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.207 |
On any entry whose person authenticated somewhere that STATES how they did it — which today is the sign-in screen and nothing else, because amr is an OIDC vocabulary and a Kerberos AS-REQ has nothing to put in it. There is no standard attribute type for “this account authenticated with more than one factor”: the nearest things in the wild are Active Directory’s msDS-* attributes, which are Microsoft’s own names for something else entirely, and pretending to be one of those would be worse than obviously not being one. |
middleName |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.208 |
The person’s middle name, released as the middle_name claim. This service’s own name; one value. |
mobile |
several | RFC | 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.41 |
The person’s mobile numbers, released as the msisdn claim and mapped by SCIM. |
o |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.10 |
The organisation the person belongs to, released as the organization claim and mapped by SCIM. |
oauthConsent |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.248 |
WHAT THIS PERSON AGREED AN APPLICATION MAY ASK FOR ON THEIR BEHALF, one value per (application, scope) — 20260901143000Z openid webapp1. Invented for the same reason as everything above it: OAuth 2.0 postdates the LDAP schema documents and registered no attribute type for consent, and the nearest standard thing is nothing at all. The grammar is common/consent.ts’s and is argued there, including why the client_id is LAST (it is the one field with no rule about what it may contain, so it takes the remainder of the value). It is NOT a credential and it grants nothing: it is a record of an answer, and the authorization endpoint reads it only to decide whether to draw the consent screen. The OTHER half of the feature is oauthGlobalConsent, which is on an APPLICATION’s entry and is in the applications schema rather than in this list. |
oauthConsentApplied |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.249 |
A CONSENT AN APPLICATION’S GLOBAL CONSENT ANSWERED FOR THIS PERSON (#537), <when> <scope> <client_id>: written the first time a sign-in passes consent because oauthGlobalConsent covered the scope, so /portal/consents can show it. A record of what happened; it grants nothing and the authorization endpoint never reads it. |
oauthConsentWithdrawn |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.250 |
WHEN THIS PERSON WITHDREW ONE (#172), <when> <scope> <client_id> with the instant to the millisecond, one value per (application, scope). It is what stops a RE-CONSENT reviving a refresh token issued before the withdrawal; common/consent.ts argues it. |
ou |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.11 |
The organisational unit or division the person belongs to, released as the organizational_unit claim and mapped by SCIM. |
pictureUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.327 |
The address of the person’s picture, released as the picture claim. While the person has a profile photo this service holds, it is that photo’s address. This service’s own name; one value. |
placeOfBirthCountry |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.328 |
The country the person was born in, an ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code, released in the Identity Assurance place_of_birth claim. One value: the attribute editor refuses a second. |
placeOfBirthLocality |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.329 |
The locality the person was born in, released in the Identity Assurance place_of_birth claim. One value: the attribute editor refuses a second. |
placeOfBirthRegion |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.330 |
The region the person was born in, released in the Identity Assurance place_of_birth claim. One value: the attribute editor refuses a second. |
postalAddress |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.16 |
The person’s whole postal address as one formatted value, released in the address claim. |
postalCode |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.17 |
The postal code of the person’s address, released in the address claim. |
preferredLanguage |
one | RFC | 2.16.840.1.113730.3.1.39 |
The person’s preferred language, in RFC 2798’s Accept-Language syntax, released as the locale claim. Single-valued in RFC 2798. |
profileUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.331 |
The address of the person’s profile page, an http or https URL, released as the profile claim. This service’s own name; one value. |
pwdAccountLockedTime |
one | other standard | 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.17 |
Set while the account is disabled: 000001010000Z means an administrator, or SCIM’s active: false, disabled it. Every door refuses the person while any value is present (draft-behera-ldap-password-policy). |
pwdChangedTime |
one | other standard | 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.16 |
When the person’s password last changed (draft-behera-ldap-password-policy). Maintained by the password policy. |
pwdHistory |
several | other standard | 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.20 |
Secret. Earlier password hashes, kept for the password policy’s history rule (draft-behera-ldap-password-policy). Withheld from every read. |
pwdReset |
one | other standard | 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.22 |
TRUE when the password must be changed at the next sign-in (draft-behera-ldap-password-policy). |
salutation |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.340 |
A formal salutation for the person, released as the Identity Assurance salutation claim. This service’s own name: no standard attribute type carries it. |
schacCountryOfCitizenship |
several | other standard | The person’s nationalities, one ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code per value, released as the nationalities claim. SCHAC’s name. | |
schacDateOfBirth |
one | other standard | The person’s date of birth, stored YYYYMMDD (SCHAC’s form), released as the birthdate claim. One value: the attribute editor refuses a second. | |
schacGender |
one | other standard | The person’s gender as an ISO/IEC 5218 code, released as the gender claim (male, female, not known or not applicable). SCHAC’s name, single-valued. | |
schacPersonalTitle |
several | other standard | The person’s honorific, such as Dr, released as the Identity Assurance title claim. SCHAC’s name. | |
scimExternalId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.417 |
SCIM’s externalId: the provisioning client’s own identifier for the person, stored verbatim by /scim/v2 and read by nothing else. |
sn |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.4 |
The person’s surname. On person’s MUST list, so it cannot be emptied. Written as cn is, and released as the family_name claim. |
spiffeCredentialStatus |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.438 |
WHETHER THIS IDENTITY MAY STILL BE ISSUED A CREDENTIAL HERE, and this is the one group in this list whose name could be read as a claim the service does not make. SPIFFE HAS NO REVOCATION — GET /spiffe says so, and the Workload API’s crl field is empty because empty is the conforming value, not because it is unimplemented. spiffeCredentialStatus is NOT a certificate status and nothing verifying an SVID consults it: it records the three things in the registry that end an identity’s ability to get a NEW one — its registration entry deleted, its agent banned, its agent deleted — and the certificates already in the world go on verifying until they expire, exactly as SPIFFE intends. The reason is a sentence rather than a code because it is the only thing that explains a status a reader did not expect. spiffeRevokedAt is never cleared, which is mfaLastAuthTime’s rule: it is the history the current-state flag beside it deliberately does not keep. |
spiffeCredentialStatusReason |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.439 |
WHETHER THIS IDENTITY MAY STILL BE ISSUED A CREDENTIAL HERE, and this is the one group in this list whose name could be read as a claim the service does not make. SPIFFE HAS NO REVOCATION — GET /spiffe says so, and the Workload API’s crl field is empty because empty is the conforming value, not because it is unimplemented. spiffeCredentialStatus is NOT a certificate status and nothing verifying an SVID consults it: it records the three things in the registry that end an identity’s ability to get a NEW one — its registration entry deleted, its agent banned, its agent deleted — and the certificates already in the world go on verifying until they expire, exactly as SPIFFE intends. The reason is a sentence rather than a code because it is the only thing that explains a status a reader did not expect. spiffeRevokedAt is never cleared, which is mfaLastAuthTime’s rule: it is the history the current-state flag beside it deliberately does not keep. |
spiffePath |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.453 |
On the entries a SPIFFE identity seeds, and load-bearing for exactly the reason the two above it are: the entry is NAMED by a hash of the SPIFFE ID (spiffePlan() says why), so spiffeSubject is the only place the identifier itself survives and the only thing locateEntry() can find the entry by. spiffePath and spiffeTrustDomain are the two halves of it a reader actually wants to filter on. Note that these are DIFFERENT NAMES from spiffeId and spiffeAgentId one container over: those are on REGISTRATION entries under ou=spiffe and mean “the identity this entry configures”, where these are on a PERSON under ou=users and mean “an identity that authenticated here”. Merging the two spellings would file a registration entry and its holder under one name. |
spiffeRevokedAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.455 |
WHETHER THIS IDENTITY MAY STILL BE ISSUED A CREDENTIAL HERE, and this is the one group in this list whose name could be read as a claim the service does not make. SPIFFE HAS NO REVOCATION — GET /spiffe says so, and the Workload API’s crl field is empty because empty is the conforming value, not because it is unimplemented. spiffeCredentialStatus is NOT a certificate status and nothing verifying an SVID consults it: it records the three things in the registry that end an identity’s ability to get a NEW one — its registration entry deleted, its agent banned, its agent deleted — and the certificates already in the world go on verifying until they expire, exactly as SPIFFE intends. The reason is a sentence rather than a code because it is the only thing that explains a status a reader did not expect. spiffeRevokedAt is never cleared, which is mfaLastAuthTime’s rule: it is the history the current-state flag beside it deliberately does not keep. |
spiffeSubject |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.458 |
On the entries a SPIFFE identity seeds, and load-bearing for exactly the reason the two above it are: the entry is NAMED by a hash of the SPIFFE ID (spiffePlan() says why), so spiffeSubject is the only place the identifier itself survives and the only thing locateEntry() can find the entry by. spiffePath and spiffeTrustDomain are the two halves of it a reader actually wants to filter on. Note that these are DIFFERENT NAMES from spiffeId and spiffeAgentId one container over: those are on REGISTRATION entries under ou=spiffe and mean “the identity this entry configures”, where these are on a PERSON under ou=users and mean “an identity that authenticated here”. Merging the two spellings would file a registration entry and its holder under one name. |
spiffeTrustDomain |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.460 |
On the entries a SPIFFE identity seeds, and load-bearing for exactly the reason the two above it are: the entry is NAMED by a hash of the SPIFFE ID (spiffePlan() says why), so spiffeSubject is the only place the identifier itself survives and the only thing locateEntry() can find the entry by. spiffePath and spiffeTrustDomain are the two halves of it a reader actually wants to filter on. Note that these are DIFFERENT NAMES from spiffeId and spiffeAgentId one container over: those are on REGISTRATION entries under ou=spiffe and mean “the identity this entry configures”, where these are on a PERSON under ou=users and mean “an identity that authenticated here”. Merging the two spellings would file a registration entry and its holder under one name. |
st |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.8 |
The state or province of the person’s address, released in the address claim. |
street |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.9 |
The street part of the person’s address, released in the address claim. |
stsAcmeEabKey |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.486 |
Secret. AND AN EIGHTH SINCE 2026-09-13: what ACME, EST and SCEP issued to a person, the two protocol credentials, and the host names an administrator registered — common/cert_enrollment.ts is the register. The private key, the EAB key and the challenge are WITHHELD from every dump and search in every mode (cert_enrollment.withheldValues()); the certificates and the host names are public. |
stsActivationExpires |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.487 |
When the pending activation link stops working. |
stsActivationToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.488 |
Secret. The scrypt hash of a pending activation link. Withheld from every read. |
stsAndroidAttestedCredential |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.489 |
THE ANDROID MARKER (#615): the credential ids of the keys above whose trusted android-key attestation the recheck asks Google’s status list about, derived on every write of the keys (deriveAndroidMarker()) so that the recheck reads its holders rather than everybody. |
stsAppPassword |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.490 |
Secret. The person’s app passwords, one JSON value holding each one’s name, the doors it is scoped to, its scrypt hash and its last use. Withheld from every read. |
stsAssertionIssuer |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.491 |
AND A SIXTH SINCE 2026-09-11: the RFC 7523 SIGNING KEY PAIRS a person may hold — SEVERAL since #1290 (2026-11-03), one value per key pair in two multi-valued attributes, and a declaration. They are the PERSON’s counterpart to oauthAssertion* on an application — no code path crosses the two sets, which is the same rule applications.js states about its own pair. common/person_assertions.js is the register and argues the whole thing, including the one refusal it exists for: a person’s key signs an assertion ABOUT THAT PERSON and about nobody else. stsAssertionPrivateKey IS THE THIRD ATTRIBUTE IN THIS DIRECTORY THAT CAN BE READ BACK AND USED, after the authenticator’s shared secret and the recovery codes, and each of its values is sealed under the key-encryption key wherever that key outlives the process for exactly their reason. stsAssertionKeyPair is public by construction: a certificate, a chain, a JWK, a kid and an expiry are all things a relying party is MEANT to be given. The seven single-valued attributes it replaced (stsAssertionJwks, …Certificate, …CertificateChain, …Kid, …ExpiresAt, …KeySource) are gone, with no reader left. |
stsAssertionKeyPair |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.492 |
AND A SIXTH SINCE 2026-09-11: the RFC 7523 SIGNING KEY PAIRS a person may hold — SEVERAL since #1290 (2026-11-03), one value per key pair in two multi-valued attributes, and a declaration. They are the PERSON’s counterpart to oauthAssertion* on an application — no code path crosses the two sets, which is the same rule applications.js states about its own pair. common/person_assertions.js is the register and argues the whole thing, including the one refusal it exists for: a person’s key signs an assertion ABOUT THAT PERSON and about nobody else. stsAssertionPrivateKey IS THE THIRD ATTRIBUTE IN THIS DIRECTORY THAT CAN BE READ BACK AND USED, after the authenticator’s shared secret and the recovery codes, and each of its values is sealed under the key-encryption key wherever that key outlives the process for exactly their reason. stsAssertionKeyPair is public by construction: a certificate, a chain, a JWK, a kid and an expiry are all things a relying party is MEANT to be given. The seven single-valued attributes it replaced (stsAssertionJwks, …Certificate, …CertificateChain, …Kid, …ExpiresAt, …KeySource) are gone, with no reader left. |
stsAssertionPrivateKey |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.493 |
Secret. AND A SIXTH SINCE 2026-09-11: the RFC 7523 SIGNING KEY PAIRS a person may hold — SEVERAL since #1290 (2026-11-03), one value per key pair in two multi-valued attributes, and a declaration. They are the PERSON’s counterpart to oauthAssertion* on an application — no code path crosses the two sets, which is the same rule applications.js states about its own pair. common/person_assertions.js is the register and argues the whole thing, including the one refusal it exists for: a person’s key signs an assertion ABOUT THAT PERSON and about nobody else. stsAssertionPrivateKey IS THE THIRD ATTRIBUTE IN THIS DIRECTORY THAT CAN BE READ BACK AND USED, after the authenticator’s shared secret and the recovery codes, and each of its values is sealed under the key-encryption key wherever that key outlives the process for exactly their reason. stsAssertionKeyPair is public by construction: a certificate, a chain, a JWK, a kid and an expiry are all things a relying party is MEANT to be given. The seven single-valued attributes it replaced (stsAssertionJwks, …Certificate, …CertificateChain, …Kid, …ExpiresAt, …KeySource) are gone, with no reader left. |
stsAudSub |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.505 |
AND A PERSON’S ACCOUNT ID AT EACH CLIENT (#148, Enterprise Extensions section 2.3): <client_id> <aud_sub> per value, recorded by an administrator and sent as the ID Token’s aud_sub to that client. |
stsAuthzenApplication |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.746 |
AN AUTHZEN CALLER’S APPLICATION SCOPE AND CALLBACKS, ON A PERSON OR A SERVICE ACCOUNT (#563, #1180): the applications they may name in context.application at /access/v1, and the access request callback URLs registered for them. An application carries the same two as appAuthzenApplication and appAuthzenCallbackUri. Written by an administrator only, through authzen/authzen_admin.ts; an sts* name is refused by every other door. |
stsAuthzenCallbackUri |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.747 |
AN AUTHZEN CALLER’S APPLICATION SCOPE AND CALLBACKS, ON A PERSON OR A SERVICE ACCOUNT (#563, #1180): the applications they may name in context.application at /access/v1, and the access request callback URLs registered for them. An application carries the same two as appAuthzenApplication and appAuthzenCallbackUri. Written by an administrator only, through authzen/authzen_admin.ts; an sts* name is refused by every other door. |
stsBackupCodes |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.533 |
Secret. The person’s recovery codes, one JSON value holding each code’s hash and when it was used, and the counts. Issued when a second factor is first enrolled. Withheld from every read. |
stsBootstrapAdministrator |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.534 |
THE BOOTSTRAP ADMINISTRATOR’S FLAGS (2026-09-13) — see readPersonFlags(). pwdReset is draft-behera-ldap-password-policy’s name, spelt as that draft spells it, beside the pwd* names the password policy already uses. |
stsCertificateHostName |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.535 |
AND AN EIGHTH SINCE 2026-09-13: what ACME, EST and SCEP issued to a person, the two protocol credentials, and the host names an administrator registered — common/cert_enrollment.ts is the register. The private key, the EAB key and the challenge are WITHHELD from every dump and search in every mode (cert_enrollment.withheldValues()); the certificates and the host names are public. |
stsCibaUserCode |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.536 |
Secret. The scrypt hash of the CIBA user code the person set on /portal/ciba. Withheld from every read. |
stsClaimSourceTokens |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.539 |
Secret. AND THE CLAIMS PROVIDER REGISTER’S (#147, 2026-09-24): the class of an ou=claimproviders entry, its record as one JSON value, and its client secret at that provider (sealed where keys persist, and withheld, SECRET_ATTRIBUTES); and on a PERSON, the tokens each provider they linked issued them, one JSON value, sealed and withheld the same way. oauth-oidc/claims_providers.ts keeps them. |
stsConsoleClaimedAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.540 |
THE BOOTSTRAP ADMINISTRATOR’S FLAGS (2026-09-13) — see readPersonFlags(). pwdReset is draft-behera-ldap-password-policy’s name, spelt as that draft spells it, beside the pwd* names the password policy already uses. |
stsDefaultDelegationSemantics |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.541 |
AND AS WHAT (#186): the semantics others may use as this person — and they may use as an actor — and the default when a request says none. See common/delegation_policy.ts. |
stsDelegationSemantics |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.542 |
AND AS WHAT (#186): the semantics others may use as this person — and they may use as an actor — and the default when a request says none. See common/delegation_policy.ts. |
stsEnrolledCertificate |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.564 |
AND AN EIGHTH SINCE 2026-09-13: what ACME, EST and SCEP issued to a person, the two protocol credentials, and the host names an administrator registered — common/cert_enrollment.ts is the register. The private key, the EAB key and the challenge are WITHHELD from every dump and search in every mode (cert_enrollment.withheldValues()); the certificates and the host names are public. |
stsEnrolledPrivateKey |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.565 |
Secret. AND AN EIGHTH SINCE 2026-09-13: what ACME, EST and SCEP issued to a person, the two protocol credentials, and the host names an administrator registered — common/cert_enrollment.ts is the register. The private key, the EAB key and the challenge are WITHHELD from every dump and search in every mode (cert_enrollment.withheldValues()); the certificates and the host names are public. |
stsIdaVerification |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.567 |
Secret. AND A TENTH (#127, 2026-09-23): the person’s IDENTITY VERIFICATIONS for OpenID Connect for Identity Assurance — one JSON value holding each verification’s trust framework, time and evidence. Evidence carries document numbers and a voucher’s name, so it is withheld from every read like the credentials beside it (SECRET_ATTRIBUTES). common/identity_assurance.ts keeps them. |
stsKrb5KeyInfo |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.568 |
The public half of the person’s Kerberos keys, one JSON value: the key version number, the encryption types and when they were derived. |
stsKrb5Keys |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.569 |
Secret. The person’s Kerberos long-term keys for every encryption type, derived from their password, as one sealed value. Password-equivalent, so withheld from every read, ciphertext included. |
stsMailVerified |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.578 |
THE MAIL CHANNEL’S ADDRESS VERIFICATION (#63, 2026-09-22) — see readPersonFlags(): the address a person proved they receive mail at, and the pending link’s hash, expiry and the address it was sent to. |
stsMailVerifyAddress |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.579 |
THE MAIL CHANNEL’S ADDRESS VERIFICATION (#63, 2026-09-22) — see readPersonFlags(): the address a person proved they receive mail at, and the pending link’s hash, expiry and the address it was sent to. |
stsMailVerifyExpires |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.580 |
THE MAIL CHANNEL’S ADDRESS VERIFICATION (#63, 2026-09-22) — see readPersonFlags(): the address a person proved they receive mail at, and the pending link’s hash, expiry and the address it was sent to. |
stsMailVerifyToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.581 |
Secret. THE MAIL CHANNEL’S ADDRESS VERIFICATION (#63, 2026-09-22) — see readPersonFlags(): the address a person proved they receive mail at, and the pending link’s hash, expiry and the address it was sent to. |
stsMayAct |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.582 |
WHO MAY ACT FOR A PERSON (#108, 2026-09-23): “sensitive and cannot be delegated” (Kerberos’s NOT_DELEGATED, on the person), and the one party they have named as their delegate, whose sub becomes the may_act claim of their access tokens. See common/delegation_policy.ts. |
stsMfaRequired |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.583 |
WHAT AN ADMINISTRATOR PUT ON A PERSON FROM THEIR /admin/users PAGE (2026-09-13) — see readPersonFlags(): a second factor required of them, and the hash of a password reset link. |
stsNotDelegated |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.584 |
WHO MAY ACT FOR A PERSON (#108, 2026-09-23): “sensitive and cannot be delegated” (Kerberos’s NOT_DELEGATED, on the person), and the one party they have named as their delegate, whose sub becomes the may_act claim of their access tokens. See common/delegation_policy.ts. |
stsPasswordResetExpires |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.621 |
When the pending password reset link stops working. |
stsPasswordResetToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.623 |
Secret. The scrypt hash of a pending password reset link an administrator or the person started. Withheld from every read. |
stsProfilePhoto |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.639 |
Secret. The person’s profile photo record, one JSON value: which stored image is theirs, whose it was, and whether they declined a partner’s copy. The image itself is not on the entry. Written only by the portal and a federated sign-in, and withheld from every read. |
stsProvisionedBy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.640 |
WHO CREATED THE ENTRY when it was not one of this service’s own doors (2026-10-20): federation:<relationship>, written once by the federated sign-in that created it and by nothing else. See PROVISIONED_BY. |
stsPseudonym |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.641 |
A LOGIN NAME BESIDE THE UID (#644). The live values are what usernameKeysOf indexes. The pending triple is one address waiting for /portal/verify-pseudonym, and it is not a name until that link is spent. |
stsPseudonymVerifyAddress |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.642 |
A LOGIN NAME BESIDE THE UID (#644). The live values are what usernameKeysOf indexes. The pending triple is one address waiting for /portal/verify-pseudonym, and it is not a name until that link is spent. |
stsPseudonymVerifyExpires |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.643 |
A LOGIN NAME BESIDE THE UID (#644). The live values are what usernameKeysOf indexes. The pending triple is one address waiting for /portal/verify-pseudonym, and it is not a name until that link is spent. |
stsPseudonymVerifyToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.644 |
Secret. A LOGIN NAME BESIDE THE UID (#644). The live values are what usernameKeysOf indexes. The pending triple is one address waiting for /portal/verify-pseudonym, and it is not a name until that link is spent. |
stsPublishedDid |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.645 |
Secret. Each did:web this realm publishes for the person, one JSON value per DID: its id, the DID, who holds its key, every version of its keys, its deactivation and, in realm custody, the sealed private key. Withheld from every read. |
stsSamlAssertionIssuer |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.661 |
AND THE PERSON’S RFC 7522 KEY PAIRS, SINCE 2026-09-13 — a second set, sharing no name with the one above it for the reason the application’s two share none. stsSamlAssertionPrivateKey is sealed like its JWT twin; each record’s thumbprint is the handle an XML Signature’s certificate is matched by, and its source records whether the pair was issued here or a certificate was uploaded in its place. |
stsSamlAssertionKeyPair |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.662 |
AND THE PERSON’S RFC 7522 KEY PAIRS, SINCE 2026-09-13 — a second set, sharing no name with the one above it for the reason the application’s two share none. stsSamlAssertionPrivateKey is sealed like its JWT twin; each record’s thumbprint is the handle an XML Signature’s certificate is matched by, and its source records whether the pair was issued here or a certificate was uploaded in its place. |
stsSamlAssertionPrivateKey |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.663 |
Secret. AND THE PERSON’S RFC 7522 KEY PAIRS, SINCE 2026-09-13 — a second set, sharing no name with the one above it for the reason the application’s two share none. stsSamlAssertionPrivateKey is sealed like its JWT twin; each record’s thumbprint is the handle an XML Signature’s certificate is matched by, and its source records whether the pair was issued here or a certificate was uploaded in its place. |
stsScepChallenge |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.664 |
Secret. AND AN EIGHTH SINCE 2026-09-13: what ACME, EST and SCEP issued to a person, the two protocol credentials, and the host names an administrator registered — common/cert_enrollment.ts is the register. The private key, the EAB key and the challenge are WITHHELD from every dump and search in every mode (cert_enrollment.withheldValues()); the certificates and the host names are public. |
stsSelfIssuedSubject |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.667 |
Secret. The SIOPv2 self-issued subjects the person enrolled, one JSON value per subject: a DID or a JWK thumbprint URI, its label and who enrolled it. Whoever holds the key signs in as the person, so it is withheld from every read. |
stsTotpCredential |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.689 |
Secret. The person’s RFC 6238 authenticator secret, one JSON value. Sealed under the key-encryption key in product mode, and withheld from every read. |
stsWebauthnCredential |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.693 |
The person’s registered WebAuthn public keys, one JSON value per passkey or security key. Public by design. Written by registration on /portal and the sign-in steps. |
stsWebauthnPqcUserHandle |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.694 |
AND A SECOND ONE FOR THE POST-QUANTUM LANE (#643): the handle every ML-DSA passkey of the post-quantum lane is created under, so it does not replace the classical one on an authenticator that holds both. Minted only beside the first (writeWebauthnUserHandle() refuses otherwise). |
stsWebauthnUserHandle |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.695 |
THE WEBAUTHN USER HANDLE (#474): 64 random bytes, base64url, one per person, that every passkey they register is created under and that a discoverable credential hands back to say whose it is. Not a secret — an authenticator stores it in the clear — and not the username, which it was until #474. common/credentials.ts argues it. |
telephoneNumber |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.20 |
The person’s telephone numbers, released as the phone_number claim and mapped by SCIM. |
timeZone |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.696 |
The person’s time zone, an IANA zone name such as Europe/Stockholm, released as the zoneinfo claim. This service’s own name; one value. |
title |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.12 |
The person’s job title, released as the job_title claim and mapped by SCIM. |
uid |
several | RFC | 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 |
The username, which names the entry (uid= |
userCertificate |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.36 |
Certificates stored on the person, as userCertificate;binary (base64 DER). A certificate from an outside certificate authority is an identity only as the one entry storing it, byte for byte. Written from the person’s console page, /admin-api/users/add-certificate and remove-certificate, or an LDAP modify. |
userPassword |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.35 |
Secret. The person’s password as an scrypt hash, hashed on every write including an LDAP modify. Written by the sign-in, the portal, an administrator, SCIM or an LDAP modify, each through the password policy. Withheld from every read. |
userPrincipalName |
one | other standard | The person’s user principal name, read by certificate enrollment’s smartcard-logon profile as the certificate’s UPN. Nothing in this service writes it; a client supplies it. | |
x509fingerprint256 |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.707 |
On the entries a TLS client certificate seeds. There is no standard attribute type for “the DN inside the certificate”, and the standard one that does exist — userCertificate, which is binary — is not what these are; certificatePlan() says the rest. |
x509firstIssued |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.708 |
THE SAME SIX ARE NOW ALSO WRITTEN BY THE SPIFFE ISSUING AUTHORITY, onto the entry of every identity it mints an X509-SVID for — the same names on purpose, because a certificate is a certificate however it arrived and a second set spelt svid* would mean a filter written for one path silently misses the other. The three below go with them and exist only on that path: an SVID is minted afresh every half-lifetime, so the six above are ASSIGNED rather than appended there and these are what is left to say how many times and since when. See applySpiffeCertificate(). |
x509issuer |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.709 |
On the entries a TLS client certificate seeds. There is no standard attribute type for “the DN inside the certificate”, and the standard one that does exist — userCertificate, which is binary — is not what these are; certificatePlan() says the rest. |
x509lastIssued |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.710 |
THE SAME SIX ARE NOW ALSO WRITTEN BY THE SPIFFE ISSUING AUTHORITY, onto the entry of every identity it mints an X509-SVID for — the same names on purpose, because a certificate is a certificate however it arrived and a second set spelt svid* would mean a filter written for one path silently misses the other. The three below go with them and exist only on that path: an SVID is minted afresh every half-lifetime, so the six above are ASSIGNED rather than appended there and these are what is left to say how many times and since when. See applySpiffeCertificate(). |
x509notAfter |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.711 |
On the entries a TLS client certificate seeds. There is no standard attribute type for “the DN inside the certificate”, and the standard one that does exist — userCertificate, which is binary — is not what these are; certificatePlan() says the rest. |
x509notBefore |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.712 |
On the entries a TLS client certificate seeds. There is no standard attribute type for “the DN inside the certificate”, and the standard one that does exist — userCertificate, which is binary — is not what these are; certificatePlan() says the rest. |
x509serialNumber |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.713 |
On the entries a TLS client certificate seeds. There is no standard attribute type for “the DN inside the certificate”, and the standard one that does exist — userCertificate, which is binary — is not what these are; certificatePlan() says the rest. |
x509subject |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.714 |
On the entries a TLS client certificate seeds. There is no standard attribute type for “the DN inside the certificate”, and the standard one that does exist — userCertificate, which is binary — is not what these are; certificatePlan() says the rest. |
x509svidsIssued |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.715 |
THE SAME SIX ARE NOW ALSO WRITTEN BY THE SPIFFE ISSUING AUTHORITY, onto the entry of every identity it mints an X509-SVID for — the same names on purpose, because a certificate is a certificate however it arrived and a second set spelt svid* would mean a filter written for one path silently misses the other. The three below go with them and exist only on that path: an SVID is minted afresh every half-lifetime, so the six above are ASSIGNED rather than appended there and these are what is left to say how many times and since when. See applySpiffeCertificate(). |
Attribute policy
TypeSpec model PolicyAttributes.
Container ou=attributePolicies.
A policy profile, kind attributes.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsAttributeDefinition |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.4 |
structural | top | This service’s class for a custom attribute of a realm, in ou=attributeDefinitions, named by the attribute (cn=<name>). |
stsAttributePolicy |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.5 |
structural | top | This service’s class for an attribute policy: the attributes every person in a realm must hold. Named by the PROFILE (cn=default, or a named profile of the realm’s own). |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
What the profile or the custom attribute is for, for the next person. |
stsAttributeLabel |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.494 |
A custom attribute’s label, drawn beside its name. |
stsAttributePolicyPrecedence |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.496 |
Which named attribute policy applies where the person and their groups name several: the lowest, from 1 to 1000. |
stsAttributePortalEditable |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.497 |
TRUE where a person may change their own values of a custom attribute on the user portal. Implies stsAttributePortalVisible. FALSE, or absent, by default. |
stsAttributePortalVisible |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.498 |
TRUE where a person sees their own values of a custom attribute on the user portal’s Overview. FALSE, or absent, by default. |
stsAttributeRequired |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.499 |
The attributes every person in this realm must hold a value of, besides uid, cn and sn, which are always required. A list, or comma-separated. Any attribute a person may be given a value for: the inetOrgPerson schema, the credential catalogue, mail, and this realm’s custom attributes. Enforced in product mode: a create without one is refused at every door, and an edit may not take one away. Default givenName, sn and mail. |
stsAttributeSingleValued |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.500 |
TRUE where a custom attribute holds one value, FALSE where it holds several. |
stsAttributeSyntax |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.504 |
A custom attribute’s syntax: string, integer, boolean, date, email, uri or dn. Its values are checked against it. |
Attribute policy on a person
TypeSpec model PolicyAttributesOnPerson.
These attributes live on the person, not on this entry.
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
stsAttributePolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.495 |
On a person or a group: the attribute policy it names, default or a named profile of the realm. One value. |
Authentication policy
TypeSpec model PolicyAuthn.
Container ou=authnPolicies.
A policy profile, kind authn.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsAuthnPolicy |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.7 |
structural | top | This service’s class for an authentication policy: which mechanisms are accepted as a first and as a second factor, and when a second factor is required. The entry is named by the PROFILE (cn=default). |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
What the profile is for, for the next person. |
stsAuthnCertificatePrimary |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.506 |
A verified TLS client certificate: GET /tls/sign-in, or Continue with your certificate on the sign-in screen. |
stsAuthnEmailCodeAttempts |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.507 |
How many wrong codes one sign-in step accepts before it is ended and the person starts again. The per-person and per-network rate limits apply as well. |
stsAuthnEmailCodePrimary |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.508 |
A six-digit code mailed to the person’s VERIFIED address. NIST SP 800-63B-4 section 3.1.3.1: “Email SHALL NOT be used for out-of-band authentication”, because a mailbox may be reached with a password alone, and mail may be read in transit or rerouted. Off by default for that reason; turn it on only where that is an accepted risk. |
stsAuthnEmailCodeSecondFactor |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.509 |
A six-digit code mailed to the person’s VERIFIED address. NIST SP 800-63B-4 section 3.1.3.1: “Email SHALL NOT be used for out-of-band authentication”, because a mailbox may be reached with a password alone, and mail may be read in transit or rerouted. Off by default for that reason; turn it on only where that is an accepted risk. |
stsAuthnEmailCodeTtlS |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.510 |
From the moment it is sent. At most ten minutes, NIST SP 800-63B-4 section 3.1.3.2’s bound for an out-of-band secret. |
stsAuthnEmailFailureLimit |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.511 |
NIST SP 800-63B-4 section 3.2.2 asks for no more than 100. The person, and their administrators, are told, and the person turns it on again from the portal. |
stsAuthnEmailLinkPrimary |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.512 |
A single-use link mailed to the person’s VERIFIED address, which completes the sign-in only in the browser that started it. NIST SP 800-63B-4 section 3.1.3.1: “Email SHALL NOT be used for out-of-band authentication”, because a mailbox may be reached with a password alone, and mail may be read in transit or rerouted. Off by default for that reason; turn it on only where that is an accepted risk. |
stsAuthnEmailLinkSecondFactor |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.513 |
A single-use link mailed to the person’s VERIFIED address, which completes the sign-in only in the browser that started it. NIST SP 800-63B-4 section 3.1.3.1: “Email SHALL NOT be used for out-of-band authentication”, because a mailbox may be reached with a password alone, and mail may be read in transit or rerouted. Off by default for that reason; turn it on only where that is an accepted risk. |
stsAuthnEmailResendS |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.514 |
A new code or link replaces the last one, which stops working. At most three are sent for one sign-in step. |
stsAuthnFederationPrimary |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.515 |
A sign-in asserted by a configured federation partner. |
stsAuthnKerberosPrimary |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.516 |
GET /authn/spnego with a Kerberos ticket. |
stsAuthnPasskeyPrimary |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.517 |
Any passkey (WebAuthn credential) the person holds, signing them in with no password. A passkey has no role: this row says, at each sign-in, whether any of them may be a first factor in this realm, unless the first factors of the authentication policy an application names (appAuthnPolicy) say otherwise. |
stsAuthnPasswordPrimary |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.518 |
A password on the sign-in screen. As a SECOND factor it is the password asked for after a wallet or other passwordless first factor. |
stsAuthnPasswordSecondFactor |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.519 |
A password on the sign-in screen. As a SECOND factor it is the password asked for after a wallet or other passwordless first factor. |
stsAuthnPolicyMechanism |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.521 |
On a NAMED authentication policy (#1148, #1237): a first-factor mechanism a sign-in it applies to allows — where the application (appAuthnPolicy) or one of the person’s groups (stsAuthnPolicy) names it and its precedence is the lowest named — password, password-mfa, webauthn, spnego, wallet or federation, one value each. None allows every one the realm allows. |
stsAuthnPolicyPrecedence |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.522 |
On a NAMED authentication policy (#1237): which one applies where several are named for one sign-in — by the application (appAuthnPolicy) and by the person’s groups (stsAuthnPolicy) — the lowest, from 1 to 1000, ties by name. 100 when absent. |
stsAuthnPolicySecondFactor |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.523 |
On a NAMED authentication policy (#1148, #1237): a second factor a sign-in it applies to allows — where the application (appAuthnPolicy) or one of the person’s groups (stsAuthnPolicy) names it and its precedence is the lowest named — password, securityKey, totp, recoveryCode, emailCode, emailLink or wallet, one value each. None leaves the realm’s authentication policy as it is. |
stsAuthnRecoveryCodeSecondFactor |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.524 |
A single-use code from a set the person generated. Off here, no new set may be generated; a set already held still works (this row replaced backupCodes.enabled, and keeps its contract). |
stsAuthnRememberedBrowserDays |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.525 |
Counted from the last time the person gave their second factor on that browser. After it they are asked again, and giving it starts the period again. |
stsAuthnRememberedBrowserSkipsSecondFactor |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.526 |
OFF BY DEFAULT. On, a person signing in on a browser they chose to remember is not asked for their second factor again within the period below of last giving it on that browser. NEVER at the admin console, the user portal or the protocol debugger; never for an administrator; never while the sign-in’s risk is medium or higher; and the sign-in is then ONE factor to every relying party — amr [“pwd”] and acr “1”, as a password alone — so an application asking for “mfa” is refused it. The browser is recognised by a bearer cookie: whoever copies the cookie skips the second factor too, until the copy is caught. |
stsAuthnRequireSecondFactor |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.527 |
if-held: a person is asked for a second factor when they hold one (or their entry says stsMfaRequired). always: everybody in this realm is, and somebody who holds none is sent to enrol one at their next sign-in. This replaced authn.mfaRequired. There is no “never”: a held factor is always asked for. |
stsAuthnRequireSecondFactorForAdministrators |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.528 |
For anybody holding a console role (Admin Read or Admin Write) who holds no second factor. offer: they are shown the step that sets one up, with an Ignore button, at every sign-in. always: they must set one up before they are signed in — except the default realm’s built-in administrator (admin.bootstrapUsername), who is only ever offered one, so a service is never left with nobody who can sign in. if-held: as everybody else, by the field above. WEAKER THAN always: an administrator on a password alone is an administrator anyone with the password is. |
stsAuthnSecurityKeySecondFactor |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.529 |
Any passkey (WebAuthn credential) the person holds, asked for after a first factor. A passkey has no role: this row says, at each sign-in, whether any of them may be a second factor in this realm, unless the second factors of the authentication policy an application names (appAuthnPolicy) say otherwise. |
stsAuthnTotpSecondFactor |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.530 |
An RFC 6238 one-time code. Never a first factor: this service holds the same shared secret the app does. Off here, nobody may ENROL one; a person who already holds one is still asked for it, because an off switch that downgraded every enrolled account to a password alone would do something other than it says (this row replaced totp.enabled, and keeps its contract). |
stsAuthnWalletPrimary |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.531 |
/authn/wallet with a credential this realm issued, or a SIOPv2 self-issued ID Token from an enrolled key. As a SECOND factor, the wallet presented after a password. |
stsAuthnWalletSecondFactor |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.532 |
/authn/wallet with a credential this realm issued, or a SIOPv2 self-issued ID Token from an enrolled key. As a SECOND factor, the wallet presented after a password. |
Authentication policy on a person
TypeSpec model PolicyAuthnOnPerson.
These attributes live on the person, not on this entry.
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
stsMailFactor |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.576 |
Which emailed second factor this person opted in to: code or link. Absent: none. Set on /portal/mfa, cleared on /admin/mfa and after too many consecutive failures. |
stsMailFactorFailures |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.577 |
Consecutive failed emailed codes or links, reset by a success. Maintained by this service. |
Locale policy
TypeSpec model PolicyLocale.
Container ou=localePolicies.
A policy profile, kind locale.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsLocalePolicy |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.12 |
structural | top | This service’s class for a locale policy: the language a realm’s pages fall back to and gives a new person. Named by the PROFILE (cn=default, or a named profile an application or a group names). |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
What the profile is for, for the next person. |
stsLocaleDefault |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.572 |
A BCP 47 language tag (RFC 5646), such as en, fr-CA or zh-TW. Pages are drawn in it when the request, the person’s preferredLanguage, the language chooser and the browser name nothing a catalog answers; dates and numbers are formatted for it even where no catalog does. Mail to a person whose entry names no language is written in it. Replaces the setting mail.defaultLanguage. |
stsLocalePopulatePreferredLanguage |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.574 |
ON BY DEFAULT. A person entry created in this realm without a preferredLanguage (RFC 2798 section 2.7) is given the default language above as one — by the console, the management API, SCIM, a federated or self-service sign-up, or a bulk load. A named profile applies where the application that caused the creation names it, or one of the person’s groups does. Existing entries are never rewritten. |
stsLocalePrecedence |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.575 |
Which named locale policy wins where several are named for a page: the lowest, from 1 to 1000. |
Locale policy on a person
TypeSpec model PolicyLocaleOnPerson.
These attributes live on the person, not on this entry.
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
stsPreferredLanguagePopulated |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.636 |
The preferredLanguage the locale policy gave this person when their entry was created. While preferredLanguage still equals it, it is the POLICY’s choice and a page ranks it below the browser’s language; once anybody sets another, it is the person’s. Written by this service only. |
Passkey policy
TypeSpec model PolicyPasskey.
Container ou=passkeyPolicies.
A policy profile, kind passkey.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsPasskeyPolicy |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.14 |
structural | top | This service’s class for a passkey policy: how passkeys behave in this realm. The entry is named by the PROFILE (cn=default). |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
What the profile is for, for the next person. |
stsPasskeyAdminEnrolment |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.591 |
off BY DEFAULT. on lets an administrator holding the Admin Write console role enrol a passkey for a person this profile applies to, from the person’s page on the console or /admin-api: the registration ceremony runs in the administrator’s own browser, against an authenticator they hold (a security key to be handed over, say), under the person’s user handle, and is verified exactly as the person’s own registration is — attestation, algorithms and this policy’s registration rules. Nothing made elsewhere can be imported. The key records which administrator enrolled it and when, and the person is told. Left out of a save, the built-in default is kept. |
stsPasskeyAggregateDevices |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.592 |
ON BY DEFAULT: one “Use passkey” step whose request lists every one of the person’s passkeys, and the browser offers whichever is present. Off, a person with more than one is shown a choice per passkey, by its name, and the request names only that one. |
stsPasskeyAllowUsernameless |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.593 |
ON BY DEFAULT. On, the sign-in screen offers Sign in with a passkey and the username field’s autofill, which ask the browser for any discoverable credential of this realm (WebAuthn Level 3 section 5.4, allowCredentials empty) and sign in the account its user handle names, with user verification required and checked. Off, neither is offered and a sign-in always names the person first. Replaces the setting webauthn.usernameless. |
stsPasskeyAttestationAlgorithms |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.594 |
none BY DEFAULT: an attestation is accepted whatever it is signed with. Otherwise a list from post-quantum, ml-dsa-44, ml-dsa-65, ml-dsa-87, slh-dsa and composite-ml-dsa: a passkey registers only with a TRUSTED attestation that carries a certificate, whose statement signature and the signature on every certificate of its chain, from the leaf to the trust anchor, are each one the list allows (post-quantum allows any ML-DSA, SLH-DSA or composite ML-DSA signature). Self and none attestation are refused, having no certificate. With enforceAttestationAtSignIn on, every sign-in holds the passkey to it by what its registration recorded, so a passkey registered before the rule stops working. This is the attestation’s algorithm, not the passkey’s own (postQuantumRequired). Left out of a save, the built-in default is kept. |
stsPasskeyBackupEligibility |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.595 |
allow (the default) accepts any passkey. disallow accepts only DEVICE-BOUND ones: a passkey whose authenticator says it may be backed up or synced (the BE flag, WebAuthn Level 3 section 6.1) is refused when it is registered and when it signs somebody in, so a synced passkey enrolled before the realm said no stops working too. BE never changes for a credential. |
stsPasskeyClientRules |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.596 |
EMPTY BY DEFAULT: every client is offered the list as it stands. Otherwise up to 20 rules separated by ;, each <browser> on <system>, where either side is a family as the passkey ceremony rows name it (Chrome, Firefox, macOS, Android) or * for any, optionally followed by a major-version range (141, 130-140, 130-, -140): Firefox 140- on Linux; * on Android 13. A passkey registration from a matching client offers the list less ML-DSA (ES256 and RS256 where that leaves none). Not applied where a classical passkey is not allowed — registrationMode pq-only, webauthn.pqcOnly, postQuantumRequired registration-and-sign-in, or at the sign-in step under postQuantumRequired sign-in — nor to the post-quantum lane, and the ceremony row says it was not. Left out of a save, empty is kept. |
stsPasskeyCredentialLabel |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.597 |
EMPTY BY DEFAULT: the provider’s name, else “Passkey” or “Security key”. Otherwise this text, with {provider} and {kind} filled in, at most 60 characters. The person may rename it afterwards, as always. |
stsPasskeyDeviceBoundRequired |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.598 |
OFF BY DEFAULT. On, an issuance to an application this profile covers waits until the sign-on session is bound to the browser’s key, and is refused when the browser skipped that registration or the wait elapsed without a binding. A session that was never offered registration is not refused by this row. Refused while authn.deviceBoundSessions is off. |
stsPasskeyEnforceAttestationAtSignIn |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.599 |
OFF BY DEFAULT. The attestation rules (the webauthn.attestation* settings: the policy, the AAGUID list, the certification level and FIPS) are checked when a passkey is registered. On, they are checked again at every sign-in against what was recorded then and the FIDO Metadata Service as it is now, so a key registered before a rule was tightened, or whose model was since reported compromised, stops signing anybody in. A key with no trusted attestation fails every rule that demands one. |
stsPasskeyEnforcePinLength |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.600 |
OFF BY DEFAULT. On, registration asks the authenticator for its minimum PIN length (CTAP 2.1 section 12.4, the minPinLength extension), records it on the key, and refuses a key whose minimum is below the next row, at registration and at every sign-in. A key answers only for relying parties it was configured to tell (CTAP 2.1 setMinPINLength with this RP ID); every other key, and every platform or synced passkey, does not report, and is refused unless the row after next is on. |
stsPasskeyEnterpriseSerialAttribute |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.601 |
EMPTY BY DEFAULT: no serial is checked. Set to an attribute of a person’s entry (for example serialNumber, which may hold several values), a security key registers only with a TRUSTED enterprise attestation whose certificate names a device serial that is one of that person’s values. Needs webauthn.attestation set to enterprise, and the vendor or platform configured to release enterprise attestation to this RP ID; without that the browser sends ordinary attestation and every registration is refused. |
stsPasskeyHintsPasskey |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.602 |
The WebAuthn hints (Level 3 section 5.4.8) the portal’s Create a passkey sends, in order, from security-key, client-device and hybrid, or none. They tell the browser which way of making the passkey to lead with. A hint may not contradict webauthn.authenticatorAttachment: client-device implies platform, security-key and hybrid cross-platform. |
stsPasskeyHintsSecurityKey |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.603 |
The hints Use a security key sends, in order, or none. The button asks for a cross-platform authenticator, so client-device contradicts it and is refused. |
stsPasskeyHintsSignIn |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.604 |
The hints a sign-in ceremony sends — the passkey step, the sign-in with no username and its autofill — in order, or none (the default: the browser offers every way it knows). |
stsPasskeyLanes |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.605 |
realm (the default) follows webauthn.pqcAlongsideClassical. both gives this profile’s people a classical and a post-quantum passkey side by side, each under its own user handle, wherever the realm’s setting is off; one gives them one lane wherever it is on. webauthn.pqcOnly still means one lane. Refused as both with registrationMode classical-only. Left out of a save, realm is kept. |
stsPasskeyMinPinLength |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.606 |
The shortest PIN a security key may be set to accept, as the key itself reports it, while the row above is on. Between 4 (CTAP 2.1’s own floor) and 63. |
stsPasskeyPinLengthOnlyIfSupported |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.607 |
OFF BY DEFAULT, which is the strict reading: while the PIN length is enforced, a key that does not report it is refused. On, such a key is accepted and only a reported minimum is held to the rule — so the rule then binds only keys configured to report to this relying party. |
stsPasskeyPostQuantumAllowCredentials |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.609 |
realm (the default) follows the realm’s webauthn.postQuantumAllowCredentials. Read only while postQuantumRequired requires a post-quantum passkey at sign-in. narrow names only the person’s post-quantum (ML-DSA) passkeys in the passkey step’s request, so a classical one is never offered, and a person whose device holds only their classical one sees the platform’s own “no passkey found” message. list-and-refuse names every passkey they hold and refuses a classical one after the ceremony, with a page saying that this application requires a post-quantum passkey and where to add one; the person may then pick a passkey that will be refused. A person holding no post-quantum passkey is told before any ceremony either way. Left out of a save, realm is kept. |
stsPasskeyPostQuantumRequired |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.610 |
off (the default) accepts a passkey whatever its signature algorithm. sign-in accepts only a POST-QUANTUM passkey, one whose algorithm is ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65 or ML-DSA-87 (RFC 9964), when it signs somebody in, as the first credential or as the second factor; a classical one may still be registered. registration-and-sign-in refuses a classical one at registration too, and enrolment then offers only ML-DSA. The algorithm decides, not the lane a key was created in. Refused while the realm offers no ML-DSA (webauthn.algorithms names none, and neither webauthn.pqcOnly nor webauthn.pqcAlongsideClassical is on). |
stsPasskeyPrecedence |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.611 |
Which named passkey policy wins where several match: the lowest, from 1 to 1000. |
stsPasskeyRecoveryAssurance |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.612 |
any BY DEFAULT IN DEVELOPMENT, not-weaker IN PRODUCT. Whether a way back into the account that asks for no passkey — a password reset link, an activation link, a recovery code, an emailed code or link — restores access for a person who holds one. any: at once. not-weaker: the first sign-in after it that is not a passkey sign-in reaches no application; the person registers a passkey that satisfies this policy and signs in with it. operator-only: as not-weaker, and the self-service doors (the forgot-password form, a recovery code or an emailed code or link at sign-in) are refused; only an administrator’s reset link, generated password or activation link remains. Left out of a save, the built-in default is kept. |
stsPasskeyRegistrationAlgorithms |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.613 |
realm (the default) offers the realm’s webauthn.algorithms. Otherwise the signature algorithms a passkey registration offers to this profile’s people, in order of preference (an authenticator makes the first it supports), from the algorithms webauthn.algorithms may name. The next row may narrow or reorder it, and a passkey whose algorithm is not one this profile offers is refused when it is registered. Left out of a save, realm is kept. |
stsPasskeyRegistrationMode |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.614 |
realm (the default) follows webauthn.pqcOnly and webauthn.pqcAlongsideClassical. pq-only offers only ML-DSA, and refuses a retry with the classical algorithms. pq-first offers ML-DSA first and the classical algorithms after it, even where the realm requests ML-DSA only. classical-only offers no ML-DSA and no post-quantum passkey beside a classical one, for people whose devices fail an ML-DSA registration. Refused with postQuantumRequired other than off or with attestationAlgorithms set (classical-only), and where the algorithms offered name no ML-DSA (pq-only, pq-first). Left out of a save, realm is kept. |
stsPasskeyRequireUsernameless |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.615 |
OFF BY DEFAULT. On, an application whose authentication mechanism is a passkey and nothing else (the authentication policy it names, appAuthnPolicy, lists webauthn alone) gets a sign-in screen with no username field: Sign in with a passkey is the way in, and a sign-in that names a person is refused. It needs the row above. The realm’s default profile does not apply it to the admin console, the debugger or the user portal; a named profile selecting that application does. |
stsPasskeyRpNameExtras |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.616 |
none (the default) shows webauthn.rpName alone. realm, organisation or realm-and-organisation append the realm’s name and/or saml.organizationName, so a person with accounts in several realms can tell the prompts apart. |
stsPasskeySecurityKeyResidentKey |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.617 |
The residentKey an enrolment through Use a security key (or one that names no kind) sends WHILE usernameless sign-in is ON. While it is off the button always asks required, so it makes a discoverable credential as Create a passkey does (which asks required always). discouraged or preferred spare a security key’s few resident slots, at the cost of a key that needs the username to sign in. Replaces the setting webauthn.residentKey. |
stsPasskeyUserDisplayName |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.618 |
EMPTY BY DEFAULT: the name the sign-in knows, else the username. Otherwise up to six directory attributes in order, separated by commas; a group of attributes separated by spaces (givenName sn) joins their values. The first whose every attribute has a value becomes user.displayName (WebAuthn Level 3 section 5.4.3), with control and direction-changing characters removed and at most 64 characters. The username is always user.name. |
Passkey policy on a person
TypeSpec model PolicyPasskeyOnPerson.
These attributes live on the person, not on this entry.
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
stsPasswordResetSource |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.622 |
Who issued the password reset link on this entry: self (the forgot-password form) or operator (an administrator). Written and cleared with the link. Maintained by this service. |
stsRecoveryPending |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.657 |
A recovery restored access to this person, who holds a passkey, and no passkey has signed them in since: the door and when, as <door> <ISO 8601 instant>. While the passkey policy’s recoveryAssurance is not-weaker or operator-only, a sign-in that is not a passkey reaches no application. Maintained by this service. |
Password policy
TypeSpec model PolicyPassword.
Container ou=passwordPolicies.
A policy profile, kind password.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
pwdPolicy |
other standard | 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.2.1 |
auxiliary | top | draft-behera-ldap-password-policy’s class for a password policy entry. pwdAttribute names the attribute the policy governs, and here that is always userPassword. |
stsPasswordPolicy |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.15 |
structural | top | This service’s own class, carrying the composition rules and the generated length the draft has no attribute for. The entry is named by the PROFILE: cn=default, or a named policy’s name. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
What the profile is for, for the next person. |
pwdAttribute |
several | other standard | 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.1 |
The attribute this policy governs: userPassword. |
pwdInHistory |
one | other standard | 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.4 |
How many of a person’s PREVIOUS passwords are remembered and refused. The current password is always refused as well while this is above 0, so 5 means a new password may be none of the last six. 0 turns the rule off. The draft’s attribute, with the draft’s meaning. Each remembered password is kept as the hash it was already stored as (argon2id or scrypt), in pwdHistory on the person’s own entry, and checking a new password costs one hash comparison per one remembered. |
pwdMinLength |
one | other standard | 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.6 |
The shortest password this service will set, counted in characters (Unicode code points, so an emoji is one). The attribute is draft-behera-ldap-password-policy’s. Twelve is the default; NIST SP 800-63B asks for at least 8, and 15 where a password is the only factor. |
stsPasswordPrecedence |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.620 |
Which named password policy wins where several are named for one person: the lowest, from 1 to 1000. |
stsPwdArgon2Iterations |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.646 |
How many passes argon2id makes over its memory (t). 2 is OWASP’s minimum at 19 MiB; each pass adds the same time again. |
stsPwdArgon2Memory |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.647 |
The memory one argon2id hash uses, in kibibytes (m). 19456 KiB (19 MiB) is OWASP’s minimum and the least this service will write. Raising it makes a stolen store slower to attack, and every sign-in uses that much more memory. |
stsPwdArgon2Parallelism |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.648 |
How many lanes argon2id divides its memory into (p). It is part of the hash, not a thread count: node computes a hash on one thread whatever this says. 1 is OWASP’s figure. |
stsPwdGeneratedLength |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.649 |
How long a password this service MAKES UP is — for a new user created from the console or /admin-api, an operator’s Generate, and the product-mode bootstrap account. It must be at least the minimum length and at least twice the symbol count plus two. Twenty characters from a 90-character alphabet is about 130 bits. |
stsPwdHashAlgorithm |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.650 |
The algorithm a newly stored password is hashed with: scrypt (RFC 7914), the default, or argon2id (RFC 9106, the OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet’s first choice). A stored hash names its own algorithm and parameters and keeps verifying. One in another algorithm, or in the same algorithm at a strictly lower cost, is hashed again at the person’s next verified sign-in. A same-algorithm hash already at least this cost is left. Client secrets, activation tokens, recovery codes and app passwords are not passwords and stay scrypt. |
stsPwdMinSymbols |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.651 |
Always 0. A policy that asks for symbols is refused: ASVS 5.0.0 6.2.5 requires that a password of any composition be accepted, so length is what this policy asks for. |
stsPwdRequireDigit |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.652 |
Always off. A policy that requires a number is refused: ASVS 5.0.0 6.2.5 requires that a password of any composition be accepted. |
stsPwdRequireUppercase |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.653 |
Always off. A policy that requires an uppercase letter is refused: ASVS 5.0.0 6.2.5 requires that a password of any composition be accepted. |
stsPwdScryptBlockSize |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.654 |
scrypt’s block size for a newly stored password while the algorithm is scrypt. Memory is about 128 × N × r bytes; 8 is the figure RFC 7914 and OWASP give. |
stsPwdScryptLogN |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.655 |
scrypt’s CPU and memory cost for a newly stored password while the algorithm is scrypt, as a power of two: 15 (the default) is N=32768. OWASP’s table pairs it with the parallelism: 2^17 with p=1, 2^16 with p=2, 2^15 with p=3, 2^14 with p=5, or 2^13 with p=10. The default is 2^15 with p=3, one of those pairs. A parallelism below the pair for the chosen cost is refused. |
stsPwdScryptParallelism |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.656 |
scrypt’s parallelism for a newly stored password while the algorithm is scrypt. Node computes it on one thread, so a higher value costs time rather than cores; the cost’s description lists the pairs OWASP accepts. The default is 3. A value below OWASP’s pair for the chosen cost is refused. |
Password policy on a person
TypeSpec model PolicyPasswordOnPerson.
These attributes live on the person, not on this entry.
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pwdChangedTime |
one | other standard | 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.16 |
When the password was last set, as a GeneralizedTime. Maintained by this service. |
pwdHistory |
several | other standard | 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.20 |
Secret. One value per remembered previous password, in the draft’s form time#syntaxOID#length#data — the data being the hash that password was stored under, never the password. Maintained by this service and refused on an LDAP add or modify, because a history anybody can edit is a history anybody can empty. |
Post-login policy
TypeSpec model PolicyPostLogin.
Container ou=postLoginPolicies.
A policy profile, kind postLogin.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsPostLoginPolicy |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.16 |
structural | top | This service’s class for a post-login activity profile: what a person is asked to do after signing in. Named by the PROFILE (cn=default, or a named profile an application or a group names). |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
What the profile is for, for the next person. |
stsPostLoginActivity |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.625 |
What is asked. pqc-passkey-migration: a person holding a passkey made with a classical algorithm is asked to register a post-quantum (ML-DSA) passkey. Whether the classical passkey is replaced in place or kept beside it is the method’s to say (below). Nobody is asked where the realm offers no ML-DSA algorithm at registration (the default webauthn.algorithms does). |
stsPostLoginAttestation |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.626 |
any: its key algorithm is ML-DSA. post-quantum: its key algorithm is ML-DSA AND its recorded attestation was signed with post-quantum algorithms throughout; a passkey with a classical attestation, or none recorded, does not count, and its holder is asked for one that does. |
stsPostLoginEnabled |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.627 |
OFF BY DEFAULT. On, every person this profile reaches who is due the activity below is asked to do it after signing in, before they are sent back to the application. A named profile with this off EXCLUDES whoever it is selected for: the members of the groups naming it, and a sign-in to an application naming it. |
stsPostLoginGraceDays |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.628 |
Counted from the person’s FIRST invitation. When it has passed, Skip is gone and the sign-in is held — no session is started — until the activity is done. 0 is no deadline: it can always be skipped. |
stsPostLoginMethod |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.629 |
upgrade: the person uses their classical passkey once, then an ML-DSA passkey replaces it in place on the same authenticator — one passkey, nothing left behind. alongside: an ML-DSA passkey is added beside it, in the post-quantum lane where the realm offers two lanes, or on another authenticator where it offers one. automatic: alongside where the person’s passkey policy offers two lanes, upgrade where it offers one. |
stsPostLoginNoPasskey |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.630 |
leave: not asked. invite: asked to register a post-quantum passkey, and may always skip it. require: asked, and may skip it only until the allotted time has passed. |
stsPostLoginNoPasskeyFallback |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.631 |
none: ML-DSA only. classical: after an ML-DSA registration fails on the device, a retry with the classical algorithms is offered (where the passkey policy allows one) — a classical passkey is better than a password, and its holder is asked for the migration later like anyone else’s. |
stsPostLoginNoPasskeyRole |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.632 |
Retired (#1135): the role a person with no passkey registered one in. A passkey has no role; nothing reads it. |
stsPostLoginPrecedence |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.634 |
Which named post-login profile wins where several are named for one sign-in — by the application and by the person’s groups: the lowest, from 1 to 1000. |
stsPostLoginSnoozeDays |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.635 |
How long Skip puts the activity off for that person. |
Service-account policy
TypeSpec model PolicyServiceAccount.
Container ou=serviceAccountPolicies.
A policy profile, kind serviceAccount.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsServiceAccountPolicy |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.19 |
structural | top | This service’s class for a service-account policy: what a service account in this realm may do and how its password rotates. The entry is named by the PROFILE: cn=default, or a named profile a service account names in its stsServiceAccountPolicy. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
What the profile is for, for the next person. |
stsServiceAccountPrecedence |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.671 |
Which named service-account policy wins where several are named: the lowest, from 1 to 1000. A service account names one policy, so today it decides nothing. |
stsSvcAcctAllowBrowserSignIn |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.674 |
OFF BY DEFAULT. Off, the sign-in screen, the user portal and the admin console refuse a service account, whichever first factor it presents, and turning a person into a service account ends their browser sessions. A service account is used by a program, and a program has no business at a sign-in screen. |
stsSvcAcctAllowEst |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.675 |
HTTP Basic at /.well-known/est (RFC 7030 section 3.2.3). Off, a service account’s right password is refused there as a wrong one is. |
stsSvcAcctAllowKerberos |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.676 |
An AS-REQ whose pre-authentication proves the password’s key (RFC 4120), and MS-KKDCP. Off, a service account’s right password is refused there as a wrong one is. |
stsSvcAcctAllowLdapBind |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.677 |
A bind on 389 or 636 (RFC 4513). Off, a service account’s right password is refused there as a wrong one is. |
stsSvcAcctAllowPasswordGrant |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.678 |
grant_type=password at the token endpoint (RFC 6749 section 4.3), where the realm allows the grant at all. Off, a service account’s right password is refused there as a wrong one is. |
stsSvcAcctAllowScim |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.679 |
HTTP Basic at /scim/v2 (RFC 7617). Off, a service account’s right password is refused there as a wrong one is. |
stsSvcAcctAllowSsf |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.680 |
HTTP Basic at the /ssf endpoints (RFC 7617). Off, a service account’s right password is refused there as a wrong one is. |
stsSvcAcctAllowWsTrust |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.681 |
A WS-Security UsernameToken sent to the security token service. Off, a service account’s right password is refused there as a wrong one is. |
stsSvcAcctExemptFromSecondFactor |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.682 |
OFF BY DEFAULT. On, the authentication policy’s second-factor requirements do not apply to a service account in this realm, and nor does the refusal of a password alone at the password doors (#101). The account’s amr still says pwd only, so a relying party asking for more is refused it. WEAKER: an account on a password alone is an account anyone with the password is. |
stsSvcAcctGeneratedLength |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.683 |
Drawn by the password policy’s generator, so it meets that policy, and never shorter than its minimum length. |
stsSvcAcctRequireOwner |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.684 |
ON BY DEFAULT. The owner — a person or a group in this realm — is who answers for the account; a service account cannot be saved without one while this is on. |
stsSvcAcctRotationAlarmFailures |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.685 |
A failed rotation is retried at the job’s next run. After this many in a row the account is reported on Monitoring → Service accounts and logged as an alarm (STS-SVCACCT-0042). |
stsSvcAcctRotationEnabled |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.686 |
OFF BY DEFAULT. On, the service-accounts.rotate job gives every service account that names a push destination a new generated password each interval: pushed to the destination FIRST, its hash committed only after the push succeeds, the previous password kept for the overlap below. A failed push changes nothing. Cannot be turned on while this realm has no push destination. |
stsSvcAcctRotationIntervalDays |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.687 |
How long a service account’s password is kept before the job replaces it, counted from the last rotation (or the account’s last password change). |
stsSvcAcctRotationOverlapMinutes |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.688 |
After a rotation the previous password is accepted for this long, so a consumer slow to read the new one is not refused — nor counted by risk scoring as guessing (#226). The previous Kerberos keys are kept as long. 0: the old password stops at once. |
Role
TypeSpec model Role.
Container ou=roles.
Recorded in ./roles.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsRole |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.17 |
structural | top | One ROLE. The entry is named by the role name (cn=staff), and everything on it is MEMBERSHIP — who holds the role. What a role is REQUIRED for lives on the application entry that requires it, in appRequiredRole, because that is a fact about the application rather than about the role. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
What the role is for, for the next person. |
displayName |
one | RFC | 2.16.840.1.113730.3.1.241 |
An optional name for people to read (#93). The role’s NAME is still what a token carries, what a requirement names and what the register is keyed on; this is only its label on the console and the API. Its stable id is the entry’s entryUUID, kept across every edit. |
owner |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.32 |
A person or a group of this realm who answers for the role (#604), by DN — RFC 4519 section 2.23’s attribute, as a group’s owners are (#603). Multi-valued, at most 25. Since #607 an owner may ADMINISTER the role through /admin-api with owner:read and owner:write (OWNER_READ, OWNER_WRITE), within what the access-control policy’s owner rule allows; an owner holds the role itself only by being a member. The user portal lists what a person owns. |
roleAllowedMemberType |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.332 |
WHO MAY HOLD this role (#93): user (people, directly or through a group) and application (an application as itself). Multi-valued; absent, both may — every role written before it. A member of a kind the role does not allow is refused when the role is written. The two console roles cannot be restricted: the roster grants their people and the seed their application. |
roleApplication |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.333 |
The ONE application this role belongs to (#310), by its identifier in ou=applications; absent, the role is realm-wide. An application’s role is named <role>@<application> in the register, so two applications may each have a reader; a token or assertion for that application carries it as <role>, and no other application’s token carries it at all. The application’s appRequiredRole may name it by <role>. |
roleConferredBy |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.334 |
A client this role is CONFERRED BY (#454): every person who signs in through that client holds the role on the access token the client is issued, and on no other token. Multi-valued, client_ids of applications in this realm. A role held this way is a fact about the TOKEN rather than about the person, so it is mixed with the roles the person holds themselves on every call, and taking a client off it takes the role off that client’s tokens at once. Never applied to a client’s own client_credentials token, whose roles are its membership. ADMIN_CONSOLE is seeded conferred by sts-admin-console. |
roleMemberApplication |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.335 |
An application that holds this role AS ITSELF — what a client_credentials grant is decided on, where there is no person. Multi-valued. NOT the same relation as appRequiredRole on the application entry, which is what that application DEMANDS of others. |
roleMemberGroup |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.336 |
A group whose every member holds this role. Multi-valued. Resolved at DECISION TIME rather than expanded on write, so an ldapmodify adding somebody to the group changes the very next token. |
roleMemberUser |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.337 |
A username that holds this role. Multi-valued. The person need not exist yet — this service creates a directory entry for any name on first sight, so a role may be granted before its holder has ever signed in. |
roleName |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.338 |
The role name, which is also the cn. Carried explicitly as well so that a reader who has only the attributes has the name. |
rolePermission |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.339 |
A permission a holder of this role may be ISSUED (#303). Multi-valued. Named as a client asks for it: a generic application permission by its full scope value — the resource application’s oauthPermissionBaseUri followed by the name — and a native permission of this service by its own name (admin:read, admin:write). It matters only for a permission its resource application GATES (oauthRoleGatedPermission); a gated permission is issued only to a subject holding a role that names it, and an ungated one as it always was. |
stsOwnerProtected |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.590 |
TRUE: the role’s owners may not administer it through /admin-api (#607), whatever they own — an administrator’s mark, read by the access-control policy’s owner rule as urn:sts:xacml:object-protected. Absent is FALSE. |
Secrets destination
TypeSpec model SecretsDestination.
Container ou=applications.
Recorded in projection:application.
An application entry that has these attributes set.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
applicationProcess |
RFC | 2.5.6.11 |
structural | top | The one REGISTERED object class that fits an application. It brings cn, description, seeAlso, ou and l — so the NAME of an application here is a standard attribute even though nothing else about it can be. |
stsApplication |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.3 |
auxiliary | top | INVENTED, because no registered LDAP schema has a client_id, a set of redirect URIs, an entityID or a service principal name. Every product that stores OAuth clients keeps them in its own database rather than in a directory, so there was nothing to borrow. These are this service’s own names in the way x509subject and didSubject already are. |
top |
RFC | 2.5.6.0 |
abstract | The abstract class every entry carries. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
appIdentifier |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.34 |
THE KEY: the identifier exactly as the protocol presented it. The entry’s own cn may be a digest of it where it is too long to be a readable RDN, so this is the attribute to search on — the same arrangement didSubject has on a DID-named person. From every protocol. |
secretDestCaCertificates |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.418 |
Families: secret-destination. vault: the PEM certificates of the CA the Vault listener chains to, trusted beside the public roots. Certificates are public; the certificate is always verified. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestCredential |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.419 |
Secret. Families: secret-destination. THE DESTINATION’S WRITE CREDENTIAL, which may write versions of named secrets and should be able to do nothing else: aws, a JSON {“accessKeyId”, “secretAccessKey”[, “sessionToken”]}; gcp, a service account key file’s JSON; azure, a JSON {“tenantId”, “clientId”, “clientSecret”}; vault, a token. Separate from the read-only credentials this service reads its own key-encryption key and database password with. Sealed with the key-encryption key when keys persist, WITHHELD from every page, /admin-api reply and directory read, and never logged. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestDirectory |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.420 |
Families: secret-destination. file (DEVELOPMENT MODE ONLY): the absolute directory a secret name is a file in. The file must already exist; a name that leaves the directory is refused. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestEndpoint |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.421 |
Families: secret-destination. azure: the vault URL (https:// |
secretDestField |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.422 |
Families: secret-destination. vault, with the password payload: the field of the version the password is written to; value when empty, which is the field this service’s own Vault reads default to. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestMount |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.423 |
Families: secret-destination. vault: where the KV version 2 engine is mounted; secret when empty. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestPayload |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.424 |
Families: secret-destination. WHAT A PUSH WRITES: password (the bare password, the default) or json — {“username”, “password”, “realm”, “rotatedAt”}, the object a reader takes the password out of by its field, as this service’s own secret reads do (keys.kekField and the like). In Vault, whose versions are maps, password writes the one field secretDestField names. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestProject |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.425 |
Families: secret-destination. gcp: the project a short secret name is in, so that a service account names its secret as sts-svc-backup rather than projects/ |
secretDestProvider |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.426 |
Families: secret-destination. WHICH SECRETS MANAGER THIS DESTINATION IS: aws (Secrets Manager, PutSecretValue), gcp (Secret Manager, AddSecretVersion), azure (Key Vault, setSecret), vault (a HashiCorp Vault or OpenBao KV version 2 engine, a write with check-and-set) or file (development mode only). A key management service is not a destination: it stores keys, not secrets. From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
secretDestRegion |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.427 |
Families: secret-destination. aws: the AWS region the secrets are in (us-east-1). From Directory → Secret destinations, the console, or by hand. |
Service account
TypeSpec model ServiceAccount.
Container ou=users.
Recorded in ./service_accounts.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsServiceAccount |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.18 |
structural | top | AUXILIARY. This service’s class for a SERVICE ACCOUNT: a person entry used by a program, governed by the realm’s service-account policy (ou=serviceAccountPolicies) (#221). |
This model lists no attributes.
Service account on a person
TypeSpec model ServiceAccountOnPerson.
These attributes live on the person, not on this entry.
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
stsOwnerProtected |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.590 |
TRUE: the account’s owners may not administer it through /admin-api (#607) — an administrator’s mark, read by the access-control policy’s owner rule. Absent is FALSE. |
stsPasswordRotatedAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.624 |
When the password was last rotated (GeneralizedTime). |
stsPreviousPassword |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.637 |
Secret. The previous password’s scrypt hash, accepted until stsPreviousPasswordExpires. Withheld from every read. |
stsPreviousPasswordExpires |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.638 |
When the previous password stops being accepted (ms since the epoch). |
stsRotationFailures |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.658 |
Consecutive failed rotations, reset by a success. |
stsRotationLastAttempt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.659 |
When the rotation job last tried this account (ms). |
stsRotationLastError |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.660 |
The error code of the last failed rotation. |
stsSecretDestination |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.665 |
The DN of the application entry (a push destination) a rotated password is written to. |
stsSecretName |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.666 |
The name or path of the secret at that destination. It must already exist: a push never creates one. |
stsServiceAccount |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.668 |
TRUE on a service account. Absent: an ordinary person. Asked through common/service_accounts.ts’s isServiceAccount(), never read directly. |
stsServiceAccountOwner |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.669 |
The DN of a person or group answerable for the account; one value per owner. |
stsServiceAccountPolicy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.670 |
The named service-account policy that governs this account (#1240): default or a policy in ou=serviceAccountPolicies of this realm. Absent is default. Only a service account may hold it, and it is cleared with stsServiceAccount. |
Signer trust anchor
TypeSpec model SignerTrustAnchor.
Container ou=signerTrustAnchors.
Held in the catalogue. No SCHEMA module.
One entry per signer truststore anchor.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsSignerTrustAnchor |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.20 |
structural | top | This service’s class for this register. |
top |
RFC | 2.5.6.0 |
abstract | The abstract class every entry carries. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
stsSignerTrustAnchorKind |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.672 |
anchor, intermediate or accepted: what the certificate is in a path this store builds. Absent is anchor. |
stsSignerTrustAnchorPurpose |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.673 |
A use the certificate is trusted for, one per value. An entry naming no purpose serves every one. |
stsTrustAnchorAddedBy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.690 |
Who added the certificate, from the console or the management API; empty where nobody is recorded. |
stsTrustAnchorCertificate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.691 |
The certificate, PEM. A third party’s certificate relied on under a signature, as an encryption recipient or in an attestation may chain to it, in this realm only. |
stsTrustAnchorFingerprint |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.692 |
The certificate’s SHA-256 fingerprint, which also names the entry. |
SPIFFE
TypeSpec model Spiffe.
Container ou=spiffe.
Recorded in ../spiffe/spiffe_registry.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
applicationProcess |
RFC | 2.5.6.11 |
structural | top | The one REGISTERED class that fits: it brings cn and description, so the NAME of a registration entry is a standard attribute even though nothing else about it can be. The same class ou=applications uses, for the same reason. |
spiffeAgent |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.1 |
auxiliary | top | INVENTED, for the same reason, on the entries under ou=agents. |
spiffeRegistrationEntry |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.2 |
auxiliary | top | INVENTED. No registered LDAP schema has a SPIFFE ID, a parent ID or a selector — SPIRE keeps its entries in SQL and nothing else keeps them anywhere — so there was nothing to borrow. |
top |
RFC | 2.5.6.0 |
abstract | The abstract class every entry carries. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
cn |
one | RFC | 2.5.4.3 |
The RDN value: the entry id. From this registry. |
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
One line saying where this entry came from. From this registry. |
spiffeAdmin |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.428 |
TRUE where the holder may call the SPIRE Server API’s administrative methods — entries, agents, bundles, federation relationships, minting an SVID — over mutual TLS. ENFORCED in both modes: the server API makes a caller admin when an unexpired entry for its identity carries this flag or spiffe.adminIds names it, and refuses those methods to a remote caller that is neither (the private Unix socket’s local caller is the other way in). Read on every call, so a change applies to the next one. From the caller. |
spiffeAgentBanned |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.429 |
TRUE where BanAgent was called. A banned agent is REFUSED at AttestAgent and RenewAgent — one of the few refusals in this service — because an unbannable agent makes the ban button a lie. From this registry. |
spiffeAgentCanReattest |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.430 |
Whether the attestor can be run again without an operator. Reported to the agent, which decides what to do about it. From the agent. |
spiffeAgentExpiresAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.431 |
When that SVID expires, as seconds since the epoch. From this registry. |
spiffeAgentId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.432 |
THE KEY of an agent entry: the agent’s own SPIFFE ID, always under the reserved /spire/agent path. From the agent. |
spiffeAgentSelector |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.433 |
The selectors the attestation produced. Invented from what the agent sent, for the same reason. From the agent. |
spiffeAgentSvidHash |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.434 |
SHA-256 over the DER of the agent’s current SVID, which is what spire.api.types.Agent carries and how an operator tells two agents with one identity apart. From this registry. |
spiffeAttestations |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.436 |
How many times it has attested or renewed. ASSIGNED, not accumulated. From this registry. |
spiffeAttestationType |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.435 |
The node attestor that verified the agent — join_token, and the other types a realm names in spiffe.nodeAttestors. A type no attestor here verifies is refused at AttestAgent, never recorded. From the agent. |
spiffeCreatedAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.437 |
GeneralizedTime. Beside the entry’s own createTimestamp because the SPIRE Server API publishes created_at as a number and a reader should be able to see both are the same moment. From this registry. |
spiffeDnsName |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.440 |
DNS subjectAltNames added to the SVID beside the SPIFFE ID. What makes an SVID usable by TLS software that checks a hostname and cannot read a SPIFFE ID. From the caller. |
spiffeDownstream |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.441 |
TRUE where the holder is a downstream SPIRE server that may ask for an intermediate CA (NewDownstreamX509CA) and publish a JWT or WIT authority. ENFORCED in both modes: those methods are refused to a caller no unexpired entry marks downstream, and the flag grants nothing else. From the caller. |
spiffeEntryExpiresAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.442 |
When the ENTRY itself stops applying, as seconds since the epoch. Different from an SVID lifetime: this retires the registration. An expired entry is kept and reported as expired rather than deleted, because an entry that vanished is indistinguishable from one nobody created. From the caller. |
spiffeEntryId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.443 |
THE KEY: the entry id, which is what the SPIRE Server API calls id and what BatchUpdateEntry and BatchDeleteEntry name. Generated here as 32 hex characters and never reused. The entry’s own cn is a shortened form of it, so this is the attribute to search on — the arrangement appIdentifier already has one container over. From this registry. |
spiffeFederatesWith |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.444 |
Trust domain names whose bundles are handed to a workload holding this identity — X509SVIDResponse.federated_bundles. A name with no bundle here is recorded and simply contributes nothing, because a federation relationship configured before the bundle arrives is the ordinary order of events. From the caller. |
spiffeFirstSeen |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.445 |
GeneralizedTime, when this agent first attested. From this registry. |
spiffeHint |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.446 |
The operator’s guidance when a workload gets more than one SVID — internal, external. Passed through to the Workload API verbatim; nothing here reads it. From the caller. |
spiffeId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.447 |
THE IDENTITY THIS ENTRY GRANTS — the SPIFFE ID a matching workload is issued. Refused if it is not a valid SPIFFE ID, if it belongs to another trust domain, or if it is under the reserved /spire path. From the caller. |
spiffeJwtSvidTtl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.448 |
The same for JWT-SVIDs. Absent or 0 means spiffe.jwtSvidTtl. From the caller. |
spiffeLastSeen |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.449 |
GeneralizedTime, the most recent time. From this registry. |
spiffeLastSvidAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.450 |
GeneralizedTime, the most recent issuance against it. From this registry. |
spiffeOrigin |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.451 |
How this entry got here: seed, console, api, grpc, auto (invented for a workload that matched nothing) or ldap. What tells an invented entry from one somebody meant. From this registry. |
spiffeParentId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.452 |
WHO MAY ISSUE IT: the SPIFFE ID of the agent (or of this server) that this entry hangs beneath. It decides which entries GetAuthorizedEntries and SyncAuthorizedEntries tell an agent about: those beneath its own SPIFFE ID or a node alias its selectors match, and BatchNewX509SVID and NewJWTSVID refuse an agent any other entry. From the caller. |
spiffeRevisionNumber |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.454 |
Incremented on every change. The SPIRE Server API publishes it and an agent uses it to tell “the entry I hold is current” from “I hold an entry”. From this registry. |
spiffeSelector |
several | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.456 |
One value per selector, written type:value — unix:uid:1000, k8s:ns:default, docker:label:app:web. The type is everything before the FIRST colon and the value is the whole rest, colons included, which is why they are stored as one string rather than as a pair: splitting on every colon is how docker:label:app:web becomes a selector nobody wrote. From the caller. |
spiffeStoreSvid |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.457 |
TRUE where the SVID is to be written to an SVID store plugin rather than handed to the workload. Recorded and not acted on — this service has no store plugins. From the caller. |
spiffeSvidsIssued |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.459 |
How many SVIDs have been issued against this entry. ASSIGNED on every change — a counter that accumulated values would be nonsense — and a live number in a directory entry, which a real directory would not hold. From this registry. |
spiffeX509SvidTtl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.462 |
The lifetime in seconds of the X509-SVIDs this entry produces. Absent or 0 means spiffe.svidTtl. From the caller. |
Trust anchor
TypeSpec model TrustAnchor.
Container ou=trustAnchors.
Held in the catalogue. No SCHEMA module.
One entry per client truststore anchor, in the default realm.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stsTrustAnchor |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.21 |
structural | top | This service’s class for this register. |
top |
RFC | 2.5.6.0 |
abstract | The abstract class every entry carries. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
stsTrustAnchorAddedBy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.690 |
Who added the anchor, from the console or the management API; empty where nobody is recorded. |
stsTrustAnchorCertificate |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.691 |
The anchor’s certificate, PEM. A client certificate presented at a TLS handshake may chain to it. |
stsTrustAnchorFingerprint |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.692 |
The certificate’s SHA-256 fingerprint, which also names the entry. |
XACML policy enforcement point
TypeSpec model XacmlPep.
Container ou=peps.
Recorded in ../xacml/xacml_pep_registry.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
xacmlPep |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.22 |
structural | top | One remote Policy Enforcement Point that has registered with this Policy Decision Point. THE ROW IS A RECORD AND NOT A PERMISSION — a PEP that never registers can still pull the repository and enforce. What a row buys is a place on the console and an address for the change nudge. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
Whatever the PEP said about itself when it registered. |
xacmlPepAllowed |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.722 |
How many of those it ALLOWED. Beside the decision count rather than derived from it, because the difference between them is what the bias and the obligation rule actually did. |
xacmlPepAuthenticated |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.723 |
“TRUE” when the registration arrived on a connection carrying a client certificate, “FALSE” when xacml.pepRequireCertificate was off and it did not. NOT hidden and not conflated: an unauthenticated registration is a row that proved nothing, and the console says so on the row rather than in a footnote. |
xacmlPepBias |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.724 |
The bias the remote PEP reports it is running with. REPORTED BY IT, never set from here: it is the PEP’s own configuration (PEP_BIAS), and a control that appeared to set it would silently do nothing. |
xacmlPepCertificateSubject |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.725 |
The full subject of the client certificate the registration arrived on. Held whole beside the DN because the DN is the LEAF and this is what was actually presented. |
xacmlPepDecisions |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.726 |
Decisions the remote PEP reports having MADE, cumulatively. Its own count, in its own process — this service did not see them, and that is the point of a remote PEP. |
xacmlPepEnabled |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.727 |
“TRUE” or “FALSE”. A disabled PEP keeps its row and its counters and is not nudged. It does NOT stop enforcing, and the console says so — nothing here can reach into another process and turn it off. |
xacmlPepHostname |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.758 |
The hostname the remote PEP reports on its registration and heartbeat (#1760): the HOSTNAME environment variable, else the kernel’s, else /etc/hostname — the name the container is known by on its network, and the one it derives its notify URL from when its HTTPS listener certificate names it. Held to a DNS name of at most 253 characters, lower-cased, never an IP address; a registration or heartbeat carrying anything else is refused (STS-XACML-0261). The realm’s default listener certificate names it beside the PEP’s registered name and its notify host. A registration without it drops it, a heartbeat without it keeps it. Absent on a PEP older than this, whose certificate names are as before. |
xacmlPepIdentity |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.728 |
The DN certificatePlan() names this certificate’s identity with. NO ENTRY IS CREATED THERE by a registration — the naming rule is reused, not the entry creation, because a PEP is a component and ou=users counts people. |
xacmlPepLastNotify |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.729 |
What happened to the last nudge — the status, or the refusal sentence — when this entry was last written. A nudge’s outcome is not written here (#1882): the newest is kept in the PEP’s liveness record beside the entry (xacml_pep_registry.liveness), and the console shows the later of the two. This service is the only one that records a failed nudge, for the reason ssf_streams.js gives about a refused push: it is invisible from the receiving end by definition. |
xacmlPepLastSeen |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.730 |
The last heartbeat or pull when this entry was last written. A heartbeat that changes nothing durable is not written here (#1882): it, the counters, the signal health and the last nudge are kept beside the entry, and the console shows the later of the two. xacml.pepStaleAfterS is how long since the last one before the console says “stale” — which changes nothing this service does, deliberately. |
xacmlPepListeners |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.756 |
The listeners an administrator defined for this remote PEP on its console page or with the set-pep-listener action of the management API (#1760), beyond the four its environment binds: one JSON array, each listener its id, protocol (http or https), purpose (api or proxy), address and port, and for an HTTPS one the DNS names and IP addresses its certificate carries, its key algorithm and a renewal counter. Validated whole on write and again when the PEP pulls them from GET /xacml/pep/settings, which binds and unbinds them while it runs. The PEP generates each HTTPS listener’s key and asks POST /xacml/pep/listener-certificate for its certificate, so no private key is ever here. Kept across a registration and a heartbeat; removed with the row. |
xacmlPepListenersInUse |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.757 |
What the remote PEP last reported, on a heartbeat, about every listener it has (#1760), its environment’s four and the defined ones: one JSON document of { listeners: [ { id, source, protocol, purpose, address, port, state, reason, renew, certificate } ] }, with when it arrived. The state is one of listening, waiting, failed and off and the reason one of a closed set, never the operating system’s text; the certificate is the subject, issuer, serial, subjectAltName, validity and fingerprint of the one it serves. Every other member is dropped. A heartbeat without it keeps it, one with null clears it, and a registration drops it. Absent on a PEP older than the listeners, which the console draws as not reported. |
xacmlPepNotifyUrl |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.731 |
Where to POST the change nudge, if the PEP gave one. THE NUDGE IS NEVER THE MECHANISM — a PEP pulls on its own interval and converges without this — so an absent, refused or unreachable URL costs latency and nothing else. |
xacmlPepPolicyCount |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.732 |
How many policies the PEP says it loaded from that pull. A count that disagrees with this repository’s is the signature of a PEP that pulled successfully and then refused a document. |
xacmlPepProxy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.752 |
The reverse-proxy configuration the remote PEP pulls from GET /xacml/pep/proxy (#1760): one JSON document — enabled, the upstream application’s base URL, the public base URL a browser reaches the proxy at, the timeouts and the ordered route table, each route with its path, methods, authentication mechanisms, the application in the realm’s registry it fronts, and XACML resource and action. Written by the set-pep-proxy action of the console and the management API, validated whole there and again when the pull is built, so a value an ldapmodify wrote that does not validate is pulled as configured: false. Kept across a registration and a heartbeat; removed with the row. |
xacmlPepRefused |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.733 |
How many it REFUSED, including Permits refused for an obligation it could not discharge (section 7.2). |
xacmlPepRegisteredAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.734 |
When this PEP first registered. Kept across a re-registration, because a component that restarts hourly is a fact worth seeing and an entry whose age reset on every restart could never show it. |
xacmlPepResource |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.735 |
What the remote PEP says it is guarding. Free text from the PEP, shown as its own claim about itself. |
xacmlPepSettings |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.754 |
The settings an administrator set for this remote PEP on its console page or with the set-pep-settings action of the management API (#1760): one JSON document holding only the settings that were set, each by its member name (description, resource, notifyUrl, bias, pip, the poll, heartbeat and back-off intervals, the timeout and body bound, the HTTPS reload interval, the log level, the AuthZEN switch, identifier and forward timeout, and the reverse proxy’s session, JWKS, upstream, relying-party and signal-stream bounds), validated whole on write and again when the PEP pulls them from GET /xacml/pep/settings. A setting not in it is the PEP’s environment variable, or its default. The minimum the PEP needs to connect the first time is never here. Kept across a registration and a heartbeat; removed with the row. |
xacmlPepSettingsInUse |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.755 |
What the remote PEP last reported, on a heartbeat, having in force for each managed setting (#1760): one JSON document of { token, values: { setting: { value, source } } }, the source service, environment or default, with when it arrived. Every setting the table does not name, every value not of its setting’s type and every other source is dropped. A heartbeat without it keeps it, one with null clears it, and a registration drops it. Absent on a PEP older than the settings, which the console draws as not reported. |
xacmlPepSignals |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.753 |
The reverse proxy’s CAEP/RISC signal-stream health as the remote PEP last reported it on a heartbeat (#1760): one JSON document of counts and ages only — the receivers, how many are healthy and stale, the stale threshold and poll interval, the oldest last-success age, the most failures in a row, the SETs accepted and refused, the sessions ended, and the library session stores’ held, max, TTL, evicted and expired — with when it arrived, and, from a PEP that reports them, one row per stream: the OIDC client it serves and its stream id, each held to a charset, whether it runs and is healthy, when it started, last polled and last succeeded (computed here from the ages the PEP sent and the arrival, never a clock of the PEP’s), and its counters. Every other member is dropped and every value that is not a non-negative integer is 0, so no URL or error text is ever held. A heartbeat without it keeps it, one with null clears it, and a registration drops it, since a registration is a new process. Absent on a PEP that never reported it, which the console draws as not reported. |
xacmlPepSyncToken |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.736 |
The repository digest this PEP last reported holding. Compared against syncToken() to decide whether it is CURRENT, so that being up to date is something this service works out rather than something the PEP asserts. |
xacmlPepThumbprint |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.737 |
RFC 8705 x5t#S256 of that certificate — the SHA-256 of its DER, base64url. The same computation the token endpoint binds a certificate-bound access token with, through the same function, so the two spellings cannot drift. |
xacmlPepUndischargeable |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.738 |
How many of those refusals were an undischargeable obligation on a Permit. Counted separately because it is the one enforcement outcome that looks like a bug from the client side and is the specification working. |
xacmlPepVersion |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.739 |
What the remote PEP says it is. Free text. |
XACML policy enforcement point cluster
TypeSpec model XacmlPepCluster.
Container ou=pepClusters.
Recorded in ../xacml/xacml_pep_clusters.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
xacmlPepCluster |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.24 |
structural | top | A logical cluster of remote Policy Enforcement Points that share one configuration (#1760): the reverse proxy, the managed settings and the listener definitions are held here once, and every member pulls them as its own. A member differs only in its name and its addresses. Membership is held here, so a PEP may be listed before it registers, and a PEP belongs to at most one cluster. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
What an administrator said about the cluster when creating it. |
xacmlPepClusterListeners |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.762 |
The listeners defined for every member of the cluster (#1760): the PEP’s own array (xacmlPepListeners), validated by the same grammar. A member may override a listener’s address and port and add DNS names to its certificate; each member’s certificate is its own, issued for its own key. Written by the set-pep-cluster-listener and remove-pep-cluster-listener actions. |
xacmlPepClusterMembers |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.763 |
The cluster’s members (#1760): one JSON array of { pep, publicBaseUrl, notifyUrl, listeners: { |
xacmlPepClusterProxy |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.760 |
The reverse-proxy configuration every member of the cluster pulls from GET /xacml/pep/proxy (#1760): the PEP’s own document (xacmlPepProxy), validated by the same grammar, its routes’ generated policies named pepc- |
xacmlPepClusterSettings |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.761 |
The managed settings every member of the cluster pulls from GET /xacml/pep/settings (#1760): the PEP’s own document (xacmlPepSettings), validated by the same table, except the notify URL, which is a member’s address and is set on the member. Written by the set-pep-cluster-settings action. |
XACML policy
TypeSpec model XacmlPolicy.
Container ou=policies.
Recorded in ../xacml/xacml_store.
| Class | Origin | OID | Kind | Superior | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
xacmlPolicy |
this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.2.23 |
structural | top | One XACML 3.0 Policy or PolicySet, stored as the document it was authored as. THIS CONTAINER IS THE POLICY REPOSITORY — an ldapmodify of xacmlPolicyDocument here changes what the PDP decides on the next request. |
| Attribute | Values | Origin | OID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
description |
several | RFC | 2.5.4.13 |
The document’s own |
xacmlApplication |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.716 |
The identifier of the application that OWNS this policy, which decides the details of that application’s authorization_details types. Such a policy is never the root, is never reached by a PolicyIdReference from the root, and is never sent to a remote PEP. |
xacmlCombiningAlgId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.717 |
The rule- or policy-combining algorithm the document names. Derived, and shown on the console because it is the single most consequential line in a policy. |
xacmlEnabled |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.718 |
“TRUE” or “FALSE”. A disabled policy stays in the repository and is not evaluated. NOT derived — it is the one thing here that is a fact about the deployment rather than about the document, which is why it is an attribute rather than a comment in the XML. |
xacmlIsRoot |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.719 |
“TRUE” on the policy the PDP starts from. A repository with no root decides nothing and says so; a repository with two is refused at write time rather than picking one. |
xacmlKind |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.720 |
“Policy” or “PolicySet”. Derived. |
xacmlOrphanedAt |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.721 |
When the owning application was deleted. The policy is kept, disabled, for audit, until an administrator removes it. |
xacmlPepRoute |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.759 |
The remote PEP and route, as the PEP’s name, a slash and the route’s id, this policy was GENERATED for by the route’s Authorization choice (simple or public) on the reverse-proxy route forms or by the generate-pep-route-policy action (#1760). Such a policy is rewritten when the route is saved, renamed with the route and removed with it; it is never the root. It may be edited in the policy editor, and the next save of the route’s simple or public choice writes it again — choose an existing policy on the route to keep a hand-written one. |
xacmlPolicyDocument |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.740 |
The XACML 3.0 XML. THIS IS THE POLICY. Everything else on the entry is derived from it. |
xacmlPolicyId |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.741 |
The PolicyId or PolicySetId inside the document. DERIVED at write time and used for listing and for resolving a PolicyIdReference; the document is the truth. |
xacmlVersion |
one | this service | 1.3.6.1.4.1.67607.1.1.742 |
The Version attribute of the document. Derived. |