THE TRANSITED-POLICY CHECK (RFC 4120 sections 2.7 and 3.3.3.2), asked
by the KDC before it issues anything from a cross-realm TGT, and before
it refers anybody onward. The path is the client's realm, the realms in
transited, and the realm that issued the presented ticket; this realm
accepts it only through an ENABLED record holding an INCOMING key from
that issuer, and:
a NON-TRANSITIVE record accepts the partner's own people only — the
client's realm is the issuer and nothing was transited;
a transitive one accepts every realm on the path that is inside the
record's namespace (the partner, or under one of its routed
suffixes), and none that is this realm (a loop);
an elided-hierarchy entry (,,) is refused: a record names
partners, not a hierarchy;
referring ONWARD needs a transitive record too — a non-transitive
trust is not a way through — and the crossings so far, plus the one
being made, may not pass krb5.maxReferralHops.
Parameters
path: any
{ crealm, issuer, transited, onward, ourRealm }, with
transited as decodeTransited() answers it
THE TRANSITED-POLICY CHECK (RFC 4120 sections 2.7 and 3.3.3.2), asked by the KDC before it issues anything from a cross-realm TGT, and before it refers anybody onward. The path is the client's realm, the realms in
transited, and the realm that issued the presented ticket; this realm accepts it only through an ENABLED record holding an INCOMING key from that issuer, and:,,) is refused: a record names partners, not a hierarchy;krb5.maxReferralHops.