Snake-case fields, optionally with expires_in (seconds).
Optionalclaims: Record<string, any>
The validated identity of the resource owner.
The access rights the token carries (RFC 9635 section 8).
The access token's value.
The token was issued with the bearer flag: no key proof is sent with it.
Who the resource owner is, as this client validated it: iss and sub from an iss_sub subject
identifier (or an opaque one, with the grant endpoint as iss), uid (their username) and
account from an account one, and the profile claims of an id_token assertion when one was
verified.
Continuation (section 5): { uri, access_token: { value }, wait? }.
Epoch seconds when the access token expires.
The access token's flags (RFC 9635 section 3.2.1).
The grant endpoint that issued it.
The grant's id: the last path segment of the continuation URI.
The instance_id the AS handed this client instance (section 3.5), if any.
Epoch seconds when the access token was issued.
The thumbprint of the client key the token is bound to.
The token's label, when a multiple-token request named one.
Token management (section 6): { uri, access_token: { value } }.
The subject information as the AS returned it: sub_ids, assertions, updated_at.
Always "GNAP": the Authorization scheme the token is presented with.
Whether the access token can be rotated (it carries a management URI).
Skew to apply for early rotation, capped at half the token lifetime so short-lived tokens aren't considered expired the moment they're issued.
Seconds until the access token expires.
StaticfromOptionalskewSec: number = 0
Treat the token as expired this many seconds early (see effectiveSkew).
The session ids iya-sts names this grant by in a CAEP session-revoked: gnap-grant:<grant id>, and
gnap-token:<jti> when the access token is a JWT. The jti is read from the token without verifying
it; it is only ever compared with the session named in a SET whose signature was verified.
What a GNAP grant gave this client: one access token, how to manage it, how to continue the grant, and who the resource owner is. Serializable with
toJSON()/GrantSet.from().The access token is bound to the client key (it is presented as
Authorization: GNAP <value>with an HTTP message signature) unlessbeareris true.